CMOC Meeting 1700 10JUN00 (Group Outliner)

1. Lessons Learned - 10JUN00
Each Agency has different priorities and needs - at the operational planning phase - we need to identify the phases and priorities and the ACTUAL ACTUAL time lines. {#8}

Would like to have water tight tents {#9}

With arrival ashore the only thing that is for sure is nothing is a given. {#10}

There needs to be more concise communication about the technologies that will be used in these types of exercises {#11}

Before  introducing new tools and technologies - it is better to gain consensus first. {#12}

Confusion about Coordination meeting between various meetings at the CMOC, Capitol, & Local Govt.  Need Poted agreed to schedule {#13}

Would like to have more lights both on the CMOC campsite as well as in the tents {#14}

The ability to determine what is going to happen in an unsure situation is incressed by experance. {#15}

There have been a number of issues regrading the size of the tents available for each group...why is the experimental tent as large as the CMOC? {#16}

scheduled meetings need to take place as planned and if the scheduled time changes, all concerned need to be informed (central board) {#17}

In the CMOC tent we should have better lighting {#18}

need for better coordination and info exchange. {#19}

The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs. {#20}

Review and confirm plans for the registration and initial care of the refugees at least 24 hours in advance {#21}

Meeting times and locations need to be posted...there has been to much confusion {#22}

Flexibility and patients have been exceptional by all parties.  THe key to good communications is courtesty and desire to do the right thing. {#23}

a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual {#24}

UN needs to be clearer about what it is doing when not visible/on site {#25}

To get in front of the problem we need to be better at identifying what are the most likely problems that will be encountered. {#26}

Number of observors seems superior in some meetings to number of reel players. {#27}

Getting power up and running to a few key areas ASAP needed to be done vice trying to do it for the whole camp {#28}

dust protected accomodations. {#29}

The exercise control group needs a more robust cell - perhaps with an NGO? {#30}

Just like in real life it is difficult to build a little town on a tropical island from scratch.  Patience with the various parts of the Combat Service Support Detachment is appreciated.  When you look around outside there are a bunch of very hard working young men and women doing the best they can. {#31}

Need to sppeed up UN operational planning process without compromising the consensus discussions required and need to reach common agreement on objectives , priorities and actions {#32}

From the military, received good, fast response on camp logistics requests {#33}

Yesterday when we were on the ground there were no guards at the gate, there was no single camp poc to ask for things like electricity and accomodations, etc.  Some how there should have been more advanced coordination. {#34}

jumping to conclusions to be avoided, i.e. when people are not on site it does not mean they are enjoying the beach life {#35}

Testing systems while we are establishing relationships contribute to more chaos than would normally be encountered. {#36}

There's only a few tent sizes available. {#37}

Lack of CMOC security yesterday was surprising. {#38}

Reality of providing logistical support may not always be provided in the expected manner due to external difficulties. {#39}

UN needs to task better in order to ensure office and accommodation requirements met. {#40}

rain seemed to have come unexpectedly and some of the sleeping equipment is wet. Is somebody checking the weather forecast? {#41}

So far UN team was not given time and space that would normaly been available to discuss strategy and planning. {#42}

The Military and the Civilian communities have different procedures and methods and each feels at an uncomfortable disadvantage when required to conform to the other {#43}

Camp design and configuration must be confirmed and changes must by posted at a central point to avoid confusion {#44}

There are a lot of opportunities to have free flowing discussions with the military. This informal communications adds to understanding eachother. {#45}

The military brought a much smaller security force than they would for a real operation specifically because they were directed to by the exercise planners in order to have everyone be a little more comfortable. {#46}

wooden pallets in the tents are not very stable and could be dangerous. The plastic sheeting when wet becomes slippery and could also pose a danger. {#47}

Understand that the MOC is the center for all logistical support.  If supplies are issued and vehicles dispatched without their knowledge, the CSSE does not have an acurate picture of what is truly available to be issued/used. {#48}

Somehow there needs to be more time for informal meetings together.  To often we mix informal with formal and there is something lost when we do that type of meeting. {#49}

Tests and new developments are very important, yet, the establishment of functional organizations to deal with the issues at hand are as difficult to build as the new tested systems. {#50}

Essential for UN teams to create and follow a meeting schedule which allows time for inter-agency coordination and collaboration. {#51}

The disproportionate human resources available to the military can easily overwhelm the civilian teams. {#52}

This exercise is not being taken as seriously as it should.  I am not saying the military or the UN is not taking it seriously.  Even though we do not have 80,000 refugees it should be treated as such; therefore, we should all train as if this were real life. {#53}

Green Government representation and interaction need to be strengthened to bring more reality to scenario. {#54}

The communications from the CMOC afloat to ashore did not go well and there is still no HF commo between both {#55}

The safety of the actual refugees is paramount.  Seemingly too much attention paid to role-playing and other "exercise" parts of the mission and not enough attention to the actual needs of civilian refugee volunteers under our care. {#56}

Having the electricity in the tents and water running all over the place seems dangerous to me {#57}

it might be useful to have a tent where people can get together for informal discussions, a tent with some chairs and maybe something to drink (water or other), {#58}

Helicopter landing yesterday was poorly organised. Loads of confusion. Does not give confidence {#59}

Several of the hardest working people out here appear to be the ones that are setting up and working on the generators.  We should all be a little patient with them.  Maybe by tommorrow the system will be running better. {#60}

Where are the meal times posted?  Some folks missed the food line because no one knew they were passing out hot meals {#61}

Would like to have a tent where we can sit to eat. {#62}

There needs to be a clearer understanding of who sets up the refugee camp. {#63}

The lines of communcation between the UN and the military needs to be opened a little more.  If the UN needs things done they should be willing and learning who they can go to. {#64}

Building more time into the exercise that would have allowed for more interaction with the participants of the CMOC would have allowed us to establish more creditability with each other. {#65}

better communication between all parties needs to be established and certain problems need to be explained better (i.e. yesterday the helicopter flights were delayed) {#66}

It makes for a lot better stories afterward if it rains on you during an event like this. {#67}

There should be a coffee mess with soda and coffee somewhere for informal conversations. {#68}

The UN team feels that it is  not fully aware of all the research areas being piloted . They feel defensive and put on the spot when asked to accept or agree to participate in experiments which have not been discussed with them {#69}

Lack of real urgency and absence of other usual key partners should be taken into consideration in analysis and evaluation of exercise. {#70}

Much planning has gone into this exercise, from plans for the refugee camp layout, to safety parameters for civilian refugee volunteers, to availability of HLZ on site for medevacs, etc.  These planning documents have been ignored in favor of free flowing role-play. {#71}

Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment? {#72}

It is a basic challenge for the UN to decide how much they would like to depend on the military to provide services/support which will profoundly define the level of the UN services. E.g. if we would have brought our own tents, WE define when the tents go up. If we bring our own generators, WE define when the service is up. It is scary to think that some of our core functions might not be provided because a third party (the military) provides some parts which will directly affect our service level {#73}

There are a lot of comments that fit together about a comfortable lounge inside a tent with a few chairs and coffee, sodas and perhaps a snack available. {#74}

Need road improvements as safety and security priority... as well as for operational and exercise rationality {#75}

The refugee camp should be set up when the notice of refugee are to arrive is given, not wait until they are schedule arrive. {#76}

This operation may have been a bit too ambiguous.  Trying to do civil military cooperation,  humanitian assistance,  equipment  testing  and develp command relationships all in two weeks is creates too many competing  priorities {#77}

At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs. {#78}

CMOC Meeting 1830 12 JUN 00 (Group Outliner)

1. Lessons learned 12JUN00
There seems some confusion on what is exercise control and what is exercise execution. {#3}

Don't forget the attaboys.  Everyone has worked long and hard for the past two days. {#4}

Military has to be prepared to do much more than they expect. {#5}

Refugee role play was excellent and personnel at the camp did well in reacting to the situations thrown at them. {#6}

after visiting the camp this afternoon I got a strong impression that the "refugees" had not been briefed properly on what was in store for them {#7}

The USMC is either expected to do to much or undermaned for this exercise.  These guys are doing a great job but they are killing themselves and their equipment. {#8}

Marines were very patient and friendly with refugees. {#9}

At least for the technical stuff, the military goes out of their way to please the UN. {#10}

In some cases, particularly where cross border displaced persons are concerned, the initial interview should be done in private so that the information given is not overheard by other people. {#11}

Identity  if items ACTUAL ACTUAL vs Exercise interjects- need to clarify the distinction -especially on 'open' comm systems {#12}

MP Guard are silent heros, doing and excellent job and should be commend. {#13}

UN should be present earlier in the camp (like 7 am) so the refugees have someone to turn to with questions. {#14}

Regardless of late arrival a general camp meeting of all participants/refugees is required. To once again reiterate general camp management issues, schedules, who to go and see re problems etc. {#15}

scope of overall mission was underestimated.  Millitary personnel were simultanously involved in CMOC construction, refugee camp construction and VIP visits and had difficulty prioritizing effort. {#16}

Again we have proven that we need constant power to do anything we computers in camp.  Or we should have solid UPS systems in place {#17}

Having Marine officer in charge at the refugee camp site is essential to getting tasks completed. {#18}

The military needs to bring more females to HA refugee situations as over 50% of refugees are women. {#19}

On these types of missions, a Military Information Support Team (MIST) is very useful to communicate inside the camp, within the JTF, and, in some cases, with permission, with the host nation populace. {#20}

Despite some problems, I believe everybody (military, UN, etc.) deserves to be praised for the efforts made and for trying to solve whatever problems come along {#21}

Discussion of Field CMOC vs. Capital CMOC very helpful.  In future need Political/Ambassador involvement. {#22}

The JLC start up proved to be very useful. {#23}

There are so many activities going on, I believe that few people have a clear idea of what is happening.    This includes refugees, soldiers, technical people and UN. {#24}

refugee tents and cots were flying away this morning. Only two military were there to help them out. Someone should have monitored that situation, and guided the 'rescue'. {#25}

The military needs to be much more prepared for children. {#26}

Camp Management System for exercise of this nature must be coordinated during the planning phase and in the CMOC afloat. {#27}

ha/dr is not a standard military operation, requires more information to be passed to the junior enlisted and officers,  You must be ready and flexible to meet unusual requests.. {#28}

role play should be on for more than one day and indication regarding when to play should be given to refugee {#29}

Huge footprint at CMOC Camp is to support relief operation at refugee camp with small Marine footprint.  Hard to role-play/exercise whilst Marines at refugee camp are stretched to provide actual essential services such as showers. {#30}

There is a very direct communications line between UN and the military. This helps to resolve problems. {#31}

quick establishment of a joint logistics cell is probably one of the most important coordination structures available:  it de-conflicts transport assets arriving and sets out procedures information sharing.  USMC provided useful fact file on their current capabilities. {#32}

How to ensure host population needs are met in both exercise and in reality needs further consideration. {#33}

Some how we need a better communication system for the Marines on the ground.  The people that we planned with know the score but the pass down needs to be spread out more to the guys doing the work {#34}

Need to put a media training aspect into the exercise. {#35}

Inprocessing concerns =- accounatbility vs force protection vs. refugee relief.  Good discussions, reviews of perceptions and actual practice.  One refugee stated that her community hurrican evacuation team had learned so much that day with the transit to the refugee site.  In the future they will provide shade & Comfort, then water and worry about the paperwork later. {#36}

Things work better when focus is on objectives of Strong Angel -- especially Civ-Mil coordination/cooperation -- and not on plumbing issues.  Once minimum standards are met, it allows participants to freely interact.  This part of the exercise is going beautifully. {#37}

Issues with the IDs for the press and the vistors need to be worked out well before we begin the exercise. {#38}

in the refugee camp this afternoon I discovered that some of the lowere ranking military had absolutely no clue about what was going on. Information does not seem to be shared {#39}

We should begin collecting basic data within the camp (e.g., CMR, U5MR, under or mal nourishment, births, etc.). {#40}

Coordination of In-Flow process requires three plans:  The Primary Plan, the Contingency Plan and the Fall-back Plan.  Also need to identify key indices on when/what is necessary to move onto the next plan. {#41}

UNHCR is not actually responsible for the refugee volunteers.  Real concerns need to be addressed by the CSSD. {#42}

Need to establish who is the person in chage of the refugee camp on the military side {#43}

Holding a mock press briefing was useful since it allowed us to focus on the questions and issues the media will continue to raise during emergencies involving both the military and UN relief agencies. {#44}

for such type of assignment, more female staff should be present within military personnel deployed. Important to deal with issues affecting female refugees requiring female staff only. {#45}

Role players who arrived at the refugee camp were excellent.  The realistic scenarios they acted out challenged the military personnel during the processing.  The (real) activist who entered the refugee area challenged us even further. {#46}

Would be good if all marines could be briefed in an info session what the UN does, what we do as an agency, what we do in real life. A lot of them are very interested and when confronted on a 1-on-1 basis, they are full of curiosity and interest. {#47}

For future consideration:  Look at different scenarios (displaced persons, due to strife,  natural or manmade disasters), focus on the coordination at various levels by separating Capitol from CMOC from relief site and ensure those site are separated to avoid confusion.  Use fixed facilities to avoid losing focus on UN/military interaction vice infrastructure. {#48}

Would have been good to separate the actual provision of assistance from those role-playing the exercise.  That would separate those requests that are notional from those that are actual.  Better instruction on this aspect of the exercise from the exercise control group would have helped -- perhaps through an opening brief when we all arrived on BI and before we started the ex. {#49}

Next time we should have a fulltime "real" government offical playing the roll fulltime during the exercise {#50}

Identfy new areas where the military can assist UNICEF -  at the troop level - need to tell the UNICEF reps what they see on their travels, patrols that day, hour, short time frame - in regards to children alone, abuses, abused women, etc.  Share the information in a timely enough manner to actual save/assist the situation. {#51}

Civilian advisors should be, and generally are, curtous to the military on the ground.  This has not alway been the case and has made UN reps a little uncomfortable... {#52}

some of military staff have no idea on who are the civilians participating in the exercise.  Need for better briefing on organisations they will have to cooperate with. {#53}

some of the lessons learned and recommendations of two evenings ago were executed almost immediately. Praise to whomever took care of this. {#54}

Need for more face to face amoung ":Like counterparts" - technical to technical, logisticians to logisticians, etc... {#55}

where is the coffee? {#56}

Establishment of a one stop shop at the refugee camp will help {#57}

The location for the exercise was less imporant then the process we tried to coordinate .  The exercise would have met with as much success and considerably less effort if it had been planned at PTA, or another less challenging area.. {#58}

Thanks to WFP for the excellent communications today between refugee camp site and the MOC during an actual actual.  The level of service provided is excellent.  Sharing comms between key participants in field operations is essential where we often have different systems. {#59}

UNHCR is doing a great job balancing the real issues with the refugees and is taking a lot of heat maybe should be directed to exercise control.  Thank you for all you are doing. {#60}

Recommend that more value is gained in an HA exercise with so many higher level participants that vice using an FTX format a TEWT (tactical exercise without troops) would be more useful in garnering SOP's and understanding between organizations.  Items that need to have actual people being the refugees (for exeriments) we could do that in a seperate yet parallel. {#61}

In future exercises with a civilian population, having a full time help/information person available to either answer questions/concerns and or direct  people to the appropriate contact person. The " refugees" would find such an individual very reassuring and it would provide a consistent  and single point of contact for problems. {#62}

Refugees need good strong coffee {#63}

Marines have shown great flexibility in reacting to many changing and demanding situations!!!!! {#64}

DOn't forget the tea {#65}

Why is Navy coffee so much better than Marine brown water? {#66}

In a 'real' environment, UN would not hold office long in a tent environment like the one we have now. It would kill the equipment, and undermine people's health. {#67}

Angry volunteers could significnt damage the prospect of this type of exercise in the future, even if we meet all other objectives.  Lets redouble our effort to create "happy campers."  Note: a group of 40 that is 100% positive may be better than a group of 60 that is only 75% positive. {#68}

As conditions at  CMOC worsen, we should evaluate if some meetings in better conditions would improve our productivity. {#69}

In real environment, more infrastructure would be set up at refugee camp -- less focus on supporting base that serves less of a function in a humanitarian context. {#70}

Lets be short on the waffle -- be brief and lets keep this under an hour {#71}

Having the UN agencies assisting in the set-up and management was a great help.  I am very grateful for their participation. {#72}

We are all learning a great deal and the lessons learned here will help shape  the our abilit to respond effectively {#73}

All refugees last night were HIGHLY complementary of the troops.  THey stated that this went beyond the expected to personal interest and assistance! {#74}

joe needs to improve hs computer skills {#75}

Keeping a sense of humour is critical {#76}

what happened to the coffee {#77}

CMOC Meeting 1830 13JUN00 (Group Outliner)

1. Lessons Learned 13JUN00 - 1830
Having some spare time to discuss issues in a more relaxed manner today proved valuable {#2}

Camp security actual and exercise needs to be addressed before thefts occur.  Tents with valuable equipment were repeatedly left unguarded and an exercise thief was able to clean out half the camp. {#3}

Press & DV's seemed to add additional focus, revitalization to our mission. {#4}

I noticed in the cmoc report from the camp, there is no mention of the UN agencies. {#5}

DV/Media day mov es the focus from relief effort to supporting the visit {#6}

The transition matrix looks useful. {#7}

VIP visits can happen within the first week of an emergency -- on day three in East 	Timor the 	UN and INTERFET hadf a 15 high level delegation.  Todays visit was in a way realistic. {#8}

The media arriving at the base-camp sometimes arrived with no escort, or were not included on the pre-identified media list.  Had this been a real CMOC area/refugee site, many of the media who arrived unexpectedly would not have been admitted. {#9}

some planning tools used by the military can be adapted and useful to the UN. {#10}

Rotating junior officers to be in charge at the refugee camp site is good as it gives more Marines experience working with UN and civilians.   Lt. Burke, Lt. Schultz and Capt. Fillmore have all done a great job organizing the support required ad it is good that all have had that experience. {#11}

OK, no one wants another meeting, but a fifteen minute briefing by each organization (perhaps one a night, preferably with a good written handout) would be useful to familiarize everyone with the participating agencies. {#12}

Refugee camp management system is fuly operational and fully will, need to tighten up on physical security of equipment and supplies {#13}

Noticed today that the navy + marine (oops, US Marine personnel) were better briefed on why they were here and who all the agencies were.  Good passage of info. {#14}

The relationship and coordination between all parties has evolved into a seemingly cohesive grouping resulting in speedy and sound decisions. {#15}

Let's not forget that ENDEX does not come until mid-day on the 15th.  Now that the Admirals, other DVs and press have gone, we still have a mission to support. {#16}

increased interactions on one on one basis have proved to be very useful and informative. {#17}

Camp Security  was not taken seriously enough in the exercise.  We are testing equipment and procedures in a rough environment (camp) where security awareness is necessary. {#18}

Visitors and Press seemed to be able to wander about without much 'supervision'.  Perhaps a bit more structure to their tours might be warrented. {#19}

The tools used to capture lessons learned have been useful.  Keeping the meeting under an hour is critical {#20}

The briefing for the VIPs provided a good overview of the exercise and where we were at.  Maybe a time out mid exercise would be useful to take stock of the exercise. {#21}

Again there is no good strong coffee available {#22}

CMOC role in the camp coordinating informationand working with the refuges {#23}

At the beginning of the exercise, all UN agencies should have briefed the military staff (all of them) about what they are doing. Some of the guys still have no idea what the different UN organisations do and what they stand for. {#24}

The young, enlisted Marines have learnt a great deal by observation of the practical workings of the UN  Have they had any briefings by the Agencies on their roles similar to those given on the Coronado.  Some simplified technical background would reinforce the practical lessons they have learnt. {#25}

Refugee morale continues to be high, they are very appreciative of the work all are doing to support/train them {#26}

Publications that describe each participants' organization, capabilities and requirements, burned on a CD in any popular format, would be a great "take home" item. {#27}

The close coordination between the agencies executing the refugee support has proven to show we can work together. {#28}

The MPs continue to do an outstanding job, especially at the camp site -- where they are being stretched with keeping real world security of the perimeter whilst enthusiastically participating in a lot of the role-playing going on. {#29}

Exceptional weather/environment planning - sun, sandstorms and rain.  where is the weather guy anyway? {#30}

Cmoc role in the camp working with  the refugees and coordinating information was very impressive. {#31}

Best "Actual Actual" Media Question - one local journalist said that when local residents heard about Operation Strong Angel they believed a huge natural disaster was on its way to the Big Island. {#32}

The force protection element within the CMOC and refugee camp were extremely uncomfortable with the free acess of the media within the basecamps. {#33}

Either actual NGOs or personnel role-playing them would have been a valuable addition to the exercise. {#34}

Starting last night with the showers, thing improved in the refugee camp greatly.  When dealing with refugees the policy should be ....do not over promise.  It destroys trust.  The rule should be...Under promise, over perform. {#35}

We have said on a number of occasions we need some time scheduled to discus some of the  more important/difficult issues in a more deliberate and rigorous manner. When will that be.....the after action/hot wash may not be the place {#36}

While a distraction and very realistic, the visit by the admirals and press was received positively by the refugee role players {#37}

"Traditional" telemedicine ie care to a single indvidual is inappropriate in a mass HA situation except for possible care to aid providers. {#38}

Press and Media personnel seemed very friendly and interested.  The whole camp did a great job of presenting all aspects of this exercise in a positive, creative light. {#39}

Pre-assigned aIr missions should be validated within 4-8 hours before the mission is flown. {#40}

The visit of the admiral was very well timed. Such VIP visits happen in real emergencies and despite all the work that needs to be done, time has to be made for such VIP visits as they are often related to funding and/or PR. {#41}

In real life many unauthorized people enter the camp.  The camp is not a prison. {#42}

Colonel Long + Captain Fujimori should be commended for their excellent work.  They have stayed on top of the ball and have got the camp into good shape. 
In addition, I noticed that the toilets, which had formerly been plastered with fairly poor humour on their walls, had been cleaned this morning.  Not a great job to have to do, but someone did it; ataboy! {#43}

Certain Marines don't know ho to use computers {#44}

We may to define the end product required of the exercise and the time line required for its completion. {#45}

Helo landing in the dust field was not necessary - we had not run out of dust yet. {#46}

The flexibility of the Marines in not keeping strict meal or shower hours at the refugee camp to accomodate the less rigid schedule of the camp has been appreciated. {#47}

Senior military leadership visited today and added some interesting perspective.   The perspective from comparable personnel from UNICEF, UHHCR, etc. would, I'm sure, have been equally or more valuable. {#48}

CommandNet is up and running in the ref camp and CA is using it to enter reports {#54}

The length of time in playing to problem has been good.  However, a period of time built into the exercise to allow for the many additional items we have found to be helpful would be helpful for the next HA; -discussions on each others organizations, -discussions on capabilities, -education to the refugees on the overall help they would receive and what would be happening to each to them, and informal discussions on how we could improve each other. {#49}

Interestingly the refugees appear to regard VIP visits as evidence of interest at high levels.  On the other hand perhaps it was just an exciting break in camp boredom.  Either way, the refugees liked it. {#50}

We need to exchange email & Address lists at next LL meeting.  It is the PERSONAL contacts that will help us in the future ev ents.  Lets not loose touch. {#51}

When we do experiments in the refugee area we need better coordination on physical and electronic requirements.  This went well but was frustrating for many... {#52}

The Admiral gave a good brief, and supported the J9 expirements -- he obviously wants his personnel not to be frightened of making a mistake; this is excellent in that we are here not just for lessons learnt, but for also finding new ways of doing things. Ataboy McGinn! {#53}

The media and press would have enjoyed listening and watching one of our daily CMOC meetings in action. {#55}

Would the addition of a DART from the U.S. State Dept be helpful? What about other NGO's? {#56}

Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations. {#57}

Could we bring some of the junior officers (Lts) into the next LL.  They are doing a lot of the heavy lifting out here and having their perspective would be useful to help us finalize these lessons learned {#58}

Jim Rogers looks knackered!  Why! {#59}

The whole operation in cmoc and the camp is runnng smoother...........things are geting better with more time together {#60}

Too little attention is being paid to assisting the host population. This is imperative in order to ensure relations, PR value, smooth and efficient exit as well as ensuring that they receive some tangible benefits {#61}

The host nation Mc Donalds is doing fine thank you {#69}

I hope that we end soon -- I am thirsty {#62}

It hindsight, it probably would have been a good idea to have released an "actual" press release on the "notional" emergency for the journalists today - since a few seemed a little confused. {#63}

After days of hard and sometimes unrewarding work the Marines have managed to keep efficiency and sense of humor. Good and very informative informal discussions with them in the camp, help to better understand how they operate. {#64}

Need to identify key NEW or Potential Points of Contact in the Government/Political areana to help smooth the military and public acceptance of the HADR Role.  UN - can you please help us identify them. {#65}

The fact that everyone has been so honest, open, and forthright in their participation is appreciated. {#66}

This has been (and still is) a very good learning exercise for everybody. If a similar exercise is planned for the future, it might be good to extend it, i.e. invite NGOs {#67}

Has anyone else noticed that the tank trail (the good road) is not so good anymore??? {#68}

Some of the experimental personnel need to be a bit more aggressive.  The people with the Cell phones for the refugees sat in the camp all day waiting for someone to approach them.  They almost left with the Cell phones {#70}

Lessons Learned  1400 14 JUN 00 (Group Outliner)

1. Lessons Learned
The military very clearly went out of their way to make the UN folks feel comfortable. The practical support we had was tremendous. {#3}

the specific role of the military was not clearly defined.. {#4}

the religious needs and practices of the refugees need to be taken into consideration and met {#5}

the base and refugee camps need to either be closer together or a better means of transportation between the two {#6}

there was no interorganiztion communication between the civilian groups {#7}

The EOD guys did a great job explaining about how to id uxo and what to do if you see some on the site {#8}

the TO&E of the military does not completely accomidate a civilian requirement...we should build a support package that more readily meets this unique mission {#9}

INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOR THE RIMPAC GAME PLAY WAS INSUFFICIENT. {#10}

We were 50 to 60 Marines short to make up for all the working parties {#11}

There seemed to be an extreme lack of inclusion of OICs in the coordination and discussion of issues within the camp in conjunction with the UN/NGOs/notional HN {#12}

After the arrival of the refugee actors, we spent too much time trying to figure out whether the military or the UN was in charge of the camp. {#13}

there was no clear plan of action for the intial days for the refugees {#14}

better tents at CMOC, water tight and better dust resistant. This was already a drag for this short time. If this was a longer operation, it would undermine moral and health. Well rested and fed people can cope much better with problems and the work load. {#15}

COMMS from the refugee camp back to the MOC did not always work {#16}

the transportation requirements seemed very unrealistic {#17}

There was a good comms system between UN and military. The radio system worked very well {#18}

refugees need to arrive earlier in the day to properly inprocess them and allow for role play from the start {#19}

have more information for those not in the planning stages so final execution does not seem so haphazard. {#20}

great food {#21}

More coordination needs to made between the higher personnel in the UN agencies and the military leadership concerning what their actual partication will be in the refugee camp. {#22}

there needs to be a clear and concise mission statement developed and this needs to be spelled out to all of the participants especially that  the more junior participants have a better understanding as to why they are here {#23}

on the military side, the t/e and t/o should have been larger {#24}

The MPs needed a mechanism to coordinate people exiting and entering from different gates and from the camp to allow for better control of where people were at all times {#25}

Environmental issue: 
A.   Grading Camp Site before erection of tents etc cause multiple respiratory problems
B.  lack of goggles for Military Personnel and taking goggles from SNCO's and Officers to give to Civilians was bad move. {#26}

Coordination for Intelligence MSL items were done in a vacuum,  all the key players were not involved. {#27}

Our (the military) understanding of the mission was to support the ability of the NGO/PVO organizations in performing a transition eg they would support refugees we would support them...this transition never seemed to materialize and resulted in over tasking {#28}

Civil Affairs did a great job working with the refugees and initiating the phase out of Marine support at the refugee camp. {#29}

To make  this an effective exercise, a coalition of militaries, US and non US and the UN/NGOs/HN should be involved in the management and creation of the camp.  My opinion this was unrealistic because it was a unilateral coordinated effort with Navy and Marines.  b {#30}

next time, do not level the camp. Leave as is, cut the grass short, but leave the roots in and remove the stones.
This will keep the soil fixed, and we will not have all of that dust flying around {#31}

pick a better base camp area {#32}

the intel people were very helpfull in submitting sitreps after eod drills {#33}

Felt that a lot of people were involved in the lessons learned. hope all feedback will be taken care of {#34}

Military did not come to show off, they came to participate, and to coordinate {#35}

I was surprised at the lack of UN presence in the refugee camp.  The UNHCR flag was hoisted, but seldom was their anyone from the UN on site. {#36}

There needed to be set times for transportation of the civilians established and edhered to. {#37}

working with actual civilians and not Marines playing civilians was great training, and is the best way to prepare for HA/DR ops {#38}

The Refugee camp appeared to be created without input from UN/NGO/HN or other US/Non US Military factions.  No true infrastructure set in the beginning until there were complaints/concerns. {#39}

better distinction between exercise control and exercise execution. {#40}

Early on in the exercise there needed to be better coordination between some of the civilian planners and the Marines that were on the ground {#41}

It seemed like every civilian thought they could tell a Marine what to do, and they expected the Marine to jump when told to do something. {#42}

real refugees would not have the same transportation requirements {#43}

Intel information cycle of distribution was hampered by the lack of the SIPR net being activated upon arrival.  No other secure means of communications was established back to the ship for Intel updates. {#44}

camps need a PA system to pass word as not all troops and or refugees had radios or could hear verbal instructions {#45}

Consistant stable power was a number one requirement for the civilians and I am not sure that was a number one priority for the Marines {#46}

This should be exercised regularly (annually?) to include ALL appropriate components/activities/organizations. {#47}

The Marines were very professional to the cilivans and worked their butts off to make everyone happy.  THANK YOU!!! {#48}

Provide some sort of transfer of information before the exercise begins concerning persons exact responsibilities so they will know who to contact when dealing with problems. {#49}

Needed  more time to get the camp setup. {#50}

Parts of this evolution were not very plausable, much of the requirements of this camp would never have supported an emcampment of a large number of refugees >500 {#51}

CMOC and refugee camps were set up too late. Camp was not ready by the time the UN ror refugees came in {#52}

the training was fairly realisitc, but at the same time real refugees would not be treated nearly the same way, i.e. complaints ect..... {#53}

CECG for Intel input was not as responsive as it needed to be.  Personnel spent the majority ot the exercise at the Ref Camp. No intel info could be passed nor evaluated from thier perspective. {#54}

Working with UN agency personnel has been very enlightening.  This exercise has enhanced our understanding of HA operations and will facilitate smooth coordination with NGOs/PVOs in future exercises/operations. {#55}

Front load ALL OICs/Heads together or an appropriate forum by the UN/NGO/HN experts so that we can understand the mission rather than at the end when frustration/misunderstanding has already set in. {#56}

Communication was difficult to coordinate, many individules used personal cell phones which would/may not be plausable in certain real world locations {#57}

At the Refugee Camp, it was hard to figure out what was real and what was pretend.  It made every scenerio hard to take seriously. {#58}

We need to know what actual and what is an exercise when dealing with scenarios. {#59}

The site for this exercised presented a number of challenges for the personnel and the equipment deployed.  If this is to be one again then we need to take a harder look at all the personnel and equipment required {#60}

realisticly, would refugees be promised certain things contractually.  support and assistance comes and gives people assistance when they have nothing, and they receive support as it is available barring unforseen problems. {#61}

The money provided to support this evolution was inadiquate {#62}

terrain was not a big a part of the equation as it should have been i.e., how it effected equipment, especially electionics. {#63}

For the sake of safety,  it is essential for a distincition to be made between exercise exercise and actual actual as not all role players did so causing confusion  and even unsafe conditions at times. {#64}

If civilians are ever used for an exercise again.  They need to have a clearer undersnding of what there role is.  Real refugees do not get treated the way these ones did. {#65}

As OICs who will be teaching and directing our personnel would have wanted more interaction with UN/NGO/HN leadership with their input/lessons learned as the exercise evolved.  How can we teach our personnel without an accurate  understanding of the thought process? {#66}

the military should have one set of personnel trained/tasked for support the refugee site that are separate from that needed at the main camp  this would improve support and deconflict many requirements {#67}

More workers need to be sent on the advanced party to prepare for the arrival of Marines {#68}

Intelligence was not a major player in this exercise, but was relied on heavely for daily briefs on the current situations around the camp and in other (notional) countries.  Intel reps from the exercising command sholud be included in the planning phases of future HA/DR exercise to ensure that thier own mission of providing the best intel support for the command is accomplished. {#69}

We received our rules of engagement but what were the rules of engagement for the UN/NGO/HN?? {#70}

Medical Mission Creep,
Multiple medical taskings arose that were not in the original training plan , i.e.,  HST ops.

The original medical  manning plan for refugee camp was IDC during the day and a general duty HM at night for emergencies only.  this changed by CADIF Surgeon and IDC had to remain 24/7.   "Fly the Brief"

Need to "fly the brief" we T/O'd enough HM's to do Original Mission, take care of Main Camp Marines and Marines at Refugee Camp.  We were to provide Emergency Aid ONLY to refugee site.  This changed in mid stream with our staff being sucked into "notional problems"  Sometimes into evening hours.  If this was the original plan we would have staffed for this plan. {#71}

The obstacles we faced (equipment breakdown, misunderstanding of mission, poor communication of expectations by those in charge of the exercise) added an element of realism to the exercise.  A perfectly scripted, no obstacles exercise would have been unrealistic and boring. {#72}

The military seems to always "put on a show" whenever they deal with civilian organizations, why is it necessary to put up a facade. If there is a need to change the military when the spotlight is on, maybe those changes should be implemented permanently, or the spotlight should reveal the "real" way things are done. {#73}

if the military is serious about learning how they  can best be utilized in excercises of this type, consider sending them to real world refugee crisisis around the world and acting in a voluntary role. {#74}

I was hoping to see how to resolve more problems without throwng money at them. {#75}

Marines need to train as the fight which means weapons {#76}

Some entity/office needs to coordinate the individual NGO/PVO groups to ensure support can be consolidated to reduce the peacemeal way requests for assistance would come in from the MOC {#77}

Good excercises, we learned a lot. {#78}

Embarkl:
Significant safety issues with stuffing Marins and Sailor into LCAC the thrwing gear over top of them.  Two sticks went in this way.  if there had been a MISHAP there would have been no way to evac the Cabin {#79}

If the ultimate goal is self sufficency for the refugees, self-sufficency should be preached from the very begining of the excersize in order to determine what the true mission of each organization throughout. {#80}

Learned {#81}

CMOC Meeting 1700 10JUN00 (Categorizer)

CMOC Meeting 1700 10JUN00
Camp Set up
1. Would like to have water tight tents
2. Would like to have more lights both on the CMOC campsite as well as in the tents
3. There have been a number of issues regrading the size of the tents available for each group...why is the experimental tent as large as the CMOC?
4. In the CMOC tent we should have better lighting
5. Getting power up and running to a few key areas ASAP needed to be done vice trying to do it for the whole camp
6. dust protected accomodations.
7. Yesterday when we were on the ground there were no guards at the gate, there was no single camp poc to ask for things like electricity and accomodations, etc.  Some how there should have been more advanced coordination.
8. There's only a few tent sizes available.
9. Lack of CMOC security yesterday was surprising.
10. Reality of providing logistical support may not always be provided in the expected manner due to external difficulties.
11. UN needs to task better in order to ensure office and accommodation requirements met.
12. So far UN team was not given time and space that would normaly been available to discuss strategy and planning.
13. Camp design and configuration must be confirmed and changes must by posted at a central point to avoid confusion
14. wooden pallets in the tents are not very stable and could be dangerous. The plastic sheeting when wet becomes slippery and could also pose a danger.
15. Having the electricity in the tents and water running all over the place seems dangerous to me
16. it might be useful to have a tent where people can get together for informal discussions, a tent with some chairs and maybe something to drink (water or other),
17. Several of the hardest working people out here appear to be the ones that are setting up and working on the generators.  We should all be a little patient with them.  Maybe by tommorrow the system will be running better.
18. Would like to have a tent where we can sit to eat.
19. There should be a coffee mess with soda and coffee somewhere for informal conversations.
20. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
21. There are a lot of comments that fit together about a comfortable lounge inside a tent with a few chairs and coffee, sodas and perhaps a snack available.
22. Need road improvements as safety and security priority... as well as for operational and exercise rationality
Comms
1. The communications from the CMOC afloat to ashore did not go well and there is still no HF commo between both
2. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
Coordination
1. There needs to be more concise communication about the technologies that will be used in these types of exercises
2. need for better coordination and info exchange.
3. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
4. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
5. UN needs to be clearer about what it is doing when not visible/on site
6. To get in front of the problem we need to be better at identifying what are the most likely problems that will be encountered.
7. Need to sppeed up UN operational planning process without compromising the consensus discussions required and need to reach common agreement on objectives , priorities and actions
8. Testing systems while we are establishing relationships contribute to more chaos than would normally be encountered.
9. jumping to conclusions to be avoided, i.e. when people are not on site it does not mean they are enjoying the beach life
10. Reality of providing logistical support may not always be provided in the expected manner due to external difficulties.
11. UN needs to task better in order to ensure office and accommodation requirements met.
12. rain seemed to have come unexpectedly and some of the sleeping equipment is wet. Is somebody checking the weather forecast?
13. So far UN team was not given time and space that would normaly been available to discuss strategy and planning.
14. Camp design and configuration must be confirmed and changes must by posted at a central point to avoid confusion
15. There are a lot of opportunities to have free flowing discussions with the military. This informal communications adds to understanding eachother.
16. Understand that the MOC is the center for all logistical support.  If supplies are issued and vehicles dispatched without their knowledge, the CSSE does not have an acurate picture of what is truly available to be issued/used.
17. Somehow there needs to be more time for informal meetings together.  To often we mix informal with formal and there is something lost when we do that type of meeting.
18. Essential for UN teams to create and follow a meeting schedule which allows time for inter-agency coordination and collaboration.
19. it might be useful to have a tent where people can get together for informal discussions, a tent with some chairs and maybe something to drink (water or other),
20. Helicopter landing yesterday was poorly organised. Loads of confusion. Does not give confidence
21. Where are the meal times posted?  Some folks missed the food line because no one knew they were passing out hot meals
22. There needs to be a clearer understanding of who sets up the refugee camp.
23. The lines of communcation between the UN and the military needs to be opened a little more.  If the UN needs things done they should be willing and learning who they can go to.
24. better communication between all parties needs to be established and certain problems need to be explained better (i.e. yesterday the helicopter flights were delayed)
25. Much planning has gone into this exercise, from plans for the refugee camp layout, to safety parameters for civilian refugee volunteers, to availability of HLZ on site for medevacs, etc.  These planning documents have been ignored in favor of free flowing role-play.
26. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
27. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
Objectives
1. Each Agency has different priorities and needs - at the operational planning phase - we need to identify the phases and priorities and the ACTUAL ACTUAL time lines.
2. There needs to be more concise communication about the technologies that will be used in these types of exercises
3. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
4. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
5. Tests and new developments are very important, yet, the establishment of functional organizations to deal with the issues at hand are as difficult to build as the new tested systems.
6. The safety of the actual refugees is paramount.  Seemingly too much attention paid to role-playing and other "exercise" parts of the mission and not enough attention to the actual needs of civilian refugee volunteers under our care.
7. This operation may have been a bit too ambiguous.  Trying to do civil military cooperation,  humanitian assistance,  equipment  testing  and develp command relationships all in two weeks is creates too many competing  priorities
8. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
Scheduling
1. Confusion about Coordination meeting between various meetings at the CMOC, Capitol, & Local Govt.  Need Poted agreed to schedule
2. scheduled meetings need to take place as planned and if the scheduled time changes, all concerned need to be informed (central board)
3. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
4. Review and confirm plans for the registration and initial care of the refugees at least 24 hours in advance
5. Meeting times and locations need to be posted...there has been to much confusion
6. Essential for UN teams to create and follow a meeting schedule which allows time for inter-agency coordination and collaboration.
7. Building more time into the exercise that would have allowed for more interaction with the participants of the CMOC would have allowed us to establish more creditability with each other.
8. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
Philosophy
1. With arrival ashore the only thing that is for sure is nothing is a given.
2. Before  introducing new tools and technologies - it is better to gain consensus first.
3. The ability to determine what is going to happen in an unsure situation is incressed by experance.
4. Flexibility and patients have been exceptional by all parties.  THe key to good communications is courtesty and desire to do the right thing.
5. Number of observors seems superior in some meetings to number of reel players.
6. Just like in real life it is difficult to build a little town on a tropical island from scratch.  Patience with the various parts of the Combat Service Support Detachment is appreciated.  When you look around outside there are a bunch of very hard working young men and women doing the best they can.
7. jumping to conclusions to be avoided, i.e. when people are not on site it does not mean they are enjoying the beach life
8. The Military and the Civilian communities have different procedures and methods and each feels at an uncomfortable disadvantage when required to conform to the other
9. There are a lot of opportunities to have free flowing discussions with the military. This informal communications adds to understanding eachother.
10. The disproportionate human resources available to the military can easily overwhelm the civilian teams.
11. This exercise is not being taken as seriously as it should.  I am not saying the military or the UN is not taking it seriously.  Even though we do not have 80,000 refugees it should be treated as such; therefore, we should all train as if this were real life.
12. It makes for a lot better stories afterward if it rains on you during an event like this.
13. The UN team feels that it is  not fully aware of all the research areas being piloted . They feel defensive and put on the spot when asked to accept or agree to participate in experiments which have not been discussed with them
14. Lack of real urgency and absence of other usual key partners should be taken into consideration in analysis and evaluation of exercise.
15. It is a basic challenge for the UN to decide how much they would like to depend on the military to provide services/support which will profoundly define the level of the UN services. E.g. if we would have brought our own tents, WE define when the tents go up. If we bring our own generators, WE define when the service is up. It is scary to think that some of our core functions might not be provided because a third party (the military) provides some parts which will directly affect our service level
16. This operation may have been a bit too ambiguous.  Trying to do civil military cooperation,  humanitian assistance,  equipment  testing  and develp command relationships all in two weeks is creates too many competing  priorities
Exercise Planning
1. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
2. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
3. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
4. To get in front of the problem we need to be better at identifying what are the most likely problems that will be encountered.
5. The exercise control group needs a more robust cell - perhaps with an NGO?
6. So far UN team was not given time and space that would normaly been available to discuss strategy and planning.
7. Camp design and configuration must be confirmed and changes must by posted at a central point to avoid confusion
8. The military brought a much smaller security force than they would for a real operation specifically because they were directed to by the exercise planners in order to have everyone be a little more comfortable.
9. Green Government representation and interaction need to be strengthened to bring more reality to scenario.
10. The safety of the actual refugees is paramount.  Seemingly too much attention paid to role-playing and other "exercise" parts of the mission and not enough attention to the actual needs of civilian refugee volunteers under our care.
11. There needs to be a clearer understanding of who sets up the refugee camp.
12. Building more time into the exercise that would have allowed for more interaction with the participants of the CMOC would have allowed us to establish more creditability with each other.
13. The UN team feels that it is  not fully aware of all the research areas being piloted . They feel defensive and put on the spot when asked to accept or agree to participate in experiments which have not been discussed with them
14. Lack of real urgency and absence of other usual key partners should be taken into consideration in analysis and evaluation of exercise.
15. Much planning has gone into this exercise, from plans for the refugee camp layout, to safety parameters for civilian refugee volunteers, to availability of HLZ on site for medevacs, etc.  These planning documents have been ignored in favor of free flowing role-play.
16. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
17. It is a basic challenge for the UN to decide how much they would like to depend on the military to provide services/support which will profoundly define the level of the UN services. E.g. if we would have brought our own tents, WE define when the tents go up. If we bring our own generators, WE define when the service is up. It is scary to think that some of our core functions might not be provided because a third party (the military) provides some parts which will directly affect our service level
18. Need road improvements as safety and security priority... as well as for operational and exercise rationality
19. The refugee camp should be set up when the notice of refugee are to arrive is given, not wait until they are schedule arrive.
20. This operation may have been a bit too ambiguous.  Trying to do civil military cooperation,  humanitian assistance,  equipment  testing  and develp command relationships all in two weeks is creates too many competing  priorities
21. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
attaboy
1. From the military, received good, fast response on camp logistics requests

CMOC Meeting 12 JUN 00 (Categorizer)

CMOC Meeting 12 JUN 00
Camp Set up
1. Huge footprint at CMOC Camp is to support relief operation at refugee camp with small Marine footprint.  Hard to role-play/exercise whilst Marines at refugee camp are stretched to provide actual essential services such as showers.
2. Establishment of a one stop shop at the refugee camp will help
3. The location for the exercise was less imporant then the process we tried to coordinate .  The exercise would have met with as much success and considerably less effort if it had been planned at PTA, or another less challenging area..
4. In a 'real' environment, UN would not hold office long in a tent environment like the one we have now. It would kill the equipment, and undermine people's health.
5. As conditions at  CMOC worsen, we should evaluate if some meetings in better conditions would improve our productivity.
6. In real environment, more infrastructure would be set up at refugee camp -- less focus on supporting base that serves less of a function in a humanitarian context.
Comms
1. Identity  if items ACTUAL ACTUAL vs Exercise interjects- need to clarify the distinction -especially on 'open' comm systems
2. Again we have proven that we need constant power to do anything we computers in camp.  Or we should have solid UPS systems in place
3. There is a very direct communications line between UN and the military. This helps to resolve problems.
4. Some how we need a better communication system for the Marines on the ground.  The people that we planned with know the score but the pass down needs to be spread out more to the guys doing the work
5. some of military staff have no idea on who are the civilians participating in the exercise.  Need for better briefing on organisations they will have to cooperate with.
6. Thanks to WFP for the excellent communications today between refugee camp site and the MOC during an actual actual.  The level of service provided is excellent.  Sharing comms between key participants in field operations is essential where we often have different systems.
Coordination
1. after visiting the camp this afternoon I got a strong impression that the "refugees" had not been briefed properly on what was in store for them
2. Regardless of late arrival a general camp meeting of all participants/refugees is required. To once again reiterate general camp management issues, schedules, who to go and see re problems etc.
3. Having Marine officer in charge at the refugee camp site is essential to getting tasks completed.
4. The JLC start up proved to be very useful.
5. refugee tents and cots were flying away this morning. Only two military were there to help them out. Someone should have monitored that situation, and guided the 'rescue'.
6. ha/dr is not a standard military operation, requires more information to be passed to the junior enlisted and officers,  You must be ready and flexible to meet unusual requests..
7. role play should be on for more than one day and indication regarding when to play should be given to refugee
8. quick establishment of a joint logistics cell is probably one of the most important coordination structures available:  it de-conflicts transport assets arriving and sets out procedures information sharing.  USMC provided useful fact file on their current capabilities.
9. Some how we need a better communication system for the Marines on the ground.  The people that we planned with know the score but the pass down needs to be spread out more to the guys doing the work
10. Issues with the IDs for the press and the vistors need to be worked out well before we begin the exercise.
11. in the refugee camp this afternoon I discovered that some of the lowere ranking military had absolutely no clue about what was going on. Information does not seem to be shared
12. Need to establish who is the person in chage of the refugee camp on the military side
13. Identfy new areas where the military can assist UNICEF -  at the troop level - need to tell the UNICEF reps what they see on their travels, patrols that day, hour, short time frame - in regards to children alone, abuses, abused women, etc.  Share the information in a timely enough manner to actual save/assist the situation.
14. some of military staff have no idea on who are the civilians participating in the exercise.  Need for better briefing on organisations they will have to cooperate with.
15. Need for more face to face amoung ":Like counterparts" - technical to technical, logisticians to logisticians, etc...
16. In future exercises with a civilian population, having a full time help/information person available to either answer questions/concerns and or direct  people to the appropriate contact person. The " refugees" would find such an individual very reassuring and it would provide a consistent  and single point of contact for problems.
Objectives
1. There seems some confusion on what is exercise control and what is exercise execution.
2. Need to put a media training aspect into the exercise.
Scheduling
1. UN should be present earlier in the camp (like 7 am) so the refugees have someone to turn to with questions.
2. after visiting the camp this afternoon I got a strong impression that the "refugees" had not been briefed properly on what was in store for them
Philosophy
1. There seems some confusion on what is exercise control and what is exercise execution.
2. Military has to be prepared to do much more than they expect.
3. The military needs to bring more females to HA refugee situations as over 50% of refugees are women.
4. Discussion of Field CMOC vs. Capital CMOC very helpful.  In future need Political/Ambassador involvement.
5. The military needs to be much more prepared for children.
6. ha/dr is not a standard military operation, requires more information to be passed to the junior enlisted and officers,  You must be ready and flexible to meet unusual requests..
7. There is a very direct communications line between UN and the military. This helps to resolve problems.
8. quick establishment of a joint logistics cell is probably one of the most important coordination structures available:  it de-conflicts transport assets arriving and sets out procedures information sharing.  USMC provided useful fact file on their current capabilities.
9. Inprocessing concerns =- accounatbility vs force protection vs. refugee relief.  Good discussions, reviews of perceptions and actual practice.  One refugee stated that her community hurrican evacuation team had learned so much that day with the transit to the refugee site.  In the future they will provide shade & Comfort, then water and worry about the paperwork later.
10. Holding a mock press briefing was useful since it allowed us to focus on the questions and issues the media will continue to raise during emergencies involving both the military and UN relief agencies.
11. for such type of assignment, more female staff should be present within military personnel deployed. Important to deal with issues affecting female refugees requiring female staff only.
12. For future consideration:  Look at different scenarios (displaced persons, due to strife,  natural or manmade disasters), focus on the coordination at various levels by separating Capitol from CMOC from relief site and ensure those site are separated to avoid confusion.  Use fixed facilities to avoid losing focus on UN/military interaction vice infrastructure.
13. Civilian advisors should be, and generally are, curtous to the military on the ground.  This has not alway been the case and has made UN reps a little uncomfortable...
14. Recommend that more value is gained in an HA exercise with so many higher level participants that vice using an FTX format a TEWT (tactical exercise without troops) would be more useful in garnering SOP's and understanding between organizations.  Items that need to have actual people being the refugees (for exeriments) we could do that in a seperate yet parallel.
15. Angry volunteers could significnt damage the prospect of this type of exercise in the future, even if we meet all other objectives.  Lets redouble our effort to create "happy campers."  Note: a group of 40 that is 100% positive may be better than a group of 60 that is only 75% positive.
16. In real environment, more infrastructure would be set up at refugee camp -- less focus on supporting base that serves less of a function in a humanitarian context.
17. Keeping a sense of humour is critical
Exercise Planning
1. There seems some confusion on what is exercise control and what is exercise execution.
2. Military has to be prepared to do much more than they expect.
3. after visiting the camp this afternoon I got a strong impression that the "refugees" had not been briefed properly on what was in store for them
4. The USMC is either expected to do to much or undermaned for this exercise.  These guys are doing a great job but they are killing themselves and their equipment.
5. In some cases, particularly where cross border displaced persons are concerned, the initial interview should be done in private so that the information given is not overheard by other people.
6. scope of overall mission was underestimated.  Millitary personnel were simultanously involved in CMOC construction, refugee camp construction and VIP visits and had difficulty prioritizing effort.
7. Again we have proven that we need constant power to do anything we computers in camp.  Or we should have solid UPS systems in place
8. Having Marine officer in charge at the refugee camp site is essential to getting tasks completed.
9. The military needs to bring more females to HA refugee situations as over 50% of refugees are women.
10. On these types of missions, a Military Information Support Team (MIST) is very useful to communicate inside the camp, within the JTF, and, in some cases, with permission, with the host nation populace.
11. Discussion of Field CMOC vs. Capital CMOC very helpful.  In future need Political/Ambassador involvement.
12. There are so many activities going on, I believe that few people have a clear idea of what is happening.    This includes refugees, soldiers, technical people and UN.
13. The military needs to be much more prepared for children.
14. Camp Management System for exercise of this nature must be coordinated during the planning phase and in the CMOC afloat.
15. Huge footprint at CMOC Camp is to support relief operation at refugee camp with small Marine footprint.  Hard to role-play/exercise whilst Marines at refugee camp are stretched to provide actual essential services such as showers.
16. How to ensure host population needs are met in both exercise and in reality needs further consideration.
17. Need to put a media training aspect into the exercise.
18. Issues with the IDs for the press and the vistors need to be worked out well before we begin the exercise.
19. in the refugee camp this afternoon I discovered that some of the lowere ranking military had absolutely no clue about what was going on. Information does not seem to be shared
20. We should begin collecting basic data within the camp (e.g., CMR, U5MR, under or mal nourishment, births, etc.).
21. Coordination of In-Flow process requires three plans:  The Primary Plan, the Contingency Plan and the Fall-back Plan.  Also need to identify key indices on when/what is necessary to move onto the next plan.
22. UNHCR is not actually responsible for the refugee volunteers.  Real concerns need to be addressed by the CSSD.
23. for such type of assignment, more female staff should be present within military personnel deployed. Important to deal with issues affecting female refugees requiring female staff only.
24. Would be good if all marines could be briefed in an info session what the UN does, what we do as an agency, what we do in real life. A lot of them are very interested and when confronted on a 1-on-1 basis, they are full of curiosity and interest.
25. Would have been good to separate the actual provision of assistance from those role-playing the exercise.  That would separate those requests that are notional from those that are actual.  Better instruction on this aspect of the exercise from the exercise control group would have helped -- perhaps through an opening brief when we all arrived on BI and before we started the ex.
26. Next time we should have a fulltime "real" government offical playing the roll fulltime during the exercise
27. some of military staff have no idea on who are the civilians participating in the exercise.  Need for better briefing on organisations they will have to cooperate with.
28. The location for the exercise was less imporant then the process we tried to coordinate .  The exercise would have met with as much success and considerably less effort if it had been planned at PTA, or another less challenging area..
29. In future exercises with a civilian population, having a full time help/information person available to either answer questions/concerns and or direct  people to the appropriate contact person. The " refugees" would find such an individual very reassuring and it would provide a consistent  and single point of contact for problems.
30. In a 'real' environment, UN would not hold office long in a tent environment like the one we have now. It would kill the equipment, and undermine people's health.
31. As conditions at  CMOC worsen, we should evaluate if some meetings in better conditions would improve our productivity.
attaboy
1. Don't forget the attaboys.  Everyone has worked long and hard for the past two days.
2. Refugee role play was excellent and personnel at the camp did well in reacting to the situations thrown at them.
3. The USMC is either expected to do to much or undermaned for this exercise.  These guys are doing a great job but they are killing themselves and their equipment.
4. Marines were very patient and friendly with refugees.
5. At least for the technical stuff, the military goes out of their way to please the UN.
6. MP Guard are silent heros, doing and excellent job and should be commend.
7. Despite some problems, I believe everybody (military, UN, etc.) deserves to be praised for the efforts made and for trying to solve whatever problems come along
8. There is a very direct communications line between UN and the military. This helps to resolve problems.
9. quick establishment of a joint logistics cell is probably one of the most important coordination structures available:  it de-conflicts transport assets arriving and sets out procedures information sharing.  USMC provided useful fact file on their current capabilities.
10. Things work better when focus is on objectives of Strong Angel -- especially Civ-Mil coordination/cooperation -- and not on plumbing issues.  Once minimum standards are met, it allows participants to freely interact.  This part of the exercise is going beautifully.
11. Holding a mock press briefing was useful since it allowed us to focus on the questions and issues the media will continue to raise during emergencies involving both the military and UN relief agencies.
12. Role players who arrived at the refugee camp were excellent.  The realistic scenarios they acted out challenged the military personnel during the processing.  The (real) activist who entered the refugee area challenged us even further.
13. some of the lessons learned and recommendations of two evenings ago were executed almost immediately. Praise to whomever took care of this.
14. Thanks to WFP for the excellent communications today between refugee camp site and the MOC during an actual actual.  The level of service provided is excellent.  Sharing comms between key participants in field operations is essential where we often have different systems.
15. UNHCR is doing a great job balancing the real issues with the refugees and is taking a lot of heat maybe should be directed to exercise control.  Thank you for all you are doing.
16. Marines have shown great flexibility in reacting to many changing and demanding situations!!!!!
17. Having the UN agencies assisting in the set-up and management was a great help.  I am very grateful for their participation.
18. We are all learning a great deal and the lessons learned here will help shape  the our abilit to respond effectively
19. All refugees last night were HIGHLY complementary of the troops.  THey stated that this went beyond the expected to personal interest and assistance!
Drinks
1. where is the coffee?
2. Refugees need good strong coffee
3. DOn't forget the tea
4. Why is Navy coffee so much better than Marine brown water?
5. joe needs to improve hs computer skills
6. what happened to the coffee

CMOC Meeting 1830 13JUN00 (Categorizer)

Camp Set up
1. Camp security actual and exercise needs to be addressed before thefts occur.  Tents with valuable equipment were repeatedly left unguarded and an exercise thief was able to clean out half the camp.
2. Refugee camp management system is fuly operational and fully will, need to tighten up on physical security of equipment and supplies
3. Camp Security  was not taken seriously enough in the exercise.  We are testing equipment and procedures in a rough environment (camp) where security awareness is necessary.
4. Visitors and Press seemed to be able to wander about without much 'supervision'.  Perhaps a bit more structure to their tours might be warrented.
5. The force protection element within the CMOC and refugee camp were extremely uncomfortable with the free acess of the media within the basecamps.
6. Starting last night with the showers, thing improved in the refugee camp greatly.  When dealing with refugees the policy should be ....do not over promise.  It destroys trust.  The rule should be...Under promise, over perform.
7. In real life many unauthorized people enter the camp.  The camp is not a prison.
8. The flexibility of the Marines in not keeping strict meal or shower hours at the refugee camp to accomodate the less rigid schedule of the camp has been appreciated.
9. When we do experiments in the refugee area we need better coordination on physical and electronic requirements.  This went well but was frustrating for many...
Comms
Coordination
1. I noticed in the cmoc report from the camp, there is no mention of the UN agencies.
2. The media arriving at the base-camp sometimes arrived with no escort, or were not included on the pre-identified media list.  Had this been a real CMOC area/refugee site, many of the media who arrived unexpectedly would not have been admitted.
3. The relationship and coordination between all parties has evolved into a seemingly cohesive grouping resulting in speedy and sound decisions.
4. Exceptional weather/environment planning - sun, sandstorms and rain.  where is the weather guy anyway?
5. We need to exchange email & Address lists at next LL meeting.  It is the PERSONAL contacts that will help us in the future ev ents.  Lets not loose touch.
6. When we do experiments in the refugee area we need better coordination on physical and electronic requirements.  This went well but was frustrating for many...
7. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
8. Could we bring some of the junior officers (Lts) into the next LL.  They are doing a lot of the heavy lifting out here and having their perspective would be useful to help us finalize these lessons learned
9. Need to identify key NEW or Potential Points of Contact in the Government/Political areana to help smooth the military and public acceptance of the HADR Role.  UN - can you please help us identify them.
10. Some of the experimental personnel need to be a bit more aggressive.  The people with the Cell phones for the refugees sat in the camp all day waiting for someone to approach them.  They almost left with the Cell phones
Objectives
1. The transition matrix looks useful.
2. The relationship and coordination between all parties has evolved into a seemingly cohesive grouping resulting in speedy and sound decisions.
3. increased interactions on one on one basis have proved to be very useful and informative.
4. The close coordination between the agencies executing the refugee support has proven to show we can work together.
5. Cmoc role in the camp working with  the refugees and coordinating information was very impressive.
6. CommandNet is up and running in the ref camp and CA is using it to enter reports
7. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
8. Too little attention is being paid to assisting the host population. This is imperative in order to ensure relations, PR value, smooth and efficient exit as well as ensuring that they receive some tangible benefits
9. After days of hard and sometimes unrewarding work the Marines have managed to keep efficiency and sense of humor. Good and very informative informal discussions with them in the camp, help to better understand how they operate.
Scheduling
1. Having some spare time to discuss issues in a more relaxed manner today proved valuable
2. Let's not forget that ENDEX does not come until mid-day on the 15th.  Now that the Admirals, other DVs and press have gone, we still have a mission to support.
3. The tools used to capture lessons learned have been useful.  Keeping the meeting under an hour is critical
4. The briefing for the VIPs provided a good overview of the exercise and where we were at.  Maybe a time out mid exercise would be useful to take stock of the exercise.
5. Pre-assigned aIr missions should be validated within 4-8 hours before the mission is flown.
6. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
Philosophy
1. Having some spare time to discuss issues in a more relaxed manner today proved valuable
2. Press & DV's seemed to add additional focus, revitalization to our mission.
3. DV/Media day mov es the focus from relief effort to supporting the visit
4. some planning tools used by the military can be adapted and useful to the UN.
5. The force protection element within the CMOC and refugee camp were extremely uncomfortable with the free acess of the media within the basecamps.
6. Starting last night with the showers, thing improved in the refugee camp greatly.  When dealing with refugees the policy should be ....do not over promise.  It destroys trust.  The rule should be...Under promise, over perform.
7. "Traditional" telemedicine ie care to a single indvidual is inappropriate in a mass HA situation except for possible care to aid providers.
8. In real life many unauthorized people enter the camp.  The camp is not a prison.
9. The length of time in playing to problem has been good.  However, a period of time built into the exercise to allow for the many additional items we have found to be helpful would be helpful for the next HA; -discussions on each others organizations, -discussions on capabilities, -education to the refugees on the overall help they would receive and what would be happening to each to them, and informal discussions on how we could improve each other.
10. The media and press would have enjoyed listening and watching one of our daily CMOC meetings in action.
11. Too little attention is being paid to assisting the host population. This is imperative in order to ensure relations, PR value, smooth and efficient exit as well as ensuring that they receive some tangible benefits
Exercise/Planning
1. VIP visits can happen within the first week of an emergency -- on day three in East 	Timor the 	UN and INTERFET hadf a 15 high level delegation.  Todays visit was in a way realistic.
2. OK, no one wants another meeting, but a fifteen minute briefing by each organization (perhaps one a night, preferably with a good written handout) would be useful to familiarize everyone with the participating agencies.
3. Visitors and Press seemed to be able to wander about without much 'supervision'.  Perhaps a bit more structure to their tours might be warrented.
4. At the beginning of the exercise, all UN agencies should have briefed the military staff (all of them) about what they are doing. Some of the guys still have no idea what the different UN organisations do and what they stand for.
5. The young, enlisted Marines have learnt a great deal by observation of the practical workings of the UN  Have they had any briefings by the Agencies on their roles similar to those given on the Coronado.  Some simplified technical background would reinforce the practical lessons they have learnt.
6. Publications that describe each participants' organization, capabilities and requirements, burned on a CD in any popular format, would be a great "take home" item.
7. Best "Actual Actual" Media Question - one local journalist said that when local residents heard about Operation Strong Angel they believed a huge natural disaster was on its way to the Big Island.
8. Either actual NGOs or personnel role-playing them would have been a valuable addition to the exercise.
9. Starting last night with the showers, thing improved in the refugee camp greatly.  When dealing with refugees the policy should be ....do not over promise.  It destroys trust.  The rule should be...Under promise, over perform.
10. The visit of the admiral was very well timed. Such VIP visits happen in real emergencies and despite all the work that needs to be done, time has to be made for such VIP visits as they are often related to funding and/or PR.
11. Senior military leadership visited today and added some interesting perspective.   The perspective from comparable personnel from UNICEF, UHHCR, etc. would, I'm sure, have been equally or more valuable.
12. When we do experiments in the refugee area we need better coordination on physical and electronic requirements.  This went well but was frustrating for many...
13. Would the addition of a DART from the U.S. State Dept be helpful? What about other NGO's?
14. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
15. Could we bring some of the junior officers (Lts) into the next LL.  They are doing a lot of the heavy lifting out here and having their perspective would be useful to help us finalize these lessons learned
16. Too little attention is being paid to assisting the host population. This is imperative in order to ensure relations, PR value, smooth and efficient exit as well as ensuring that they receive some tangible benefits
17. It hindsight, it probably would have been a good idea to have released an "actual" press release on the "notional" emergency for the journalists today - since a few seemed a little confused.
18. This has been (and still is) a very good learning exercise for everybody. If a similar exercise is planned for the future, it might be good to extend it, i.e. invite NGOs
attaboy
1. Rotating junior officers to be in charge at the refugee camp site is good as it gives more Marines experience working with UN and civilians.   Lt. Burke, Lt. Schultz and Capt. Fillmore have all done a great job organizing the support required ad it is good that all have had that experience.
2. Noticed today that the navy + marine (oops, US Marine personnel) were better briefed on why they were here and who all the agencies were.  Good passage of info.
3. The relationship and coordination between all parties has evolved into a seemingly cohesive grouping resulting in speedy and sound decisions.
4. Refugee morale continues to be high, they are very appreciative of the work all are doing to support/train them
5. The close coordination between the agencies executing the refugee support has proven to show we can work together.
6. The MPs continue to do an outstanding job, especially at the camp site -- where they are being stretched with keeping real world security of the perimeter whilst enthusiastically participating in a lot of the role-playing going on.
7. Cmoc role in the camp working with  the refugees and coordinating information was very impressive.
8. While a distraction and very realistic, the visit by the admirals and press was received positively by the refugee role players
9. Press and Media personnel seemed very friendly and interested.  The whole camp did a great job of presenting all aspects of this exercise in a positive, creative light.
10. Colonel Long + Captain Fujimori should be commended for their excellent work.  They have stayed on top of the ball and have got the camp into good shape. 
In addition, I noticed that the toilets, which had formerly been plastered with fairly poor humour on their walls, had been cleaned this morning.  Not a great job to have to do, but someone did it; ataboy!
11. The flexibility of the Marines in not keeping strict meal or shower hours at the refugee camp to accomodate the less rigid schedule of the camp has been appreciated.
12. CommandNet is up and running in the ref camp and CA is using it to enter reports
13. Interestingly the refugees appear to regard VIP visits as evidence of interest at high levels.  On the other hand perhaps it was just an exciting break in camp boredom.  Either way, the refugees liked it.
14. The Admiral gave a good brief, and supported the J9 expirements -- he obviously wants his personnel not to be frightened of making a mistake; this is excellent in that we are here not just for lessons learnt, but for also finding new ways of doing things. Ataboy McGinn!
15. The whole operation in cmoc and the camp is runnng smoother...........things are geting better with more time together
16. After days of hard and sometimes unrewarding work the Marines have managed to keep efficiency and sense of humor. Good and very informative informal discussions with them in the camp, help to better understand how they operate.
17. The fact that everyone has been so honest, open, and forthright in their participation is appreciated.
Drinks
1. DV/Media day mov es the focus from relief effort to supporting the visit
2. Again there is no good strong coffee available
3. Certain Marines don't know ho to use computers
4. Helo landing in the dust field was not necessary - we had not run out of dust yet.
5. Jim Rogers looks knackered!  Why!
6. The host nation Mc Donalds is doing fine thank you
7. I hope that we end soon -- I am thirsty
8. Has anyone else noticed that the tank trail (the good road) is not so good anymore???
CMOC Meeting 1830 13JUN00
Hotwash
1. Strategic
2. Operational
3. Tactical
4. We have said on a number of occasions we need some time scheduled to discus some of the  more important/difficult issues in a more deliberate and rigorous manner. When will that be.....the after action/hot wash may not be the place
5. We may to define the end product required of the exercise and the time line required for its completion.

Lessons Learned  1400 14 JUN 00 (Categorizer)

Lessons Learned  1400 14 JUN 00
Camp Set up
1. the base and refugee camps need to either be closer together or a better means of transportation between the two
2. better tents at CMOC, water tight and better dust resistant. This was already a drag for this short time. If this was a longer operation, it would undermine moral and health. Well rested and fed people can cope much better with problems and the work load.
3. Environmental issue: 
A.   Grading Camp Site before erection of tents etc cause multiple respiratory problems
B.  lack of goggles for Military Personnel and taking goggles from SNCO's and Officers to give to Civilians was bad move.
4. Environmental issue: 
A.   Grading Camp Site before erection of tents etc cause multiple respiratory problems
B.  lack of goggles for Military Personnel and taking goggles from SNCO's and Officers to give to Civilians was bad move.
5. next time, do not level the camp. Leave as is, cut the grass short, but leave the roots in and remove the stones.
This will keep the soil fixed, and we will not have all of that dust flying around
6. pick a better base camp area
7. camps need a PA system to pass word as not all troops and or refugees had radios or could hear verbal instructions
8. Consistant stable power was a number one requirement for the civilians and I am not sure that was a number one priority for the Marines
9. Needed  more time to get the camp setup.
10. The site for this exercised presented a number of challenges for the personnel and the equipment deployed.  If this is to be one again then we need to take a harder look at all the personnel and equipment required
11. terrain was not a big a part of the equation as it should have been i.e., how it effected equipment, especially electionics.
Comms
1. there was no interorganiztion communication between the civilian groups
2. COMMS from the refugee camp back to the MOC did not always work
3. There was a good comms system between UN and military. The radio system worked very well
4. Intel information cycle of distribution was hampered by the lack of the SIPR net being activated upon arrival.  No other secure means of communications was established back to the ship for Intel updates.
5. camps need a PA system to pass word as not all troops and or refugees had radios or could hear verbal instructions
6. Communication was difficult to coordinate, many individules used personal cell phones which would/may not be plausable in certain real world locations
Coordination
1. the religious needs and practices of the refugees need to be taken into consideration and met
2. there was no interorganiztion communication between the civilian groups
3. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOR THE RIMPAC GAME PLAY WAS INSUFFICIENT.
4. We were 50 to 60 Marines short to make up for all the working parties
5. There seemed to be an extreme lack of inclusion of OICs in the coordination and discussion of issues within the camp in conjunction with the UN/NGOs/notional HN
6. After the arrival of the refugee actors, we spent too much time trying to figure out whether the military or the UN was in charge of the camp.
7. COMMS from the refugee camp back to the MOC did not always work
8. refugees need to arrive earlier in the day to properly inprocess them and allow for role play from the start
9. have more information for those not in the planning stages so final execution does not seem so haphazard.
10. More coordination needs to made between the higher personnel in the UN agencies and the military leadership concerning what their actual partication will be in the refugee camp.
11. The MPs needed a mechanism to coordinate people exiting and entering from different gates and from the camp to allow for better control of where people were at all times
12. Coordination for Intelligence MSL items were done in a vacuum,  all the key players were not involved.
13. To make  this an effective exercise, a coalition of militaries, US and non US and the UN/NGOs/HN should be involved in the management and creation of the camp.  My opinion this was unrealistic because it was a unilateral coordinated effort with Navy and Marines.  b
14. The Refugee camp appeared to be created without input from UN/NGO/HN or other US/Non US Military factions.  No true infrastructure set in the beginning until there were complaints/concerns.
15. better distinction between exercise control and exercise execution.
16. Early on in the exercise there needed to be better coordination between some of the civilian planners and the Marines that were on the ground
17. real refugees would not have the same transportation requirements
18. Consistant stable power was a number one requirement for the civilians and I am not sure that was a number one priority for the Marines
19. Provide some sort of transfer of information before the exercise begins concerning persons exact responsibilities so they will know who to contact when dealing with problems.
20. CMOC and refugee camps were set up too late. Camp was not ready by the time the UN ror refugees came in
21. CECG for Intel input was not as responsive as it needed to be.  Personnel spent the majority ot the exercise at the Ref Camp. No intel info could be passed nor evaluated from thier perspective.
22. Front load ALL OICs/Heads together or an appropriate forum by the UN/NGO/HN experts so that we can understand the mission rather than at the end when frustration/misunderstanding has already set in.
23. Communication was difficult to coordinate, many individules used personal cell phones which would/may not be plausable in certain real world locations
24. For the sake of safety,  it is essential for a distincition to be made between exercise exercise and actual actual as not all role players did so causing confusion  and even unsafe conditions at times.
25. More workers need to be sent on the advanced party to prepare for the arrival of Marines
26. Some entity/office needs to coordinate the individual NGO/PVO groups to ensure support can be consolidated to reduce the peacemeal way requests for assistance would come in from the MOC
27. Embarkl:
Significant safety issues with stuffing Marins and Sailor into LCAC the thrwing gear over top of them.  Two sticks went in this way.  if there had been a MISHAP there would have been no way to evac the Cabin
Objectives
1. the specific role of the military was not clearly defined..
2. After the arrival of the refugee actors, we spent too much time trying to figure out whether the military or the UN was in charge of the camp.
3. there needs to be a clear and concise mission statement developed and this needs to be spelled out to all of the participants especially that  the more junior participants have a better understanding as to why they are here
4. working with actual civilians and not Marines playing civilians was great training, and is the best way to prepare for HA/DR ops
5. It seemed like every civilian thought they could tell a Marine what to do, and they expected the Marine to jump when told to do something.
6. It seemed like every civilian thought they could tell a Marine what to do, and they expected the Marine to jump when told to do something.
7. the training was fairly realisitc, but at the same time real refugees would not be treated nearly the same way, i.e. complaints ect.....
8. If the ultimate goal is self sufficency for the refugees, self-sufficency should be preached from the very begining of the excersize in order to determine what the true mission of each organization throughout.
Scheduling
1. There needed to be set times for transportation of the civilians established and edhered to.
Philosophy
1. the religious needs and practices of the refugees need to be taken into consideration and met
2. the TO&E of the military does not completely accomidate a civilian requirement...we should build a support package that more readily meets this unique mission
3. there needs to be a clear and concise mission statement developed and this needs to be spelled out to all of the participants especially that  the more junior participants have a better understanding as to why they are here
4. To make  this an effective exercise, a coalition of militaries, US and non US and the UN/NGOs/HN should be involved in the management and creation of the camp.  My opinion this was unrealistic because it was a unilateral coordinated effort with Navy and Marines.  b
5. Felt that a lot of people were involved in the lessons learned. hope all feedback will be taken care of
6. I was surprised at the lack of UN presence in the refugee camp.  The UNHCR flag was hoisted, but seldom was their anyone from the UN on site.
7. This should be exercised regularly (annually?) to include ALL appropriate components/activities/organizations.
8. Parts of this evolution were not very plausable, much of the requirements of this camp would never have supported an emcampment of a large number of refugees >500
9. the training was fairly realisitc, but at the same time real refugees would not be treated nearly the same way, i.e. complaints ect.....
10. Front load ALL OICs/Heads together or an appropriate forum by the UN/NGO/HN experts so that we can understand the mission rather than at the end when frustration/misunderstanding has already set in.
11. realisticly, would refugees be promised certain things contractually.  support and assistance comes and gives people assistance when they have nothing, and they receive support as it is available barring unforseen problems.
12. If civilians are ever used for an exercise again.  They need to have a clearer undersnding of what there role is.  Real refugees do not get treated the way these ones did.
13. As OICs who will be teaching and directing our personnel would have wanted more interaction with UN/NGO/HN leadership with their input/lessons learned as the exercise evolved.  How can we teach our personnel without an accurate  understanding of the thought process?
14. Intelligence was not a major player in this exercise, but was relied on heavely for daily briefs on the current situations around the camp and in other (notional) countries.  Intel reps from the exercising command sholud be included in the planning phases of future HA/DR exercise to ensure that thier own mission of providing the best intel support for the command is accomplished.
15. We received our rules of engagement but what were the rules of engagement for the UN/NGO/HN??
16. The obstacles we faced (equipment breakdown, misunderstanding of mission, poor communication of expectations by those in charge of the exercise) added an element of realism to the exercise.  A perfectly scripted, no obstacles exercise would have been unrealistic and boring.
17. The military seems to always "put on a show" whenever they deal with civilian organizations, why is it necessary to put up a facade. If there is a need to change the military when the spotlight is on, maybe those changes should be implemented permanently, or the spotlight should reveal the "real" way things are done.
18. I was hoping to see how to resolve more problems without throwng money at them.
19. Marines need to train as the fight which means weapons
20. If the ultimate goal is self sufficency for the refugees, self-sufficency should be preached from the very begining of the excersize in order to determine what the true mission of each organization throughout.
Exercise/Planning
1. the base and refugee camps need to either be closer together or a better means of transportation between the two
2. the TO&E of the military does not completely accomidate a civilian requirement...we should build a support package that more readily meets this unique mission
3. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOR THE RIMPAC GAME PLAY WAS INSUFFICIENT.
4. We were 50 to 60 Marines short to make up for all the working parties
5. We were 50 to 60 Marines short to make up for all the working parties
6. There seemed to be an extreme lack of inclusion of OICs in the coordination and discussion of issues within the camp in conjunction with the UN/NGOs/notional HN
7. there was no clear plan of action for the intial days for the refugees
8. the transportation requirements seemed very unrealistic
9. refugees need to arrive earlier in the day to properly inprocess them and allow for role play from the start
10. there needs to be a clear and concise mission statement developed and this needs to be spelled out to all of the participants especially that  the more junior participants have a better understanding as to why they are here
11. on the military side, the t/e and t/o should have been larger
12. The MPs needed a mechanism to coordinate people exiting and entering from different gates and from the camp to allow for better control of where people were at all times
13. Coordination for Intelligence MSL items were done in a vacuum,  all the key players were not involved.
14. I was surprised at the lack of UN presence in the refugee camp.  The UNHCR flag was hoisted, but seldom was their anyone from the UN on site.
15. The Refugee camp appeared to be created without input from UN/NGO/HN or other US/Non US Military factions.  No true infrastructure set in the beginning until there were complaints/concerns.
16. better distinction between exercise control and exercise execution.
17. real refugees would not have the same transportation requirements
18. This should be exercised regularly (annually?) to include ALL appropriate components/activities/organizations.
19. Consistant stable power was a number one requirement for the civilians and I am not sure that was a number one priority for the Marines
20. Provide some sort of transfer of information before the exercise begins concerning persons exact responsibilities so they will know who to contact when dealing with problems.
21. CMOC and refugee camps were set up too late. Camp was not ready by the time the UN ror refugees came in
22. Working with UN agency personnel has been very enlightening.  This exercise has enhanced our understanding of HA operations and will facilitate smooth coordination with NGOs/PVOs in future exercises/operations.
23. At the Refugee Camp, it was hard to figure out what was real and what was pretend.  It made every scenerio hard to take seriously.
24. We need to know what actual and what is an exercise when dealing with scenarios.
25. The site for this exercised presented a number of challenges for the personnel and the equipment deployed.  If this is to be one again then we need to take a harder look at all the personnel and equipment required
26. realisticly, would refugees be promised certain things contractually.  support and assistance comes and gives people assistance when they have nothing, and they receive support as it is available barring unforseen problems.
27. The money provided to support this evolution was inadiquate
28. The money provided to support this evolution was inadiquate
29. terrain was not a big a part of the equation as it should have been i.e., how it effected equipment, especially electionics.
30. For the sake of safety,  it is essential for a distincition to be made between exercise exercise and actual actual as not all role players did so causing confusion  and even unsafe conditions at times.
31. the military should have one set of personnel trained/tasked for support the refugee site that are separate from that needed at the main camp  this would improve support and deconflict many requirements
32. More workers need to be sent on the advanced party to prepare for the arrival of Marines
33. Medical Mission Creep,
Multiple medical taskings arose that were not in the original training plan , i.e.,  HST ops.

The original medical  manning plan for refugee camp was IDC during the day and a general duty HM at night for emergencies only.  this changed by CADIF Surgeon and IDC had to remain 24/7.   "Fly the Brief"

Need to "fly the brief" we T/O'd enough HM's to do Original Mission, take care of Main Camp Marines and Marines at Refugee Camp.  We were to provide Emergency Aid ONLY to refugee site.  This changed in mid stream with our staff being sucked into "notional problems"  Sometimes into evening hours.  If this was the original plan we would have staffed for this plan.
34. Some entity/office needs to coordinate the individual NGO/PVO groups to ensure support can be consolidated to reduce the peacemeal way requests for assistance would come in from the MOC
35. Embarkl:
Significant safety issues with stuffing Marins and Sailor into LCAC the thrwing gear over top of them.  Two sticks went in this way.  if there had been a MISHAP there would have been no way to evac the Cabin
36. If the ultimate goal is self sufficency for the refugees, self-sufficency should be preached from the very begining of the excersize in order to determine what the true mission of each organization throughout.
attaboy
1. The military very clearly went out of their way to make the UN folks feel comfortable. The practical support we had was tremendous.
2. The EOD guys did a great job explaining about how to id uxo and what to do if you see some on the site
3. There was a good comms system between UN and military. The radio system worked very well
4. great food
5. Civil Affairs did a great job working with the refugees and initiating the phase out of Marine support at the refugee camp.
6. the intel people were very helpfull in submitting sitreps after eod drills
7. Military did not come to show off, they came to participate, and to coordinate
8. working with actual civilians and not Marines playing civilians was great training, and is the best way to prepare for HA/DR ops
9. The Marines were very professional to the cilivans and worked their butts off to make everyone happy.  THANK YOU!!!
10. The obstacles we faced (equipment breakdown, misunderstanding of mission, poor communication of expectations by those in charge of the exercise) added an element of realism to the exercise.  A perfectly scripted, no obstacles exercise would have been unrealistic and boring.
11. Good excercises, we learned a lot.
12. dental support was outstanding...the appointments were flexible and provided on a walk in basis..great job
Drinks
Very Inportant Lessons Learned
1. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOR THE RIMPAC GAME PLAY WAS INSUFFICIENT.
2. have more information for those not in the planning stages so final execution does not seem so haphazard.
3. More coordination needs to made between the higher personnel in the UN agencies and the military leadership concerning what their actual partication will be in the refugee camp.
4. Coordination for Intelligence MSL items were done in a vacuum,  all the key players were not involved.
5. Our (the military) understanding of the mission was to support the ability of the NGO/PVO organizations in performing a transition eg they would support refugees we would support them...this transition never seemed to materialize and resulted in over tasking
6. I was surprised at the lack of UN presence in the refugee camp.  The UNHCR flag was hoisted, but seldom was their anyone from the UN on site.
7. This should be exercised regularly (annually?) to include ALL appropriate components/activities/organizations.
8. Provide some sort of transfer of information before the exercise begins concerning persons exact responsibilities so they will know who to contact when dealing with problems.
9. The money provided to support this evolution was inadiquate
10. if the military is serious about learning how they  can best be utilized in excercises of this type, consider sending them to real world refugee crisisis around the world and acting in a voluntary role.

Combined (Categorizer)

10JUN00 Camp Set up
1. Would like to have water tight tents
2. Would like to have more lights both on the CMOC campsite as well as in the tents
3. There have been a number of issues regrading the size of the tents available for each group...why is the experimental tent as large as the CMOC?
4. In the CMOC tent we should have better lighting
5. Getting power up and running to a few key areas ASAP needed to be done vice trying to do it for the whole camp
6. dust protected accomodations.
7. Yesterday when we were on the ground there were no guards at the gate, there was no single camp poc to ask for things like electricity and accomodations, etc.  Some how there should have been more advanced coordination.
8. There's only a few tent sizes available.
9. Lack of CMOC security yesterday was surprising.
10. Reality of providing logistical support may not always be provided in the expected manner due to external difficulties.
11. UN needs to task better in order to ensure office and accommodation requirements met.
12. So far UN team was not given time and space that would normaly been available to discuss strategy and planning.
13. Camp design and configuration must be confirmed and changes must by posted at a central point to avoid confusion
14. wooden pallets in the tents are not very stable and could be dangerous. The plastic sheeting when wet becomes slippery and could also pose a danger.
15. Having the electricity in the tents and water running all over the place seems dangerous to me
16. it might be useful to have a tent where people can get together for informal discussions, a tent with some chairs and maybe something to drink (water or other),
17. Several of the hardest working people out here appear to be the ones that are setting up and working on the generators.  We should all be a little patient with them.  Maybe by tommorrow the system will be running better.
18. Would like to have a tent where we can sit to eat.
19. There should be a coffee mess with soda and coffee somewhere for informal conversations.
20. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
21. There are a lot of comments that fit together about a comfortable lounge inside a tent with a few chairs and coffee, sodas and perhaps a snack available.
22. Need road improvements as safety and security priority... as well as for operational and exercise rationality
12JUN00 Camp Setup
1. Huge footprint at CMOC Camp is to support relief operation at refugee camp with small Marine footprint.  Hard to role-play/exercise whilst Marines at refugee camp are stretched to provide actual essential services such as showers.
2. Establishment of a one stop shop at the refugee camp will help
3. The location for the exercise was less imporant then the process we tried to coordinate .  The exercise would have met with as much success and considerably less effort if it had been planned at PTA, or another less challenging area..
4. In a 'real' environment, UN would not hold office long in a tent environment like the one we have now. It would kill the equipment, and undermine people's health.
5. As conditions at  CMOC worsen, we should evaluate if some meetings in better conditions would improve our productivity.
6. In real environment, more infrastructure would be set up at refugee camp -- less focus on supporting base that serves less of a function in a humanitarian context.
13JUN00 Camp Set up
1. Camp security actual and exercise needs to be addressed before thefts occur.  Tents with valuable equipment were repeatedly left unguarded and an exercise thief was able to clean out half the camp.
2. Refugee camp management system is fuly operational and fully will, need to tighten up on physical security of equipment and supplies
3. Camp Security  was not taken seriously enough in the exercise.  We are testing equipment and procedures in a rough environment (camp) where security awareness is necessary.
4. Visitors and Press seemed to be able to wander about without much 'supervision'.  Perhaps a bit more structure to their tours might be warrented.
5. The force protection element within the CMOC and refugee camp were extremely uncomfortable with the free acess of the media within the basecamps.
6. Starting last night with the showers, thing improved in the refugee camp greatly.  When dealing with refugees the policy should be ....do not over promise.  It destroys trust.  The rule should be...Under promise, over perform.
7. In real life many unauthorized people enter the camp.  The camp is not a prison.
8. The flexibility of the Marines in not keeping strict meal or shower hours at the refugee camp to accomodate the less rigid schedule of the camp has been appreciated.
9. When we do experiments in the refugee area we need better coordination on physical and electronic requirements.  This went well but was frustrating for many...
14JUN00 Camp Set UP
1. the base and refugee camps need to either be closer together or a better means of transportation between the two
2. better tents at CMOC, water tight and better dust resistant. This was already a drag for this short time. If this was a longer operation, it would undermine moral and health. Well rested and fed people can cope much better with problems and the work load.
3. Environmental issue: 
A.   Grading Camp Site before erection of tents etc cause multiple respiratory problems
B.  lack of goggles for Military Personnel and taking goggles from SNCO's and Officers to give to Civilians was bad move.
4. Environmental issue: 
A.   Grading Camp Site before erection of tents etc cause multiple respiratory problems
B.  lack of goggles for Military Personnel and taking goggles from SNCO's and Officers to give to Civilians was bad move.
5. next time, do not level the camp. Leave as is, cut the grass short, but leave the roots in and remove the stones.
This will keep the soil fixed, and we will not have all of that dust flying around
6. pick a better base camp area
7. camps need a PA system to pass word as not all troops and or refugees had radios or could hear verbal instructions
8. Consistant stable power was a number one requirement for the civilians and I am not sure that was a number one priority for the Marines
9. Needed  more time to get the camp setup.
10. The site for this exercised presented a number of challenges for the personnel and the equipment deployed.  If this is to be one again then we need to take a harder look at all the personnel and equipment required
11. terrain was not a big a part of the equation as it should have been i.e., how it effected equipment, especially electionics.
Camp Set Up Combined
10JUN00 Comms
1. The communications from the CMOC afloat to ashore did not go well and there is still no HF commo between both
2. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
12JUN00 Comms
1. Identity  if items ACTUAL ACTUAL vs Exercise interjects- need to clarify the distinction -especially on 'open' comm systems
2. Again we have proven that we need constant power to do anything we computers in camp.  Or we should have solid UPS systems in place
3. There is a very direct communications line between UN and the military. This helps to resolve problems.
4. Some how we need a better communication system for the Marines on the ground.  The people that we planned with know the score but the pass down needs to be spread out more to the guys doing the work
5. some of military staff have no idea on who are the civilians participating in the exercise.  Need for better briefing on organisations they will have to cooperate with.
6. Thanks to WFP for the excellent communications today between refugee camp site and the MOC during an actual actual.  The level of service provided is excellent.  Sharing comms between key participants in field operations is essential where we often have different systems.
13JUN00 Comms
14JUN00 Comms
1. there was no interorganiztion communication between the civilian groups
2. COMMS from the refugee camp back to the MOC did not always work
3. There was a good comms system between UN and military. The radio system worked very well
4. Intel information cycle of distribution was hampered by the lack of the SIPR net being activated upon arrival.  No other secure means of communications was established back to the ship for Intel updates.
5. camps need a PA system to pass word as not all troops and or refugees had radios or could hear verbal instructions
6. Communication was difficult to coordinate, many individules used personal cell phones which would/may not be plausable in certain real world locations
Comms Combined
10JUN00 Coordination
1. There needs to be more concise communication about the technologies that will be used in these types of exercises
2. need for better coordination and info exchange.
3. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
4. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
5. UN needs to be clearer about what it is doing when not visible/on site
6. To get in front of the problem we need to be better at identifying what are the most likely problems that will be encountered.
7. Need to sppeed up UN operational planning process without compromising the consensus discussions required and need to reach common agreement on objectives , priorities and actions
8. Testing systems while we are establishing relationships contribute to more chaos than would normally be encountered.
9. jumping to conclusions to be avoided, i.e. when people are not on site it does not mean they are enjoying the beach life
10. Reality of providing logistical support may not always be provided in the expected manner due to external difficulties.
11. UN needs to task better in order to ensure office and accommodation requirements met.
12. rain seemed to have come unexpectedly and some of the sleeping equipment is wet. Is somebody checking the weather forecast?
13. So far UN team was not given time and space that would normaly been available to discuss strategy and planning.
14. Camp design and configuration must be confirmed and changes must by posted at a central point to avoid confusion
15. There are a lot of opportunities to have free flowing discussions with the military. This informal communications adds to understanding eachother.
16. Understand that the MOC is the center for all logistical support.  If supplies are issued and vehicles dispatched without their knowledge, the CSSE does not have an acurate picture of what is truly available to be issued/used.
17. Somehow there needs to be more time for informal meetings together.  To often we mix informal with formal and there is something lost when we do that type of meeting.
18. Essential for UN teams to create and follow a meeting schedule which allows time for inter-agency coordination and collaboration.
19. it might be useful to have a tent where people can get together for informal discussions, a tent with some chairs and maybe something to drink (water or other),
20. Helicopter landing yesterday was poorly organised. Loads of confusion. Does not give confidence
21. Where are the meal times posted?  Some folks missed the food line because no one knew they were passing out hot meals
22. There needs to be a clearer understanding of who sets up the refugee camp.
23. The lines of communcation between the UN and the military needs to be opened a little more.  If the UN needs things done they should be willing and learning who they can go to.
24. better communication between all parties needs to be established and certain problems need to be explained better (i.e. yesterday the helicopter flights were delayed)
25. Much planning has gone into this exercise, from plans for the refugee camp layout, to safety parameters for civilian refugee volunteers, to availability of HLZ on site for medevacs, etc.  These planning documents have been ignored in favor of free flowing role-play.
26. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
27. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
12JUN00 Coordination
1. after visiting the camp this afternoon I got a strong impression that the "refugees" had not been briefed properly on what was in store for them
2. Regardless of late arrival a general camp meeting of all participants/refugees is required. To once again reiterate general camp management issues, schedules, who to go and see re problems etc.
3. Having Marine officer in charge at the refugee camp site is essential to getting tasks completed.
4. The JLC start up proved to be very useful.
5. refugee tents and cots were flying away this morning. Only two military were there to help them out. Someone should have monitored that situation, and guided the 'rescue'.
6. ha/dr is not a standard military operation, requires more information to be passed to the junior enlisted and officers,  You must be ready and flexible to meet unusual requests..
7. role play should be on for more than one day and indication regarding when to play should be given to refugee
8. quick establishment of a joint logistics cell is probably one of the most important coordination structures available:  it de-conflicts transport assets arriving and sets out procedures information sharing.  USMC provided useful fact file on their current capabilities.
9. Some how we need a better communication system for the Marines on the ground.  The people that we planned with know the score but the pass down needs to be spread out more to the guys doing the work
10. Issues with the IDs for the press and the vistors need to be worked out well before we begin the exercise.
11. in the refugee camp this afternoon I discovered that some of the lowere ranking military had absolutely no clue about what was going on. Information does not seem to be shared
12. Need to establish who is the person in chage of the refugee camp on the military side
13. Identfy new areas where the military can assist UNICEF -  at the troop level - need to tell the UNICEF reps what they see on their travels, patrols that day, hour, short time frame - in regards to children alone, abuses, abused women, etc.  Share the information in a timely enough manner to actual save/assist the situation.
14. some of military staff have no idea on who are the civilians participating in the exercise.  Need for better briefing on organisations they will have to cooperate with.
15. Need for more face to face amoung ":Like counterparts" - technical to technical, logisticians to logisticians, etc...
16. In future exercises with a civilian population, having a full time help/information person available to either answer questions/concerns and or direct  people to the appropriate contact person. The " refugees" would find such an individual very reassuring and it would provide a consistent  and single point of contact for problems.
13JUN00 Coordination
1. I noticed in the cmoc report from the camp, there is no mention of the UN agencies.
2. The media arriving at the base-camp sometimes arrived with no escort, or were not included on the pre-identified media list.  Had this been a real CMOC area/refugee site, many of the media who arrived unexpectedly would not have been admitted.
3. The relationship and coordination between all parties has evolved into a seemingly cohesive grouping resulting in speedy and sound decisions.
4. Exceptional weather/environment planning - sun, sandstorms and rain.  where is the weather guy anyway?
5. We need to exchange email & Address lists at next LL meeting.  It is the PERSONAL contacts that will help us in the future ev ents.  Lets not loose touch.
6. When we do experiments in the refugee area we need better coordination on physical and electronic requirements.  This went well but was frustrating for many...
7. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
8. Could we bring some of the junior officers (Lts) into the next LL.  They are doing a lot of the heavy lifting out here and having their perspective would be useful to help us finalize these lessons learned
9. Need to identify key NEW or Potential Points of Contact in the Government/Political areana to help smooth the military and public acceptance of the HADR Role.  UN - can you please help us identify them.
10. Some of the experimental personnel need to be a bit more aggressive.  The people with the Cell phones for the refugees sat in the camp all day waiting for someone to approach them.  They almost left with the Cell phones
14JUN00 Coordination
1. the religious needs and practices of the refugees need to be taken into consideration and met
2. there was no interorganiztion communication between the civilian groups
3. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOR THE RIMPAC GAME PLAY WAS INSUFFICIENT.
4. We were 50 to 60 Marines short to make up for all the working parties
5. There seemed to be an extreme lack of inclusion of OICs in the coordination and discussion of issues within the camp in conjunction with the UN/NGOs/notional HN
6. After the arrival of the refugee actors, we spent too much time trying to figure out whether the military or the UN was in charge of the camp.
7. COMMS from the refugee camp back to the MOC did not always work
8. refugees need to arrive earlier in the day to properly inprocess them and allow for role play from the start
9. have more information for those not in the planning stages so final execution does not seem so haphazard.
10. More coordination needs to made between the higher personnel in the UN agencies and the military leadership concerning what their actual partication will be in the refugee camp.
11. The MPs needed a mechanism to coordinate people exiting and entering from different gates and from the camp to allow for better control of where people were at all times
12. Coordination for Intelligence MSL items were done in a vacuum,  all the key players were not involved.
13. To make  this an effective exercise, a coalition of militaries, US and non US and the UN/NGOs/HN should be involved in the management and creation of the camp.  My opinion this was unrealistic because it was a unilateral coordinated effort with Navy and Marines.  b
14. The Refugee camp appeared to be created without input from UN/NGO/HN or other US/Non US Military factions.  No true infrastructure set in the beginning until there were complaints/concerns.
15. better distinction between exercise control and exercise execution.
16. Early on in the exercise there needed to be better coordination between some of the civilian planners and the Marines that were on the ground
17. real refugees would not have the same transportation requirements
18. Consistant stable power was a number one requirement for the civilians and I am not sure that was a number one priority for the Marines
19. Provide some sort of transfer of information before the exercise begins concerning persons exact responsibilities so they will know who to contact when dealing with problems.
20. CMOC and refugee camps were set up too late. Camp was not ready by the time the UN ror refugees came in
21. CECG for Intel input was not as responsive as it needed to be.  Personnel spent the majority ot the exercise at the Ref Camp. No intel info could be passed nor evaluated from thier perspective.
22. Front load ALL OICs/Heads together or an appropriate forum by the UN/NGO/HN experts so that we can understand the mission rather than at the end when frustration/misunderstanding has already set in.
23. Communication was difficult to coordinate, many individules used personal cell phones which would/may not be plausable in certain real world locations
24. For the sake of safety,  it is essential for a distincition to be made between exercise exercise and actual actual as not all role players did so causing confusion  and even unsafe conditions at times.
25. More workers need to be sent on the advanced party to prepare for the arrival of Marines
26. Some entity/office needs to coordinate the individual NGO/PVO groups to ensure support can be consolidated to reduce the peacemeal way requests for assistance would come in from the MOC
27. Embarkl:
Significant safety issues with stuffing Marins and Sailor into LCAC the thrwing gear over top of them.  Two sticks went in this way.  if there had been a MISHAP there would have been no way to evac the Cabin
Coordination Combined
10JUN00 Objectives
1. Each Agency has different priorities and needs - at the operational planning phase - we need to identify the phases and priorities and the ACTUAL ACTUAL time lines.
2. There needs to be more concise communication about the technologies that will be used in these types of exercises
3. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
4. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
5. Tests and new developments are very important, yet, the establishment of functional organizations to deal with the issues at hand are as difficult to build as the new tested systems.
6. The safety of the actual refugees is paramount.  Seemingly too much attention paid to role-playing and other "exercise" parts of the mission and not enough attention to the actual needs of civilian refugee volunteers under our care.
7. This operation may have been a bit too ambiguous.  Trying to do civil military cooperation,  humanitian assistance,  equipment  testing  and develp command relationships all in two weeks is creates too many competing  priorities
8. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
12JUN00 Objectives
1. There seems some confusion on what is exercise control and what is exercise execution.
2. Need to put a media training aspect into the exercise.
13JUN00 Objectives
1. The transition matrix looks useful.
2. The relationship and coordination between all parties has evolved into a seemingly cohesive grouping resulting in speedy and sound decisions.
3. increased interactions on one on one basis have proved to be very useful and informative.
4. The close coordination between the agencies executing the refugee support has proven to show we can work together.
5. Cmoc role in the camp working with  the refugees and coordinating information was very impressive.
6. CommandNet is up and running in the ref camp and CA is using it to enter reports
7. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
8. Too little attention is being paid to assisting the host population. This is imperative in order to ensure relations, PR value, smooth and efficient exit as well as ensuring that they receive some tangible benefits
9. After days of hard and sometimes unrewarding work the Marines have managed to keep efficiency and sense of humor. Good and very informative informal discussions with them in the camp, help to better understand how they operate.
14JUN00 Objectives
1. the specific role of the military was not clearly defined..
2. After the arrival of the refugee actors, we spent too much time trying to figure out whether the military or the UN was in charge of the camp.
3. there needs to be a clear and concise mission statement developed and this needs to be spelled out to all of the participants especially that  the more junior participants have a better understanding as to why they are here
4. working with actual civilians and not Marines playing civilians was great training, and is the best way to prepare for HA/DR ops
5. It seemed like every civilian thought they could tell a Marine what to do, and they expected the Marine to jump when told to do something.
6. It seemed like every civilian thought they could tell a Marine what to do, and they expected the Marine to jump when told to do something.
7. the training was fairly realisitc, but at the same time real refugees would not be treated nearly the same way, i.e. complaints ect.....
8. If the ultimate goal is self sufficency for the refugees, self-sufficency should be preached from the very begining of the excersize in order to determine what the true mission of each organization throughout.
Objectives Combined
10JUN00 Scheduling
1. Confusion about Coordination meeting between various meetings at the CMOC, Capitol, & Local Govt.  Need Poted agreed to schedule
2. scheduled meetings need to take place as planned and if the scheduled time changes, all concerned need to be informed (central board)
3. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
4. Review and confirm plans for the registration and initial care of the refugees at least 24 hours in advance
5. Meeting times and locations need to be posted...there has been to much confusion
6. Essential for UN teams to create and follow a meeting schedule which allows time for inter-agency coordination and collaboration.
7. Building more time into the exercise that would have allowed for more interaction with the participants of the CMOC would have allowed us to establish more creditability with each other.
8. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
12JUN00 Scheduling
1. UN should be present earlier in the camp (like 7 am) so the refugees have someone to turn to with questions.
2. after visiting the camp this afternoon I got a strong impression that the "refugees" had not been briefed properly on what was in store for them
13JUN00 Scheduling
1. Having some spare time to discuss issues in a more relaxed manner today proved valuable
2. Let's not forget that ENDEX does not come until mid-day on the 15th.  Now that the Admirals, other DVs and press have gone, we still have a mission to support.
3. The tools used to capture lessons learned have been useful.  Keeping the meeting under an hour is critical
4. The briefing for the VIPs provided a good overview of the exercise and where we were at.  Maybe a time out mid exercise would be useful to take stock of the exercise.
5. Pre-assigned aIr missions should be validated within 4-8 hours before the mission is flown.
6. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
14JUN00 Scheduling
1. There needed to be set times for transportation of the civilians established and edhered to.
Scheduling Combined
10JUN00 Philosophy
1. With arrival ashore the only thing that is for sure is nothing is a given.
2. Before  introducing new tools and technologies - it is better to gain consensus first.
3. The ability to determine what is going to happen in an unsure situation is incressed by experance.
4. Flexibility and patients have been exceptional by all parties.  THe key to good communications is courtesty and desire to do the right thing.
5. Number of observors seems superior in some meetings to number of reel players.
6. Just like in real life it is difficult to build a little town on a tropical island from scratch.  Patience with the various parts of the Combat Service Support Detachment is appreciated.  When you look around outside there are a bunch of very hard working young men and women doing the best they can.
7. jumping to conclusions to be avoided, i.e. when people are not on site it does not mean they are enjoying the beach life
8. The Military and the Civilian communities have different procedures and methods and each feels at an uncomfortable disadvantage when required to conform to the other
9. There are a lot of opportunities to have free flowing discussions with the military. This informal communications adds to understanding eachother.
10. The disproportionate human resources available to the military can easily overwhelm the civilian teams.
11. This exercise is not being taken as seriously as it should.  I am not saying the military or the UN is not taking it seriously.  Even though we do not have 80,000 refugees it should be treated as such; therefore, we should all train as if this were real life.
12. It makes for a lot better stories afterward if it rains on you during an event like this.
13. The UN team feels that it is  not fully aware of all the research areas being piloted . They feel defensive and put on the spot when asked to accept or agree to participate in experiments which have not been discussed with them
14. Lack of real urgency and absence of other usual key partners should be taken into consideration in analysis and evaluation of exercise.
15. It is a basic challenge for the UN to decide how much they would like to depend on the military to provide services/support which will profoundly define the level of the UN services. E.g. if we would have brought our own tents, WE define when the tents go up. If we bring our own generators, WE define when the service is up. It is scary to think that some of our core functions might not be provided because a third party (the military) provides some parts which will directly affect our service level
16. This operation may have been a bit too ambiguous.  Trying to do civil military cooperation,  humanitian assistance,  equipment  testing  and develp command relationships all in two weeks is creates too many competing  priorities
12JUN00 Philosophy
1. There seems some confusion on what is exercise control and what is exercise execution.
2. Military has to be prepared to do much more than they expect.
3. The military needs to bring more females to HA refugee situations as over 50% of refugees are women.
4. Discussion of Field CMOC vs. Capital CMOC very helpful.  In future need Political/Ambassador involvement.
5. The military needs to be much more prepared for children.
6. ha/dr is not a standard military operation, requires more information to be passed to the junior enlisted and officers,  You must be ready and flexible to meet unusual requests..
7. There is a very direct communications line between UN and the military. This helps to resolve problems.
8. quick establishment of a joint logistics cell is probably one of the most important coordination structures available:  it de-conflicts transport assets arriving and sets out procedures information sharing.  USMC provided useful fact file on their current capabilities.
9. Inprocessing concerns =- accounatbility vs force protection vs. refugee relief.  Good discussions, reviews of perceptions and actual practice.  One refugee stated that her community hurrican evacuation team had learned so much that day with the transit to the refugee site.  In the future they will provide shade & Comfort, then water and worry about the paperwork later.
10. Holding a mock press briefing was useful since it allowed us to focus on the questions and issues the media will continue to raise during emergencies involving both the military and UN relief agencies.
11. for such type of assignment, more female staff should be present within military personnel deployed. Important to deal with issues affecting female refugees requiring female staff only.
12. For future consideration:  Look at different scenarios (displaced persons, due to strife,  natural or manmade disasters), focus on the coordination at various levels by separating Capitol from CMOC from relief site and ensure those site are separated to avoid confusion.  Use fixed facilities to avoid losing focus on UN/military interaction vice infrastructure.
13. Civilian advisors should be, and generally are, curtous to the military on the ground.  This has not alway been the case and has made UN reps a little uncomfortable...
14. Recommend that more value is gained in an HA exercise with so many higher level participants that vice using an FTX format a TEWT (tactical exercise without troops) would be more useful in garnering SOP's and understanding between organizations.  Items that need to have actual people being the refugees (for exeriments) we could do that in a seperate yet parallel.
15. Angry volunteers could significnt damage the prospect of this type of exercise in the future, even if we meet all other objectives.  Lets redouble our effort to create "happy campers."  Note: a group of 40 that is 100% positive may be better than a group of 60 that is only 75% positive.
16. In real environment, more infrastructure would be set up at refugee camp -- less focus on supporting base that serves less of a function in a humanitarian context.
17. Keeping a sense of humour is critical
13JUN00 Philosophy
1. Having some spare time to discuss issues in a more relaxed manner today proved valuable
2. Press & DV's seemed to add additional focus, revitalization to our mission.
3. DV/Media day mov es the focus from relief effort to supporting the visit
4. some planning tools used by the military can be adapted and useful to the UN.
5. The force protection element within the CMOC and refugee camp were extremely uncomfortable with the free acess of the media within the basecamps.
6. Starting last night with the showers, thing improved in the refugee camp greatly.  When dealing with refugees the policy should be ....do not over promise.  It destroys trust.  The rule should be...Under promise, over perform.
7. "Traditional" telemedicine ie care to a single indvidual is inappropriate in a mass HA situation except for possible care to aid providers.
8. In real life many unauthorized people enter the camp.  The camp is not a prison.
9. The length of time in playing to problem has been good.  However, a period of time built into the exercise to allow for the many additional items we have found to be helpful would be helpful for the next HA; -discussions on each others organizations, -discussions on capabilities, -education to the refugees on the overall help they would receive and what would be happening to each to them, and informal discussions on how we could improve each other.
10. The media and press would have enjoyed listening and watching one of our daily CMOC meetings in action.
11. Too little attention is being paid to assisting the host population. This is imperative in order to ensure relations, PR value, smooth and efficient exit as well as ensuring that they receive some tangible benefits
14JUN00 Philosophy
1. the religious needs and practices of the refugees need to be taken into consideration and met
2. the TO&E of the military does not completely accomidate a civilian requirement...we should build a support package that more readily meets this unique mission
3. there needs to be a clear and concise mission statement developed and this needs to be spelled out to all of the participants especially that  the more junior participants have a better understanding as to why they are here
4. To make  this an effective exercise, a coalition of militaries, US and non US and the UN/NGOs/HN should be involved in the management and creation of the camp.  My opinion this was unrealistic because it was a unilateral coordinated effort with Navy and Marines.  b
5. Felt that a lot of people were involved in the lessons learned. hope all feedback will be taken care of
6. I was surprised at the lack of UN presence in the refugee camp.  The UNHCR flag was hoisted, but seldom was their anyone from the UN on site.
7. This should be exercised regularly (annually?) to include ALL appropriate components/activities/organizations.
8. Parts of this evolution were not very plausable, much of the requirements of this camp would never have supported an emcampment of a large number of refugees >500
9. the training was fairly realisitc, but at the same time real refugees would not be treated nearly the same way, i.e. complaints ect.....
10. Front load ALL OICs/Heads together or an appropriate forum by the UN/NGO/HN experts so that we can understand the mission rather than at the end when frustration/misunderstanding has already set in.
11. realisticly, would refugees be promised certain things contractually.  support and assistance comes and gives people assistance when they have nothing, and they receive support as it is available barring unforseen problems.
12. If civilians are ever used for an exercise again.  They need to have a clearer undersnding of what there role is.  Real refugees do not get treated the way these ones did.
13. As OICs who will be teaching and directing our personnel would have wanted more interaction with UN/NGO/HN leadership with their input/lessons learned as the exercise evolved.  How can we teach our personnel without an accurate  understanding of the thought process?
14. Intelligence was not a major player in this exercise, but was relied on heavely for daily briefs on the current situations around the camp and in other (notional) countries.  Intel reps from the exercising command sholud be included in the planning phases of future HA/DR exercise to ensure that thier own mission of providing the best intel support for the command is accomplished.
15. We received our rules of engagement but what were the rules of engagement for the UN/NGO/HN??
16. The obstacles we faced (equipment breakdown, misunderstanding of mission, poor communication of expectations by those in charge of the exercise) added an element of realism to the exercise.  A perfectly scripted, no obstacles exercise would have been unrealistic and boring.
17. The military seems to always "put on a show" whenever they deal with civilian organizations, why is it necessary to put up a facade. If there is a need to change the military when the spotlight is on, maybe those changes should be implemented permanently, or the spotlight should reveal the "real" way things are done.
18. I was hoping to see how to resolve more problems without throwng money at them.
19. Marines need to train as the fight which means weapons
20. If the ultimate goal is self sufficency for the refugees, self-sufficency should be preached from the very begining of the excersize in order to determine what the true mission of each organization throughout.
Philosophy Combined
10JUN00 Exercise Planning
1. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
2. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
3. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
4. To get in front of the problem we need to be better at identifying what are the most likely problems that will be encountered.
5. The exercise control group needs a more robust cell - perhaps with an NGO?
6. So far UN team was not given time and space that would normaly been available to discuss strategy and planning.
7. Camp design and configuration must be confirmed and changes must by posted at a central point to avoid confusion
8. The military brought a much smaller security force than they would for a real operation specifically because they were directed to by the exercise planners in order to have everyone be a little more comfortable.
9. Green Government representation and interaction need to be strengthened to bring more reality to scenario.
10. The safety of the actual refugees is paramount.  Seemingly too much attention paid to role-playing and other "exercise" parts of the mission and not enough attention to the actual needs of civilian refugee volunteers under our care.
11. There needs to be a clearer understanding of who sets up the refugee camp.
12. Building more time into the exercise that would have allowed for more interaction with the participants of the CMOC would have allowed us to establish more creditability with each other.
13. The UN team feels that it is  not fully aware of all the research areas being piloted . They feel defensive and put on the spot when asked to accept or agree to participate in experiments which have not been discussed with them
14. Lack of real urgency and absence of other usual key partners should be taken into consideration in analysis and evaluation of exercise.
15. Much planning has gone into this exercise, from plans for the refugee camp layout, to safety parameters for civilian refugee volunteers, to availability of HLZ on site for medevacs, etc.  These planning documents have been ignored in favor of free flowing role-play.
16. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
17. It is a basic challenge for the UN to decide how much they would like to depend on the military to provide services/support which will profoundly define the level of the UN services. E.g. if we would have brought our own tents, WE define when the tents go up. If we bring our own generators, WE define when the service is up. It is scary to think that some of our core functions might not be provided because a third party (the military) provides some parts which will directly affect our service level
18. Need road improvements as safety and security priority... as well as for operational and exercise rationality
19. The refugee camp should be set up when the notice of refugee are to arrive is given, not wait until they are schedule arrive.
20. This operation may have been a bit too ambiguous.  Trying to do civil military cooperation,  humanitian assistance,  equipment  testing  and develp command relationships all in two weeks is creates too many competing  priorities
21. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
12JUN00 Exercise Planning
1. There seems some confusion on what is exercise control and what is exercise execution.
2. Military has to be prepared to do much more than they expect.
3. after visiting the camp this afternoon I got a strong impression that the "refugees" had not been briefed properly on what was in store for them
4. The USMC is either expected to do to much or undermaned for this exercise.  These guys are doing a great job but they are killing themselves and their equipment.
5. In some cases, particularly where cross border displaced persons are concerned, the initial interview should be done in private so that the information given is not overheard by other people.
6. scope of overall mission was underestimated.  Millitary personnel were simultanously involved in CMOC construction, refugee camp construction and VIP visits and had difficulty prioritizing effort.
7. Again we have proven that we need constant power to do anything we computers in camp.  Or we should have solid UPS systems in place
8. Having Marine officer in charge at the refugee camp site is essential to getting tasks completed.
9. The military needs to bring more females to HA refugee situations as over 50% of refugees are women.
10. On these types of missions, a Military Information Support Team (MIST) is very useful to communicate inside the camp, within the JTF, and, in some cases, with permission, with the host nation populace.
11. Discussion of Field CMOC vs. Capital CMOC very helpful.  In future need Political/Ambassador involvement.
12. There are so many activities going on, I believe that few people have a clear idea of what is happening.    This includes refugees, soldiers, technical people and UN.
13. The military needs to be much more prepared for children.
14. Camp Management System for exercise of this nature must be coordinated during the planning phase and in the CMOC afloat.
15. Huge footprint at CMOC Camp is to support relief operation at refugee camp with small Marine footprint.  Hard to role-play/exercise whilst Marines at refugee camp are stretched to provide actual essential services such as showers.
16. How to ensure host population needs are met in both exercise and in reality needs further consideration.
17. Need to put a media training aspect into the exercise.
18. Issues with the IDs for the press and the vistors need to be worked out well before we begin the exercise.
19. in the refugee camp this afternoon I discovered that some of the lowere ranking military had absolutely no clue about what was going on. Information does not seem to be shared
20. We should begin collecting basic data within the camp (e.g., CMR, U5MR, under or mal nourishment, births, etc.).
21. Coordination of In-Flow process requires three plans:  The Primary Plan, the Contingency Plan and the Fall-back Plan.  Also need to identify key indices on when/what is necessary to move onto the next plan.
22. UNHCR is not actually responsible for the refugee volunteers.  Real concerns need to be addressed by the CSSD.
23. for such type of assignment, more female staff should be present within military personnel deployed. Important to deal with issues affecting female refugees requiring female staff only.
24. Would be good if all marines could be briefed in an info session what the UN does, what we do as an agency, what we do in real life. A lot of them are very interested and when confronted on a 1-on-1 basis, they are full of curiosity and interest.
25. Would have been good to separate the actual provision of assistance from those role-playing the exercise.  That would separate those requests that are notional from those that are actual.  Better instruction on this aspect of the exercise from the exercise control group would have helped -- perhaps through an opening brief when we all arrived on BI and before we started the ex.
26. Next time we should have a fulltime "real" government offical playing the roll fulltime during the exercise
27. some of military staff have no idea on who are the civilians participating in the exercise.  Need for better briefing on organisations they will have to cooperate with.
28. The location for the exercise was less imporant then the process we tried to coordinate .  The exercise would have met with as much success and considerably less effort if it had been planned at PTA, or another less challenging area..
29. In future exercises with a civilian population, having a full time help/information person available to either answer questions/concerns and or direct  people to the appropriate contact person. The " refugees" would find such an individual very reassuring and it would provide a consistent  and single point of contact for problems.
30. In a 'real' environment, UN would not hold office long in a tent environment like the one we have now. It would kill the equipment, and undermine people's health.
31. As conditions at  CMOC worsen, we should evaluate if some meetings in better conditions would improve our productivity.
13JUN00 Exercise Planning
1. VIP visits can happen within the first week of an emergency -- on day three in East 	Timor the 	UN and INTERFET hadf a 15 high level delegation.  Todays visit was in a way realistic.
2. OK, no one wants another meeting, but a fifteen minute briefing by each organization (perhaps one a night, preferably with a good written handout) would be useful to familiarize everyone with the participating agencies.
3. Visitors and Press seemed to be able to wander about without much 'supervision'.  Perhaps a bit more structure to their tours might be warrented.
4. At the beginning of the exercise, all UN agencies should have briefed the military staff (all of them) about what they are doing. Some of the guys still have no idea what the different UN organisations do and what they stand for.
5. The young, enlisted Marines have learnt a great deal by observation of the practical workings of the UN  Have they had any briefings by the Agencies on their roles similar to those given on the Coronado.  Some simplified technical background would reinforce the practical lessons they have learnt.
6. Publications that describe each participants' organization, capabilities and requirements, burned on a CD in any popular format, would be a great "take home" item.
7. Best "Actual Actual" Media Question - one local journalist said that when local residents heard about Operation Strong Angel they believed a huge natural disaster was on its way to the Big Island.
8. Either actual NGOs or personnel role-playing them would have been a valuable addition to the exercise.
9. Starting last night with the showers, thing improved in the refugee camp greatly.  When dealing with refugees the policy should be ....do not over promise.  It destroys trust.  The rule should be...Under promise, over perform.
10. The visit of the admiral was very well timed. Such VIP visits happen in real emergencies and despite all the work that needs to be done, time has to be made for such VIP visits as they are often related to funding and/or PR.
11. Senior military leadership visited today and added some interesting perspective.   The perspective from comparable personnel from UNICEF, UHHCR, etc. would, I'm sure, have been equally or more valuable.
12. When we do experiments in the refugee area we need better coordination on physical and electronic requirements.  This went well but was frustrating for many...
13. Would the addition of a DART from the U.S. State Dept be helpful? What about other NGO's?
14. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
15. Could we bring some of the junior officers (Lts) into the next LL.  They are doing a lot of the heavy lifting out here and having their perspective would be useful to help us finalize these lessons learned
16. Too little attention is being paid to assisting the host population. This is imperative in order to ensure relations, PR value, smooth and efficient exit as well as ensuring that they receive some tangible benefits
17. It hindsight, it probably would have been a good idea to have released an "actual" press release on the "notional" emergency for the journalists today - since a few seemed a little confused.
18. This has been (and still is) a very good learning exercise for everybody. If a similar exercise is planned for the future, it might be good to extend it, i.e. invite NGOs
14JUN00 Exercise Planning
1. the base and refugee camps need to either be closer together or a better means of transportation between the two
2. the TO&E of the military does not completely accomidate a civilian requirement...we should build a support package that more readily meets this unique mission
3. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOR THE RIMPAC GAME PLAY WAS INSUFFICIENT.
4. We were 50 to 60 Marines short to make up for all the working parties
5. We were 50 to 60 Marines short to make up for all the working parties
6. There seemed to be an extreme lack of inclusion of OICs in the coordination and discussion of issues within the camp in conjunction with the UN/NGOs/notional HN
7. there was no clear plan of action for the intial days for the refugees
8. the transportation requirements seemed very unrealistic
9. refugees need to arrive earlier in the day to properly inprocess them and allow for role play from the start
10. there needs to be a clear and concise mission statement developed and this needs to be spelled out to all of the participants especially that  the more junior participants have a better understanding as to why they are here
11. on the military side, the t/e and t/o should have been larger
12. The MPs needed a mechanism to coordinate people exiting and entering from different gates and from the camp to allow for better control of where people were at all times
13. Coordination for Intelligence MSL items were done in a vacuum,  all the key players were not involved.
14. I was surprised at the lack of UN presence in the refugee camp.  The UNHCR flag was hoisted, but seldom was their anyone from the UN on site.
15. The Refugee camp appeared to be created without input from UN/NGO/HN or other US/Non US Military factions.  No true infrastructure set in the beginning until there were complaints/concerns.
16. better distinction between exercise control and exercise execution.
17. real refugees would not have the same transportation requirements
18. This should be exercised regularly (annually?) to include ALL appropriate components/activities/organizations.
19. Consistant stable power was a number one requirement for the civilians and I am not sure that was a number one priority for the Marines
20. Provide some sort of transfer of information before the exercise begins concerning persons exact responsibilities so they will know who to contact when dealing with problems.
21. CMOC and refugee camps were set up too late. Camp was not ready by the time the UN ror refugees came in
22. Working with UN agency personnel has been very enlightening.  This exercise has enhanced our understanding of HA operations and will facilitate smooth coordination with NGOs/PVOs in future exercises/operations.
23. At the Refugee Camp, it was hard to figure out what was real and what was pretend.  It made every scenerio hard to take seriously.
24. We need to know what actual and what is an exercise when dealing with scenarios.
25. The site for this exercised presented a number of challenges for the personnel and the equipment deployed.  If this is to be one again then we need to take a harder look at all the personnel and equipment required
26. realisticly, would refugees be promised certain things contractually.  support and assistance comes and gives people assistance when they have nothing, and they receive support as it is available barring unforseen problems.
27. The money provided to support this evolution was inadiquate
28. The money provided to support this evolution was inadiquate
29. terrain was not a big a part of the equation as it should have been i.e., how it effected equipment, especially electionics.
30. For the sake of safety,  it is essential for a distincition to be made between exercise exercise and actual actual as not all role players did so causing confusion  and even unsafe conditions at times.
31. the military should have one set of personnel trained/tasked for support the refugee site that are separate from that needed at the main camp  this would improve support and deconflict many requirements
32. More workers need to be sent on the advanced party to prepare for the arrival of Marines
33. Medical Mission Creep,
Multiple medical taskings arose that were not in the original training plan , i.e.,  HST ops.

The original medical  manning plan for refugee camp was IDC during the day and a general duty HM at night for emergencies only.  this changed by CADIF Surgeon and IDC had to remain 24/7.   "Fly the Brief"

Need to "fly the brief" we T/O'd enough HM's to do Original Mission, take care of Main Camp Marines and Marines at Refugee Camp.  We were to provide Emergency Aid ONLY to refugee site.  This changed in mid stream with our staff being sucked into "notional problems"  Sometimes into evening hours.  If this was the original plan we would have staffed for this plan.
34. Some entity/office needs to coordinate the individual NGO/PVO groups to ensure support can be consolidated to reduce the peacemeal way requests for assistance would come in from the MOC
35. Embarkl:
Significant safety issues with stuffing Marins and Sailor into LCAC the thrwing gear over top of them.  Two sticks went in this way.  if there had been a MISHAP there would have been no way to evac the Cabin
36. If the ultimate goal is self sufficency for the refugees, self-sufficency should be preached from the very begining of the excersize in order to determine what the true mission of each organization throughout.
Exercise Planning Combined
10JUN00 attaboy
1. From the military, received good, fast response on camp logistics requests
12JUN00 Attaboy
1. Don't forget the attaboys.  Everyone has worked long and hard for the past two days.
2. Refugee role play was excellent and personnel at the camp did well in reacting to the situations thrown at them.
3. The USMC is either expected to do to much or undermaned for this exercise.  These guys are doing a great job but they are killing themselves and their equipment.
4. Marines were very patient and friendly with refugees.
5. At least for the technical stuff, the military goes out of their way to please the UN.
6. MP Guard are silent heros, doing and excellent job and should be commend.
7. Despite some problems, I believe everybody (military, UN, etc.) deserves to be praised for the efforts made and for trying to solve whatever problems come along
8. There is a very direct communications line between UN and the military. This helps to resolve problems.
9. quick establishment of a joint logistics cell is probably one of the most important coordination structures available:  it de-conflicts transport assets arriving and sets out procedures information sharing.  USMC provided useful fact file on their current capabilities.
10. Things work better when focus is on objectives of Strong Angel -- especially Civ-Mil coordination/cooperation -- and not on plumbing issues.  Once minimum standards are met, it allows participants to freely interact.  This part of the exercise is going beautifully.
11. Holding a mock press briefing was useful since it allowed us to focus on the questions and issues the media will continue to raise during emergencies involving both the military and UN relief agencies.
12. Role players who arrived at the refugee camp were excellent.  The realistic scenarios they acted out challenged the military personnel during the processing.  The (real) activist who entered the refugee area challenged us even further.
13. some of the lessons learned and recommendations of two evenings ago were executed almost immediately. Praise to whomever took care of this.
14. Thanks to WFP for the excellent communications today between refugee camp site and the MOC during an actual actual.  The level of service provided is excellent.  Sharing comms between key participants in field operations is essential where we often have different systems.
15. UNHCR is doing a great job balancing the real issues with the refugees and is taking a lot of heat maybe should be directed to exercise control.  Thank you for all you are doing.
16. Marines have shown great flexibility in reacting to many changing and demanding situations!!!!!
17. Having the UN agencies assisting in the set-up and management was a great help.  I am very grateful for their participation.
18. We are all learning a great deal and the lessons learned here will help shape  the our abilit to respond effectively
19. All refugees last night were HIGHLY complementary of the troops.  THey stated that this went beyond the expected to personal interest and assistance!
13JUN00 Attaboy
1. Rotating junior officers to be in charge at the refugee camp site is good as it gives more Marines experience working with UN and civilians.   Lt. Burke, Lt. Schultz and Capt. Fillmore have all done a great job organizing the support required ad it is good that all have had that experience.
2. Noticed today that the navy + marine (oops, US Marine personnel) were better briefed on why they were here and who all the agencies were.  Good passage of info.
3. The relationship and coordination between all parties has evolved into a seemingly cohesive grouping resulting in speedy and sound decisions.
4. Refugee morale continues to be high, they are very appreciative of the work all are doing to support/train them
5. The close coordination between the agencies executing the refugee support has proven to show we can work together.
6. The MPs continue to do an outstanding job, especially at the camp site -- where they are being stretched with keeping real world security of the perimeter whilst enthusiastically participating in a lot of the role-playing going on.
7. Cmoc role in the camp working with  the refugees and coordinating information was very impressive.
8. While a distraction and very realistic, the visit by the admirals and press was received positively by the refugee role players
9. Press and Media personnel seemed very friendly and interested.  The whole camp did a great job of presenting all aspects of this exercise in a positive, creative light.
10. Colonel Long + Captain Fujimori should be commended for their excellent work.  They have stayed on top of the ball and have got the camp into good shape. 
In addition, I noticed that the toilets, which had formerly been plastered with fairly poor humour on their walls, had been cleaned this morning.  Not a great job to have to do, but someone did it; ataboy!
11. The flexibility of the Marines in not keeping strict meal or shower hours at the refugee camp to accomodate the less rigid schedule of the camp has been appreciated.
12. CommandNet is up and running in the ref camp and CA is using it to enter reports
13. Interestingly the refugees appear to regard VIP visits as evidence of interest at high levels.  On the other hand perhaps it was just an exciting break in camp boredom.  Either way, the refugees liked it.
14. The Admiral gave a good brief, and supported the J9 expirements -- he obviously wants his personnel not to be frightened of making a mistake; this is excellent in that we are here not just for lessons learnt, but for also finding new ways of doing things. Ataboy McGinn!
15. The whole operation in cmoc and the camp is runnng smoother...........things are geting better with more time together
16. After days of hard and sometimes unrewarding work the Marines have managed to keep efficiency and sense of humor. Good and very informative informal discussions with them in the camp, help to better understand how they operate.
17. The fact that everyone has been so honest, open, and forthright in their participation is appreciated.
14JUN00 Attaboy
1. The military very clearly went out of their way to make the UN folks feel comfortable. The practical support we had was tremendous.
2. The EOD guys did a great job explaining about how to id uxo and what to do if you see some on the site
3. There was a good comms system between UN and military. The radio system worked very well
4. great food
5. Civil Affairs did a great job working with the refugees and initiating the phase out of Marine support at the refugee camp.
6. the intel people were very helpfull in submitting sitreps after eod drills
7. Military did not come to show off, they came to participate, and to coordinate
8. working with actual civilians and not Marines playing civilians was great training, and is the best way to prepare for HA/DR ops
9. The Marines were very professional to the cilivans and worked their butts off to make everyone happy.  THANK YOU!!!
10. The obstacles we faced (equipment breakdown, misunderstanding of mission, poor communication of expectations by those in charge of the exercise) added an element of realism to the exercise.  A perfectly scripted, no obstacles exercise would have been unrealistic and boring.
11. Good excercises, we learned a lot.
12. dental support was outstanding...the appointments were flexible and provided on a walk in basis..great job
Attaboy Combined
12JUN00 Drinks
1. where is the coffee?
2. Refugees need good strong coffee
3. DOn't forget the tea
4. Why is Navy coffee so much better than Marine brown water?
5. joe needs to improve hs computer skills
6. what happened to the coffee
13JUN00 Drinks
1. DV/Media day mov es the focus from relief effort to supporting the visit
2. Again there is no good strong coffee available
3. Certain Marines don't know ho to use computers
4. Helo landing in the dust field was not necessary - we had not run out of dust yet.
5. Jim Rogers looks knackered!  Why!
6. The host nation Mc Donalds is doing fine thank you
7. I hope that we end soon -- I am thirsty
8. Has anyone else noticed that the tank trail (the good road) is not so good anymore???
14JUN00 Drinks
Drinks Combined
13JUN00 Hotwash
1. Strategic
2. Operational
3. Tactical
4. We have said on a number of occasions we need some time scheduled to discus some of the  more important/difficult issues in a more deliberate and rigorous manner. When will that be.....the after action/hot wash may not be the place
5. We may to define the end product required of the exercise and the time line required for its completion.
14JUN00 Very Important Lessons Learned
1. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOR THE RIMPAC GAME PLAY WAS INSUFFICIENT.
2. have more information for those not in the planning stages so final execution does not seem so haphazard.
3. More coordination needs to made between the higher personnel in the UN agencies and the military leadership concerning what their actual partication will be in the refugee camp.
4. Coordination for Intelligence MSL items were done in a vacuum,  all the key players were not involved.
5. Our (the military) understanding of the mission was to support the ability of the NGO/PVO organizations in performing a transition eg they would support refugees we would support them...this transition never seemed to materialize and resulted in over tasking
6. I was surprised at the lack of UN presence in the refugee camp.  The UNHCR flag was hoisted, but seldom was their anyone from the UN on site.
7. This should be exercised regularly (annually?) to include ALL appropriate components/activities/organizations.
8. Provide some sort of transfer of information before the exercise begins concerning persons exact responsibilities so they will know who to contact when dealing with problems.
9. The money provided to support this evolution was inadiquate
10. if the military is serious about learning how they  can best be utilized in excercises of this type, consider sending them to real world refugee crisisis around the world and acting in a voluntary role.

15JUN00 Combined Version 2 (Categorizer)

15JUN00 Camp Set Up Combined
1. 10JUN00 Camp Set up
2. Would like to have water tight tents
3. Would like to have more lights both on the CMOC campsite as well as in the tents
4. There have been a number of issues regrading the size of the tents available for each group...why is the experimental tent as large as the CMOC?
5. In the CMOC tent we should have better lighting
6. Getting power up and running to a few key areas ASAP needed to be done vice trying to do it for the whole camp
7. dust protected accomodations.
8. Yesterday when we were on the ground there were no guards at the gate, there was no single camp poc to ask for things like electricity and accomodations, etc.  Some how there should have been more advanced coordination.
9. There's only a few tent sizes available.
10. Lack of CMOC security yesterday was surprising.
11. Reality of providing logistical support may not always be provided in the expected manner due to external difficulties.
12. UN needs to task better in order to ensure office and accommodation requirements met.
13. So far UN team was not given time and space that would normaly been available to discuss strategy and planning.
14. Camp design and configuration must be confirmed and changes must by posted at a central point to avoid confusion
15. wooden pallets in the tents are not very stable and could be dangerous. The plastic sheeting when wet becomes slippery and could also pose a danger.
16. Having the electricity in the tents and water running all over the place seems dangerous to me
17. it might be useful to have a tent where people can get together for informal discussions, a tent with some chairs and maybe something to drink (water or other),
18. Several of the hardest working people out here appear to be the ones that are setting up and working on the generators.  We should all be a little patient with them.  Maybe by tommorrow the system will be running better.
19. Would like to have a tent where we can sit to eat.
20. There should be a coffee mess with soda and coffee somewhere for informal conversations.
21. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
22. There are a lot of comments that fit together about a comfortable lounge inside a tent with a few chairs and coffee, sodas and perhaps a snack available.
23. Need road improvements as safety and security priority... as well as for operational and exercise rationality
24. 12JUN00 Camp Setup
25. Huge footprint at CMOC Camp is to support relief operation at refugee camp with small Marine footprint.  Hard to role-play/exercise whilst Marines at refugee camp are stretched to provide actual essential services such as showers.
26. Establishment of a one stop shop at the refugee camp will help
27. The location for the exercise was less imporant then the process we tried to coordinate .  The exercise would have met with as much success and considerably less effort if it had been planned at PTA, or another less challenging area..
28. In a 'real' environment, UN would not hold office long in a tent environment like the one we have now. It would kill the equipment, and undermine people's health.
29. As conditions at  CMOC worsen, we should evaluate if some meetings in better conditions would improve our productivity.
30. In real environment, more infrastructure would be set up at refugee camp -- less focus on supporting base that serves less of a function in a humanitarian context.
31. 13JUN00 Camp Set up
32. Camp security actual and exercise needs to be addressed before thefts occur.  Tents with valuable equipment were repeatedly left unguarded and an exercise thief was able to clean out half the camp.
33. Refugee camp management system is fuly operational and fully will, need to tighten up on physical security of equipment and supplies
34. Camp Security  was not taken seriously enough in the exercise.  We are testing equipment and procedures in a rough environment (camp) where security awareness is necessary.
35. Visitors and Press seemed to be able to wander about without much 'supervision'.  Perhaps a bit more structure to their tours might be warrented.
36. The force protection element within the CMOC and refugee camp were extremely uncomfortable with the free acess of the media within the basecamps.
37. Starting last night with the showers, thing improved in the refugee camp greatly.  When dealing with refugees the policy should be ....do not over promise.  It destroys trust.  The rule should be...Under promise, over perform.
38. In real life many unauthorized people enter the camp.  The camp is not a prison.
39. The flexibility of the Marines in not keeping strict meal or shower hours at the refugee camp to accomodate the less rigid schedule of the camp has been appreciated.
40. When we do experiments in the refugee area we need better coordination on physical and electronic requirements.  This went well but was frustrating for many...
41. 14JUN00 Camp Set UP
42. the base and refugee camps need to either be closer together or a better means of transportation between the two
43. better tents at CMOC, water tight and better dust resistant. This was already a drag for this short time. If this was a longer operation, it would undermine moral and health. Well rested and fed people can cope much better with problems and the work load.
44. Environmental issue: 
A.   Grading Camp Site before erection of tents etc cause multiple respiratory problems
B.  lack of goggles for Military Personnel and taking goggles from SNCO's and Officers to give to Civilians was bad move.
45. Environmental issue: 
A.   Grading Camp Site before erection of tents etc cause multiple respiratory problems
B.  lack of goggles for Military Personnel and taking goggles from SNCO's and Officers to give to Civilians was bad move.
46. next time, do not level the camp. Leave as is, cut the grass short, but leave the roots in and remove the stones.
This will keep the soil fixed, and we will not have all of that dust flying around
47. pick a better base camp area
48. camps need a PA system to pass word as not all troops and or refugees had radios or could hear verbal instructions
49. Consistant stable power was a number one requirement for the civilians and I am not sure that was a number one priority for the Marines
50. Needed  more time to get the camp setup.
51. The site for this exercised presented a number of challenges for the personnel and the equipment deployed.  If this is to be one again then we need to take a harder look at all the personnel and equipment required
52. terrain was not a big a part of the equation as it should have been i.e., how it effected equipment, especially electionics.
15JUN00 Comms Combined
1. 10JUN00 Comms
2. The communications from the CMOC afloat to ashore did not go well and there is still no HF commo between both
3. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
4. 12JUN00 Comms
5. Identity  if items ACTUAL ACTUAL vs Exercise interjects- need to clarify the distinction -especially on 'open' comm systems
6. Again we have proven that we need constant power to do anything we computers in camp.  Or we should have solid UPS systems in place
7. There is a very direct communications line between UN and the military. This helps to resolve problems.
8. Some how we need a better communication system for the Marines on the ground.  The people that we planned with know the score but the pass down needs to be spread out more to the guys doing the work
9. some of military staff have no idea on who are the civilians participating in the exercise.  Need for better briefing on organisations they will have to cooperate with.
10. Thanks to WFP for the excellent communications today between refugee camp site and the MOC during an actual actual.  The level of service provided is excellent.  Sharing comms between key participants in field operations is essential where we often have different systems.
11. 13JUN00 Comms
12. 14JUN00 Comms
13. there was no interorganiztion communication between the civilian groups
14. COMMS from the refugee camp back to the MOC did not always work
15. There was a good comms system between UN and military. The radio system worked very well
16. Intel information cycle of distribution was hampered by the lack of the SIPR net being activated upon arrival.  No other secure means of communications was established back to the ship for Intel updates.
17. camps need a PA system to pass word as not all troops and or refugees had radios or could hear verbal instructions
18. Communication was difficult to coordinate, many individules used personal cell phones which would/may not be plausable in certain real world locations
15JUN00 Coordination Combined
1. 10JUN00 Coordination
2. There needs to be more concise communication about the technologies that will be used in these types of exercises
3. need for better coordination and info exchange.
4. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
5. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
6. UN needs to be clearer about what it is doing when not visible/on site
7. To get in front of the problem we need to be better at identifying what are the most likely problems that will be encountered.
8. Need to sppeed up UN operational planning process without compromising the consensus discussions required and need to reach common agreement on objectives , priorities and actions
9. Testing systems while we are establishing relationships contribute to more chaos than would normally be encountered.
10. jumping to conclusions to be avoided, i.e. when people are not on site it does not mean they are enjoying the beach life
11. Reality of providing logistical support may not always be provided in the expected manner due to external difficulties.
12. UN needs to task better in order to ensure office and accommodation requirements met.
13. rain seemed to have come unexpectedly and some of the sleeping equipment is wet. Is somebody checking the weather forecast?
14. So far UN team was not given time and space that would normaly been available to discuss strategy and planning.
15. Camp design and configuration must be confirmed and changes must by posted at a central point to avoid confusion
16. There are a lot of opportunities to have free flowing discussions with the military. This informal communications adds to understanding eachother.
17. Understand that the MOC is the center for all logistical support.  If supplies are issued and vehicles dispatched without their knowledge, the CSSE does not have an acurate picture of what is truly available to be issued/used.
18. Somehow there needs to be more time for informal meetings together.  To often we mix informal with formal and there is something lost when we do that type of meeting.
19. Essential for UN teams to create and follow a meeting schedule which allows time for inter-agency coordination and collaboration.
20. it might be useful to have a tent where people can get together for informal discussions, a tent with some chairs and maybe something to drink (water or other),
21. Helicopter landing yesterday was poorly organised. Loads of confusion. Does not give confidence
22. Where are the meal times posted?  Some folks missed the food line because no one knew they were passing out hot meals
23. There needs to be a clearer understanding of who sets up the refugee camp.
24. The lines of communcation between the UN and the military needs to be opened a little more.  If the UN needs things done they should be willing and learning who they can go to.
25. better communication between all parties needs to be established and certain problems need to be explained better (i.e. yesterday the helicopter flights were delayed)
26. Much planning has gone into this exercise, from plans for the refugee camp layout, to safety parameters for civilian refugee volunteers, to availability of HLZ on site for medevacs, etc.  These planning documents have been ignored in favor of free flowing role-play.
27. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
28. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
29. 12JUN00 Coordination
30. after visiting the camp this afternoon I got a strong impression that the "refugees" had not been briefed properly on what was in store for them
31. Regardless of late arrival a general camp meeting of all participants/refugees is required. To once again reiterate general camp management issues, schedules, who to go and see re problems etc.
32. Having Marine officer in charge at the refugee camp site is essential to getting tasks completed.
33. The JLC start up proved to be very useful.
34. refugee tents and cots were flying away this morning. Only two military were there to help them out. Someone should have monitored that situation, and guided the 'rescue'.
35. ha/dr is not a standard military operation, requires more information to be passed to the junior enlisted and officers,  You must be ready and flexible to meet unusual requests..
36. role play should be on for more than one day and indication regarding when to play should be given to refugee
37. quick establishment of a joint logistics cell is probably one of the most important coordination structures available:  it de-conflicts transport assets arriving and sets out procedures information sharing.  USMC provided useful fact file on their current capabilities.
38. Some how we need a better communication system for the Marines on the ground.  The people that we planned with know the score but the pass down needs to be spread out more to the guys doing the work
39. Issues with the IDs for the press and the vistors need to be worked out well before we begin the exercise.
40. in the refugee camp this afternoon I discovered that some of the lowere ranking military had absolutely no clue about what was going on. Information does not seem to be shared
41. Need to establish who is the person in chage of the refugee camp on the military side
42. Identfy new areas where the military can assist UNICEF -  at the troop level - need to tell the UNICEF reps what they see on their travels, patrols that day, hour, short time frame - in regards to children alone, abuses, abused women, etc.  Share the information in a timely enough manner to actual save/assist the situation.
43. some of military staff have no idea on who are the civilians participating in the exercise.  Need for better briefing on organisations they will have to cooperate with.
44. Need for more face to face amoung ":Like counterparts" - technical to technical, logisticians to logisticians, etc...
45. In future exercises with a civilian population, having a full time help/information person available to either answer questions/concerns and or direct  people to the appropriate contact person. The " refugees" would find such an individual very reassuring and it would provide a consistent  and single point of contact for problems.
46. 13JUN00 Coordination
47. I noticed in the cmoc report from the camp, there is no mention of the UN agencies.
48. The media arriving at the base-camp sometimes arrived with no escort, or were not included on the pre-identified media list.  Had this been a real CMOC area/refugee site, many of the media who arrived unexpectedly would not have been admitted.
49. The relationship and coordination between all parties has evolved into a seemingly cohesive grouping resulting in speedy and sound decisions.
50. Exceptional weather/environment planning - sun, sandstorms and rain.  where is the weather guy anyway?
51. We need to exchange email & Address lists at next LL meeting.  It is the PERSONAL contacts that will help us in the future ev ents.  Lets not loose touch.
52. When we do experiments in the refugee area we need better coordination on physical and electronic requirements.  This went well but was frustrating for many...
53. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
54. Could we bring some of the junior officers (Lts) into the next LL.  They are doing a lot of the heavy lifting out here and having their perspective would be useful to help us finalize these lessons learned
55. Need to identify key NEW or Potential Points of Contact in the Government/Political areana to help smooth the military and public acceptance of the HADR Role.  UN - can you please help us identify them.
56. Some of the experimental personnel need to be a bit more aggressive.  The people with the Cell phones for the refugees sat in the camp all day waiting for someone to approach them.  They almost left with the Cell phones
57. 14JUN00 Coordination
58. the religious needs and practices of the refugees need to be taken into consideration and met
59. there was no interorganiztion communication between the civilian groups
60. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOR THE RIMPAC GAME PLAY WAS INSUFFICIENT.
61. We were 50 to 60 Marines short to make up for all the working parties
62. There seemed to be an extreme lack of inclusion of OICs in the coordination and discussion of issues within the camp in conjunction with the UN/NGOs/notional HN
63. After the arrival of the refugee actors, we spent too much time trying to figure out whether the military or the UN was in charge of the camp.
64. COMMS from the refugee camp back to the MOC did not always work
65. refugees need to arrive earlier in the day to properly inprocess them and allow for role play from the start
66. have more information for those not in the planning stages so final execution does not seem so haphazard.
67. More coordination needs to made between the higher personnel in the UN agencies and the military leadership concerning what their actual partication will be in the refugee camp.
68. The MPs needed a mechanism to coordinate people exiting and entering from different gates and from the camp to allow for better control of where people were at all times
69. Coordination for Intelligence MSL items were done in a vacuum,  all the key players were not involved.
70. To make  this an effective exercise, a coalition of militaries, US and non US and the UN/NGOs/HN should be involved in the management and creation of the camp.  My opinion this was unrealistic because it was a unilateral coordinated effort with Navy and Marines.  b
71. The Refugee camp appeared to be created without input from UN/NGO/HN or other US/Non US Military factions.  No true infrastructure set in the beginning until there were complaints/concerns.
72. better distinction between exercise control and exercise execution.
73. Early on in the exercise there needed to be better coordination between some of the civilian planners and the Marines that were on the ground
74. real refugees would not have the same transportation requirements
75. Consistant stable power was a number one requirement for the civilians and I am not sure that was a number one priority for the Marines
76. Provide some sort of transfer of information before the exercise begins concerning persons exact responsibilities so they will know who to contact when dealing with problems.
77. CMOC and refugee camps were set up too late. Camp was not ready by the time the UN ror refugees came in
78. CECG for Intel input was not as responsive as it needed to be.  Personnel spent the majority ot the exercise at the Ref Camp. No intel info could be passed nor evaluated from thier perspective.
79. Front load ALL OICs/Heads together or an appropriate forum by the UN/NGO/HN experts so that we can understand the mission rather than at the end when frustration/misunderstanding has already set in.
80. Communication was difficult to coordinate, many individules used personal cell phones which would/may not be plausable in certain real world locations
81. For the sake of safety,  it is essential for a distincition to be made between exercise exercise and actual actual as not all role players did so causing confusion  and even unsafe conditions at times.
82. More workers need to be sent on the advanced party to prepare for the arrival of Marines
83. Some entity/office needs to coordinate the individual NGO/PVO groups to ensure support can be consolidated to reduce the peacemeal way requests for assistance would come in from the MOC
84. Embarkl:
Significant safety issues with stuffing Marins and Sailor into LCAC the thrwing gear over top of them.  Two sticks went in this way.  if there had been a MISHAP there would have been no way to evac the Cabin
15JUN00 Objectives Combined
1. 10JUN00 Objectives
2. Each Agency has different priorities and needs - at the operational planning phase - we need to identify the phases and priorities and the ACTUAL ACTUAL time lines.
3. There needs to be more concise communication about the technologies that will be used in these types of exercises
4. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
5. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
6. Tests and new developments are very important, yet, the establishment of functional organizations to deal with the issues at hand are as difficult to build as the new tested systems.
7. The safety of the actual refugees is paramount.  Seemingly too much attention paid to role-playing and other "exercise" parts of the mission and not enough attention to the actual needs of civilian refugee volunteers under our care.
8. This operation may have been a bit too ambiguous.  Trying to do civil military cooperation,  humanitian assistance,  equipment  testing  and develp command relationships all in two weeks is creates too many competing  priorities
9. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
10. 12JUN00 Objectives
11. There seems some confusion on what is exercise control and what is exercise execution.
12. Need to put a media training aspect into the exercise.
13. 13JUN00 Objectives
14. The transition matrix looks useful.
15. The relationship and coordination between all parties has evolved into a seemingly cohesive grouping resulting in speedy and sound decisions.
16. increased interactions on one on one basis have proved to be very useful and informative.
17. The close coordination between the agencies executing the refugee support has proven to show we can work together.
18. Cmoc role in the camp working with  the refugees and coordinating information was very impressive.
19. CommandNet is up and running in the ref camp and CA is using it to enter reports
20. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
21. Too little attention is being paid to assisting the host population. This is imperative in order to ensure relations, PR value, smooth and efficient exit as well as ensuring that they receive some tangible benefits
22. After days of hard and sometimes unrewarding work the Marines have managed to keep efficiency and sense of humor. Good and very informative informal discussions with them in the camp, help to better understand how they operate.
23. 14JUN00 Objectives
24. the specific role of the military was not clearly defined..
25. After the arrival of the refugee actors, we spent too much time trying to figure out whether the military or the UN was in charge of the camp.
26. there needs to be a clear and concise mission statement developed and this needs to be spelled out to all of the participants especially that  the more junior participants have a better understanding as to why they are here
27. working with actual civilians and not Marines playing civilians was great training, and is the best way to prepare for HA/DR ops
28. It seemed like every civilian thought they could tell a Marine what to do, and they expected the Marine to jump when told to do something.
29. It seemed like every civilian thought they could tell a Marine what to do, and they expected the Marine to jump when told to do something.
30. the training was fairly realisitc, but at the same time real refugees would not be treated nearly the same way, i.e. complaints ect.....
31. If the ultimate goal is self sufficency for the refugees, self-sufficency should be preached from the very begining of the excersize in order to determine what the true mission of each organization throughout.
15JUN00 Scheduling Combined
1. 10JUN00 Scheduling
2. Confusion about Coordination meeting between various meetings at the CMOC, Capitol, & Local Govt.  Need Poted agreed to schedule
3. scheduled meetings need to take place as planned and if the scheduled time changes, all concerned need to be informed (central board)
4. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
5. Review and confirm plans for the registration and initial care of the refugees at least 24 hours in advance
6. Meeting times and locations need to be posted...there has been to much confusion
7. Essential for UN teams to create and follow a meeting schedule which allows time for inter-agency coordination and collaboration.
8. Building more time into the exercise that would have allowed for more interaction with the participants of the CMOC would have allowed us to establish more creditability with each other.
9. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
10. 12JUN00 Scheduling
11. UN should be present earlier in the camp (like 7 am) so the refugees have someone to turn to with questions.
12. after visiting the camp this afternoon I got a strong impression that the "refugees" had not been briefed properly on what was in store for them
13. 13JUN00 Scheduling
14. Having some spare time to discuss issues in a more relaxed manner today proved valuable
15. Let's not forget that ENDEX does not come until mid-day on the 15th.  Now that the Admirals, other DVs and press have gone, we still have a mission to support.
16. The tools used to capture lessons learned have been useful.  Keeping the meeting under an hour is critical
17. The briefing for the VIPs provided a good overview of the exercise and where we were at.  Maybe a time out mid exercise would be useful to take stock of the exercise.
18. Pre-assigned aIr missions should be validated within 4-8 hours before the mission is flown.
19. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
20. 14JUN00 Scheduling
21. There needed to be set times for transportation of the civilians established and edhered to.
15JUN00 Philosophy Combined
1. 10JUN00 Philosophy
2. With arrival ashore the only thing that is for sure is nothing is a given.
3. Before  introducing new tools and technologies - it is better to gain consensus first.
4. The ability to determine what is going to happen in an unsure situation is incressed by experance.
5. Flexibility and patients have been exceptional by all parties.  THe key to good communications is courtesty and desire to do the right thing.
6. Number of observors seems superior in some meetings to number of reel players.
7. Just like in real life it is difficult to build a little town on a tropical island from scratch.  Patience with the various parts of the Combat Service Support Detachment is appreciated.  When you look around outside there are a bunch of very hard working young men and women doing the best they can.
8. jumping to conclusions to be avoided, i.e. when people are not on site it does not mean they are enjoying the beach life
9. The Military and the Civilian communities have different procedures and methods and each feels at an uncomfortable disadvantage when required to conform to the other
10. There are a lot of opportunities to have free flowing discussions with the military. This informal communications adds to understanding eachother.
11. The disproportionate human resources available to the military can easily overwhelm the civilian teams.
12. This exercise is not being taken as seriously as it should.  I am not saying the military or the UN is not taking it seriously.  Even though we do not have 80,000 refugees it should be treated as such; therefore, we should all train as if this were real life.
13. It makes for a lot better stories afterward if it rains on you during an event like this.
14. The UN team feels that it is  not fully aware of all the research areas being piloted . They feel defensive and put on the spot when asked to accept or agree to participate in experiments which have not been discussed with them
15. Lack of real urgency and absence of other usual key partners should be taken into consideration in analysis and evaluation of exercise.
16. It is a basic challenge for the UN to decide how much they would like to depend on the military to provide services/support which will profoundly define the level of the UN services. E.g. if we would have brought our own tents, WE define when the tents go up. If we bring our own generators, WE define when the service is up. It is scary to think that some of our core functions might not be provided because a third party (the military) provides some parts which will directly affect our service level
17. This operation may have been a bit too ambiguous.  Trying to do civil military cooperation,  humanitian assistance,  equipment  testing  and develp command relationships all in two weeks is creates too many competing  priorities
18. 12JUN00 Philosophy
19. There seems some confusion on what is exercise control and what is exercise execution.
20. Military has to be prepared to do much more than they expect.
21. The military needs to bring more females to HA refugee situations as over 50% of refugees are women.
22. Discussion of Field CMOC vs. Capital CMOC very helpful.  In future need Political/Ambassador involvement.
23. The military needs to be much more prepared for children.
24. ha/dr is not a standard military operation, requires more information to be passed to the junior enlisted and officers,  You must be ready and flexible to meet unusual requests..
25. There is a very direct communications line between UN and the military. This helps to resolve problems.
26. quick establishment of a joint logistics cell is probably one of the most important coordination structures available:  it de-conflicts transport assets arriving and sets out procedures information sharing.  USMC provided useful fact file on their current capabilities.
27. Inprocessing concerns =- accounatbility vs force protection vs. refugee relief.  Good discussions, reviews of perceptions and actual practice.  One refugee stated that her community hurrican evacuation team had learned so much that day with the transit to the refugee site.  In the future they will provide shade & Comfort, then water and worry about the paperwork later.
28. Holding a mock press briefing was useful since it allowed us to focus on the questions and issues the media will continue to raise during emergencies involving both the military and UN relief agencies.
29. for such type of assignment, more female staff should be present within military personnel deployed. Important to deal with issues affecting female refugees requiring female staff only.
30. For future consideration:  Look at different scenarios (displaced persons, due to strife,  natural or manmade disasters), focus on the coordination at various levels by separating Capitol from CMOC from relief site and ensure those site are separated to avoid confusion.  Use fixed facilities to avoid losing focus on UN/military interaction vice infrastructure.
31. Civilian advisors should be, and generally are, curtous to the military on the ground.  This has not alway been the case and has made UN reps a little uncomfortable...
32. Recommend that more value is gained in an HA exercise with so many higher level participants that vice using an FTX format a TEWT (tactical exercise without troops) would be more useful in garnering SOP's and understanding between organizations.  Items that need to have actual people being the refugees (for exeriments) we could do that in a seperate yet parallel.
33. Angry volunteers could significnt damage the prospect of this type of exercise in the future, even if we meet all other objectives.  Lets redouble our effort to create "happy campers."  Note: a group of 40 that is 100% positive may be better than a group of 60 that is only 75% positive.
34. In real environment, more infrastructure would be set up at refugee camp -- less focus on supporting base that serves less of a function in a humanitarian context.
35. Keeping a sense of humour is critical
36. 13JUN00 Philosophy
37. Having some spare time to discuss issues in a more relaxed manner today proved valuable
38. Press & DV's seemed to add additional focus, revitalization to our mission.
39. DV/Media day mov es the focus from relief effort to supporting the visit
40. some planning tools used by the military can be adapted and useful to the UN.
41. The force protection element within the CMOC and refugee camp were extremely uncomfortable with the free acess of the media within the basecamps.
42. Starting last night with the showers, thing improved in the refugee camp greatly.  When dealing with refugees the policy should be ....do not over promise.  It destroys trust.  The rule should be...Under promise, over perform.
43. "Traditional" telemedicine ie care to a single indvidual is inappropriate in a mass HA situation except for possible care to aid providers.
44. In real life many unauthorized people enter the camp.  The camp is not a prison.
45. The length of time in playing to problem has been good.  However, a period of time built into the exercise to allow for the many additional items we have found to be helpful would be helpful for the next HA; -discussions on each others organizations, -discussions on capabilities, -education to the refugees on the overall help they would receive and what would be happening to each to them, and informal discussions on how we could improve each other.
46. The media and press would have enjoyed listening and watching one of our daily CMOC meetings in action.
47. Too little attention is being paid to assisting the host population. This is imperative in order to ensure relations, PR value, smooth and efficient exit as well as ensuring that they receive some tangible benefits
48. 14JUN00 Philosophy
49. the religious needs and practices of the refugees need to be taken into consideration and met
50. the TO&E of the military does not completely accomidate a civilian requirement...we should build a support package that more readily meets this unique mission
51. there needs to be a clear and concise mission statement developed and this needs to be spelled out to all of the participants especially that  the more junior participants have a better understanding as to why they are here
52. To make  this an effective exercise, a coalition of militaries, US and non US and the UN/NGOs/HN should be involved in the management and creation of the camp.  My opinion this was unrealistic because it was a unilateral coordinated effort with Navy and Marines.  b
53. Felt that a lot of people were involved in the lessons learned. hope all feedback will be taken care of
54. I was surprised at the lack of UN presence in the refugee camp.  The UNHCR flag was hoisted, but seldom was their anyone from the UN on site.
55. This should be exercised regularly (annually?) to include ALL appropriate components/activities/organizations.
56. Parts of this evolution were not very plausable, much of the requirements of this camp would never have supported an emcampment of a large number of refugees >500
57. the training was fairly realisitc, but at the same time real refugees would not be treated nearly the same way, i.e. complaints ect.....
58. Front load ALL OICs/Heads together or an appropriate forum by the UN/NGO/HN experts so that we can understand the mission rather than at the end when frustration/misunderstanding has already set in.
59. realisticly, would refugees be promised certain things contractually.  support and assistance comes and gives people assistance when they have nothing, and they receive support as it is available barring unforseen problems.
60. If civilians are ever used for an exercise again.  They need to have a clearer undersnding of what there role is.  Real refugees do not get treated the way these ones did.
61. As OICs who will be teaching and directing our personnel would have wanted more interaction with UN/NGO/HN leadership with their input/lessons learned as the exercise evolved.  How can we teach our personnel without an accurate  understanding of the thought process?
62. Intelligence was not a major player in this exercise, but was relied on heavely for daily briefs on the current situations around the camp and in other (notional) countries.  Intel reps from the exercising command sholud be included in the planning phases of future HA/DR exercise to ensure that thier own mission of providing the best intel support for the command is accomplished.
63. We received our rules of engagement but what were the rules of engagement for the UN/NGO/HN??
64. The obstacles we faced (equipment breakdown, misunderstanding of mission, poor communication of expectations by those in charge of the exercise) added an element of realism to the exercise.  A perfectly scripted, no obstacles exercise would have been unrealistic and boring.
65. The military seems to always "put on a show" whenever they deal with civilian organizations, why is it necessary to put up a facade. If there is a need to change the military when the spotlight is on, maybe those changes should be implemented permanently, or the spotlight should reveal the "real" way things are done.
66. I was hoping to see how to resolve more problems without throwng money at them.
67. Marines need to train as the fight which means weapons
68. If the ultimate goal is self sufficency for the refugees, self-sufficency should be preached from the very begining of the excersize in order to determine what the true mission of each organization throughout.
15JUN00 Exercise Planning Combined
1. 10JUN00 Exercise Planning
2. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
3. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
4. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
5. To get in front of the problem we need to be better at identifying what are the most likely problems that will be encountered.
6. The exercise control group needs a more robust cell - perhaps with an NGO?
7. So far UN team was not given time and space that would normaly been available to discuss strategy and planning.
8. Camp design and configuration must be confirmed and changes must by posted at a central point to avoid confusion
9. The military brought a much smaller security force than they would for a real operation specifically because they were directed to by the exercise planners in order to have everyone be a little more comfortable.
10. Green Government representation and interaction need to be strengthened to bring more reality to scenario.
11. The safety of the actual refugees is paramount.  Seemingly too much attention paid to role-playing and other "exercise" parts of the mission and not enough attention to the actual needs of civilian refugee volunteers under our care.
12. There needs to be a clearer understanding of who sets up the refugee camp.
13. Building more time into the exercise that would have allowed for more interaction with the participants of the CMOC would have allowed us to establish more creditability with each other.
14. The UN team feels that it is  not fully aware of all the research areas being piloted . They feel defensive and put on the spot when asked to accept or agree to participate in experiments which have not been discussed with them
15. Lack of real urgency and absence of other usual key partners should be taken into consideration in analysis and evaluation of exercise.
16. Much planning has gone into this exercise, from plans for the refugee camp layout, to safety parameters for civilian refugee volunteers, to availability of HLZ on site for medevacs, etc.  These planning documents have been ignored in favor of free flowing role-play.
17. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
18. It is a basic challenge for the UN to decide how much they would like to depend on the military to provide services/support which will profoundly define the level of the UN services. E.g. if we would have brought our own tents, WE define when the tents go up. If we bring our own generators, WE define when the service is up. It is scary to think that some of our core functions might not be provided because a third party (the military) provides some parts which will directly affect our service level
19. Need road improvements as safety and security priority... as well as for operational and exercise rationality
20. The refugee camp should be set up when the notice of refugee are to arrive is given, not wait until they are schedule arrive.
21. This operation may have been a bit too ambiguous.  Trying to do civil military cooperation,  humanitian assistance,  equipment  testing  and develp command relationships all in two weeks is creates too many competing  priorities
22. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
23. 12JUN00 Exercise Planning
24. There seems some confusion on what is exercise control and what is exercise execution.
25. Military has to be prepared to do much more than they expect.
26. after visiting the camp this afternoon I got a strong impression that the "refugees" had not been briefed properly on what was in store for them
27. The USMC is either expected to do to much or undermaned for this exercise.  These guys are doing a great job but they are killing themselves and their equipment.
28. In some cases, particularly where cross border displaced persons are concerned, the initial interview should be done in private so that the information given is not overheard by other people.
29. scope of overall mission was underestimated.  Millitary personnel were simultanously involved in CMOC construction, refugee camp construction and VIP visits and had difficulty prioritizing effort.
30. Again we have proven that we need constant power to do anything we computers in camp.  Or we should have solid UPS systems in place
31. Having Marine officer in charge at the refugee camp site is essential to getting tasks completed.
32. The military needs to bring more females to HA refugee situations as over 50% of refugees are women.
33. On these types of missions, a Military Information Support Team (MIST) is very useful to communicate inside the camp, within the JTF, and, in some cases, with permission, with the host nation populace.
34. Discussion of Field CMOC vs. Capital CMOC very helpful.  In future need Political/Ambassador involvement.
35. There are so many activities going on, I believe that few people have a clear idea of what is happening.    This includes refugees, soldiers, technical people and UN.
36. The military needs to be much more prepared for children.
37. Camp Management System for exercise of this nature must be coordinated during the planning phase and in the CMOC afloat.
38. Huge footprint at CMOC Camp is to support relief operation at refugee camp with small Marine footprint.  Hard to role-play/exercise whilst Marines at refugee camp are stretched to provide actual essential services such as showers.
39. How to ensure host population needs are met in both exercise and in reality needs further consideration.
40. Need to put a media training aspect into the exercise.
41. Issues with the IDs for the press and the vistors need to be worked out well before we begin the exercise.
42. in the refugee camp this afternoon I discovered that some of the lowere ranking military had absolutely no clue about what was going on. Information does not seem to be shared
43. We should begin collecting basic data within the camp (e.g., CMR, U5MR, under or mal nourishment, births, etc.).
44. Coordination of In-Flow process requires three plans:  The Primary Plan, the Contingency Plan and the Fall-back Plan.  Also need to identify key indices on when/what is necessary to move onto the next plan.
45. UNHCR is not actually responsible for the refugee volunteers.  Real concerns need to be addressed by the CSSD.
46. for such type of assignment, more female staff should be present within military personnel deployed. Important to deal with issues affecting female refugees requiring female staff only.
47. Would be good if all marines could be briefed in an info session what the UN does, what we do as an agency, what we do in real life. A lot of them are very interested and when confronted on a 1-on-1 basis, they are full of curiosity and interest.
48. Would have been good to separate the actual provision of assistance from those role-playing the exercise.  That would separate those requests that are notional from those that are actual.  Better instruction on this aspect of the exercise from the exercise control group would have helped -- perhaps through an opening brief when we all arrived on BI and before we started the ex.
49. Next time we should have a fulltime "real" government offical playing the roll fulltime during the exercise
50. some of military staff have no idea on who are the civilians participating in the exercise.  Need for better briefing on organisations they will have to cooperate with.
51. The location for the exercise was less imporant then the process we tried to coordinate .  The exercise would have met with as much success and considerably less effort if it had been planned at PTA, or another less challenging area..
52. In future exercises with a civilian population, having a full time help/information person available to either answer questions/concerns and or direct  people to the appropriate contact person. The " refugees" would find such an individual very reassuring and it would provide a consistent  and single point of contact for problems.
53. In a 'real' environment, UN would not hold office long in a tent environment like the one we have now. It would kill the equipment, and undermine people's health.
54. As conditions at  CMOC worsen, we should evaluate if some meetings in better conditions would improve our productivity.
55. 13JUN00 Exercise Planning
56. VIP visits can happen within the first week of an emergency -- on day three in East 	Timor the 	UN and INTERFET hadf a 15 high level delegation.  Todays visit was in a way realistic.
57. OK, no one wants another meeting, but a fifteen minute briefing by each organization (perhaps one a night, preferably with a good written handout) would be useful to familiarize everyone with the participating agencies.
58. Visitors and Press seemed to be able to wander about without much 'supervision'.  Perhaps a bit more structure to their tours might be warrented.
59. At the beginning of the exercise, all UN agencies should have briefed the military staff (all of them) about what they are doing. Some of the guys still have no idea what the different UN organisations do and what they stand for.
60. The young, enlisted Marines have learnt a great deal by observation of the practical workings of the UN  Have they had any briefings by the Agencies on their roles similar to those given on the Coronado.  Some simplified technical background would reinforce the practical lessons they have learnt.
61. Publications that describe each participants' organization, capabilities and requirements, burned on a CD in any popular format, would be a great "take home" item.
62. Best "Actual Actual" Media Question - one local journalist said that when local residents heard about Operation Strong Angel they believed a huge natural disaster was on its way to the Big Island.
63. Either actual NGOs or personnel role-playing them would have been a valuable addition to the exercise.
64. Starting last night with the showers, thing improved in the refugee camp greatly.  When dealing with refugees the policy should be ....do not over promise.  It destroys trust.  The rule should be...Under promise, over perform.
65. The visit of the admiral was very well timed. Such VIP visits happen in real emergencies and despite all the work that needs to be done, time has to be made for such VIP visits as they are often related to funding and/or PR.
66. Senior military leadership visited today and added some interesting perspective.   The perspective from comparable personnel from UNICEF, UHHCR, etc. would, I'm sure, have been equally or more valuable.
67. When we do experiments in the refugee area we need better coordination on physical and electronic requirements.  This went well but was frustrating for many...
68. Would the addition of a DART from the U.S. State Dept be helpful? What about other NGO's?
69. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
70. Could we bring some of the junior officers (Lts) into the next LL.  They are doing a lot of the heavy lifting out here and having their perspective would be useful to help us finalize these lessons learned
71. Too little attention is being paid to assisting the host population. This is imperative in order to ensure relations, PR value, smooth and efficient exit as well as ensuring that they receive some tangible benefits
72. It hindsight, it probably would have been a good idea to have released an "actual" press release on the "notional" emergency for the journalists today - since a few seemed a little confused.
73. This has been (and still is) a very good learning exercise for everybody. If a similar exercise is planned for the future, it might be good to extend it, i.e. invite NGOs
74. 14JUN00 Exercise Planning
75. the base and refugee camps need to either be closer together or a better means of transportation between the two
76. the TO&E of the military does not completely accomidate a civilian requirement...we should build a support package that more readily meets this unique mission
77. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOR THE RIMPAC GAME PLAY WAS INSUFFICIENT.
78. We were 50 to 60 Marines short to make up for all the working parties
79. We were 50 to 60 Marines short to make up for all the working parties
80. There seemed to be an extreme lack of inclusion of OICs in the coordination and discussion of issues within the camp in conjunction with the UN/NGOs/notional HN
81. there was no clear plan of action for the intial days for the refugees
82. the transportation requirements seemed very unrealistic
83. refugees need to arrive earlier in the day to properly inprocess them and allow for role play from the start
84. there needs to be a clear and concise mission statement developed and this needs to be spelled out to all of the participants especially that  the more junior participants have a better understanding as to why they are here
85. on the military side, the t/e and t/o should have been larger
86. The MPs needed a mechanism to coordinate people exiting and entering from different gates and from the camp to allow for better control of where people were at all times
87. Coordination for Intelligence MSL items were done in a vacuum,  all the key players were not involved.
88. I was surprised at the lack of UN presence in the refugee camp.  The UNHCR flag was hoisted, but seldom was their anyone from the UN on site.
89. The Refugee camp appeared to be created without input from UN/NGO/HN or other US/Non US Military factions.  No true infrastructure set in the beginning until there were complaints/concerns.
90. better distinction between exercise control and exercise execution.
91. real refugees would not have the same transportation requirements
92. This should be exercised regularly (annually?) to include ALL appropriate components/activities/organizations.
93. Consistant stable power was a number one requirement for the civilians and I am not sure that was a number one priority for the Marines
94. Provide some sort of transfer of information before the exercise begins concerning persons exact responsibilities so they will know who to contact when dealing with problems.
95. CMOC and refugee camps were set up too late. Camp was not ready by the time the UN ror refugees came in
96. Working with UN agency personnel has been very enlightening.  This exercise has enhanced our understanding of HA operations and will facilitate smooth coordination with NGOs/PVOs in future exercises/operations.
97. At the Refugee Camp, it was hard to figure out what was real and what was pretend.  It made every scenerio hard to take seriously.
98. We need to know what actual and what is an exercise when dealing with scenarios.
99. The site for this exercised presented a number of challenges for the personnel and the equipment deployed.  If this is to be one again then we need to take a harder look at all the personnel and equipment required
100. realisticly, would refugees be promised certain things contractually.  support and assistance comes and gives people assistance when they have nothing, and they receive support as it is available barring unforseen problems.
101. The money provided to support this evolution was inadiquate
102. The money provided to support this evolution was inadiquate
103. terrain was not a big a part of the equation as it should have been i.e., how it effected equipment, especially electionics.
104. For the sake of safety,  it is essential for a distincition to be made between exercise exercise and actual actual as not all role players did so causing confusion  and even unsafe conditions at times.
105. the military should have one set of personnel trained/tasked for support the refugee site that are separate from that needed at the main camp  this would improve support and deconflict many requirements
106. More workers need to be sent on the advanced party to prepare for the arrival of Marines
107. Medical Mission Creep,
Multiple medical taskings arose that were not in the original training plan , i.e.,  HST ops.

The original medical  manning plan for refugee camp was IDC during the day and a general duty HM at night for emergencies only.  this changed by CADIF Surgeon and IDC had to remain 24/7.   "Fly the Brief"

Need to "fly the brief" we T/O'd enough HM's to do Original Mission, take care of Main Camp Marines and Marines at Refugee Camp.  We were to provide Emergency Aid ONLY to refugee site.  This changed in mid stream with our staff being sucked into "notional problems"  Sometimes into evening hours.  If this was the original plan we would have staffed for this plan.
108. Some entity/office needs to coordinate the individual NGO/PVO groups to ensure support can be consolidated to reduce the peacemeal way requests for assistance would come in from the MOC
109. Embarkl:
Significant safety issues with stuffing Marins and Sailor into LCAC the thrwing gear over top of them.  Two sticks went in this way.  if there had been a MISHAP there would have been no way to evac the Cabin
110. If the ultimate goal is self sufficency for the refugees, self-sufficency should be preached from the very begining of the excersize in order to determine what the true mission of each organization throughout.
15JUN00 Attaboy Combined
1. 10JUN00 attaboy
2. From the military, received good, fast response on camp logistics requests
3. 12JUN00 Attaboy
4. Don't forget the attaboys.  Everyone has worked long and hard for the past two days.
5. Refugee role play was excellent and personnel at the camp did well in reacting to the situations thrown at them.
6. The USMC is either expected to do to much or undermaned for this exercise.  These guys are doing a great job but they are killing themselves and their equipment.
7. Marines were very patient and friendly with refugees.
8. At least for the technical stuff, the military goes out of their way to please the UN.
9. MP Guard are silent heros, doing and excellent job and should be commend.
10. Despite some problems, I believe everybody (military, UN, etc.) deserves to be praised for the efforts made and for trying to solve whatever problems come along
11. There is a very direct communications line between UN and the military. This helps to resolve problems.
12. quick establishment of a joint logistics cell is probably one of the most important coordination structures available:  it de-conflicts transport assets arriving and sets out procedures information sharing.  USMC provided useful fact file on their current capabilities.
13. Things work better when focus is on objectives of Strong Angel -- especially Civ-Mil coordination/cooperation -- and not on plumbing issues.  Once minimum standards are met, it allows participants to freely interact.  This part of the exercise is going beautifully.
14. Holding a mock press briefing was useful since it allowed us to focus on the questions and issues the media will continue to raise during emergencies involving both the military and UN relief agencies.
15. Role players who arrived at the refugee camp were excellent.  The realistic scenarios they acted out challenged the military personnel during the processing.  The (real) activist who entered the refugee area challenged us even further.
16. some of the lessons learned and recommendations of two evenings ago were executed almost immediately. Praise to whomever took care of this.
17. Thanks to WFP for the excellent communications today between refugee camp site and the MOC during an actual actual.  The level of service provided is excellent.  Sharing comms between key participants in field operations is essential where we often have different systems.
18. UNHCR is doing a great job balancing the real issues with the refugees and is taking a lot of heat maybe should be directed to exercise control.  Thank you for all you are doing.
19. Marines have shown great flexibility in reacting to many changing and demanding situations!!!!!
20. Having the UN agencies assisting in the set-up and management was a great help.  I am very grateful for their participation.
21. We are all learning a great deal and the lessons learned here will help shape  the our abilit to respond effectively
22. All refugees last night were HIGHLY complementary of the troops.  THey stated that this went beyond the expected to personal interest and assistance!
23. 13JUN00 Attaboy
24. Rotating junior officers to be in charge at the refugee camp site is good as it gives more Marines experience working with UN and civilians.   Lt. Burke, Lt. Schultz and Capt. Fillmore have all done a great job organizing the support required ad it is good that all have had that experience.
25. Noticed today that the navy + marine (oops, US Marine personnel) were better briefed on why they were here and who all the agencies were.  Good passage of info.
26. The relationship and coordination between all parties has evolved into a seemingly cohesive grouping resulting in speedy and sound decisions.
27. Refugee morale continues to be high, they are very appreciative of the work all are doing to support/train them
28. The close coordination between the agencies executing the refugee support has proven to show we can work together.
29. The MPs continue to do an outstanding job, especially at the camp site -- where they are being stretched with keeping real world security of the perimeter whilst enthusiastically participating in a lot of the role-playing going on.
30. Cmoc role in the camp working with  the refugees and coordinating information was very impressive.
31. While a distraction and very realistic, the visit by the admirals and press was received positively by the refugee role players
32. Press and Media personnel seemed very friendly and interested.  The whole camp did a great job of presenting all aspects of this exercise in a positive, creative light.
33. Colonel Long + Captain Fujimori should be commended for their excellent work.  They have stayed on top of the ball and have got the camp into good shape. 
In addition, I noticed that the toilets, which had formerly been plastered with fairly poor humour on their walls, had been cleaned this morning.  Not a great job to have to do, but someone did it; ataboy!
34. The flexibility of the Marines in not keeping strict meal or shower hours at the refugee camp to accomodate the less rigid schedule of the camp has been appreciated.
35. CommandNet is up and running in the ref camp and CA is using it to enter reports
36. Interestingly the refugees appear to regard VIP visits as evidence of interest at high levels.  On the other hand perhaps it was just an exciting break in camp boredom.  Either way, the refugees liked it.
37. The Admiral gave a good brief, and supported the J9 expirements -- he obviously wants his personnel not to be frightened of making a mistake; this is excellent in that we are here not just for lessons learnt, but for also finding new ways of doing things. Ataboy McGinn!
38. The whole operation in cmoc and the camp is runnng smoother...........things are geting better with more time together
39. After days of hard and sometimes unrewarding work the Marines have managed to keep efficiency and sense of humor. Good and very informative informal discussions with them in the camp, help to better understand how they operate.
40. The fact that everyone has been so honest, open, and forthright in their participation is appreciated.
41. 14JUN00 Attaboy
42. The military very clearly went out of their way to make the UN folks feel comfortable. The practical support we had was tremendous.
43. The EOD guys did a great job explaining about how to id uxo and what to do if you see some on the site
44. There was a good comms system between UN and military. The radio system worked very well
45. great food
46. Civil Affairs did a great job working with the refugees and initiating the phase out of Marine support at the refugee camp.
47. the intel people were very helpfull in submitting sitreps after eod drills
48. Military did not come to show off, they came to participate, and to coordinate
49. working with actual civilians and not Marines playing civilians was great training, and is the best way to prepare for HA/DR ops
50. The Marines were very professional to the cilivans and worked their butts off to make everyone happy.  THANK YOU!!!
51. The obstacles we faced (equipment breakdown, misunderstanding of mission, poor communication of expectations by those in charge of the exercise) added an element of realism to the exercise.  A perfectly scripted, no obstacles exercise would have been unrealistic and boring.
52. Good excercises, we learned a lot.
53. dental support was outstanding...the appointments were flexible and provided on a walk in basis..great job
15JUN00 Drinks Combined
1. 12JUN00 Drinks
2. where is the coffee?
3. Refugees need good strong coffee
4. DOn't forget the tea
5. Why is Navy coffee so much better than Marine brown water?
6. joe needs to improve hs computer skills
7. what happened to the coffee
8. 13JUN00 Drinks
9. DV/Media day mov es the focus from relief effort to supporting the visit
10. Again there is no good strong coffee available
11. Certain Marines don't know ho to use computers
12. Helo landing in the dust field was not necessary - we had not run out of dust yet.
13. Jim Rogers looks knackered!  Why!
14. The host nation Mc Donalds is doing fine thank you
15. I hope that we end soon -- I am thirsty
16. Has anyone else noticed that the tank trail (the good road) is not so good anymore???
17. 14JUN00 Drinks
13JUN00 Hotwash
1. Strategic
2. Operational
3. Tactical
4. We have said on a number of occasions we need some time scheduled to discus some of the  more important/difficult issues in a more deliberate and rigorous manner. When will that be.....the after action/hot wash may not be the place
5. We may to define the end product required of the exercise and the time line required for its completion.
14JUN00 Very Important Lessons Learned
1. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOR THE RIMPAC GAME PLAY WAS INSUFFICIENT.
2. have more information for those not in the planning stages so final execution does not seem so haphazard.
3. More coordination needs to made between the higher personnel in the UN agencies and the military leadership concerning what their actual partication will be in the refugee camp.
4. Coordination for Intelligence MSL items were done in a vacuum,  all the key players were not involved.
5. Our (the military) understanding of the mission was to support the ability of the NGO/PVO organizations in performing a transition eg they would support refugees we would support them...this transition never seemed to materialize and resulted in over tasking
6. I was surprised at the lack of UN presence in the refugee camp.  The UNHCR flag was hoisted, but seldom was their anyone from the UN on site.
7. This should be exercised regularly (annually?) to include ALL appropriate components/activities/organizations.
8. Provide some sort of transfer of information before the exercise begins concerning persons exact responsibilities so they will know who to contact when dealing with problems.
9. The money provided to support this evolution was inadiquate
10. if the military is serious about learning how they  can best be utilized in excercises of this type, consider sending them to real world refugee crisisis around the world and acting in a voluntary role.

15JUN00 Camp Setup (Vote)

Voting Results
Multiple Selection (maximum choices = 10) (Allow bypass)
Number of ballot items: 53
Total number of voters (N):  19

Total
9	1. In real environment, more infrastructure would be set up at refugee camp -- less focus on supporting base that serves less of a function in a humanitarian context.
8	2. camps need a PA system to pass word as not all troops and or refugees had radios or could hear verbal instructions
7	3. So far UN team was not given time and space that would normaly been available to discuss strategy and planning.
6	4. The location for the exercise was less imporant then the process we tried to coordinate .  The exercise would have met with as much success and considerably less effort if it had been planned at PTA, or another less challenging area..
6	5. Huge footprint at CMOC Camp is to support relief operation at refugee camp with small Marine footprint.  Hard to role-play/exercise whilst Marines at refugee camp are stretched to provide actual essential services such as showers.
5	6. Getting power up and running to a few key areas ASAP needed to be done vice trying to do it for the whole camp
5	7. Camp design and configuration must be confirmed and changes must by posted at a central point to avoid confusion
4	8. In real life many unauthorized people enter the camp.  The camp is not a prison.
4	9. In a 'real' environment, UN would not hold office long in a tent environment like the one we have now. It would kill the equipment, and undermine people's health.
4	10. Establishment of a one stop shop at the refugee camp will help
3	11. it might be useful to have a tent where people can get together for informal discussions, a tent with some chairs and maybe something to drink (water or other),
3	12. The site for this exercised presented a number of challenges for the personnel and the equipment deployed.  If this is to be one again then we need to take a harder look at all the personnel and equipment required
3	13. Needed  more time to get the camp setup.
3	14. Starting last night with the showers, thing improved in the refugee camp greatly.  When dealing with refugees the policy should be ....do not over promise.  It destroys trust.  The rule should be...Under promise, over perform.
3	15. Reality of providing logistical support may not always be provided in the expected manner due to external difficulties.
2	16. Consistant stable power was a number one requirement for the civilians and I am not sure that was a number one priority for the Marines
2	17. The flexibility of the Marines in not keeping strict meal or shower hours at the refugee camp to accomodate the less rigid schedule of the camp has been appreciated.
2	18. There should be a coffee mess with soda and coffee somewhere for informal conversations.
2	19. dust protected accomodations.
1	20. As conditions at  CMOC worsen, we should evaluate if some meetings in better conditions would improve our productivity.
1	21. next time, do not level the camp. Leave as is, cut the grass short, but leave the roots in and remove the stones.
This will keep the soil fixed, and we will not have all of that dust flying around
1	22. Environmental issue: 
A.   Grading Camp Site before erection of tents etc cause multiple respiratory problems
B.  lack of goggles for Military Personnel and taking goggles from SNCO's and Officers to give to Civilians was bad move.
1	23. better tents at CMOC, water tight and better dust resistant. This was already a drag for this short time. If this was a longer operation, it would undermine moral and health. Well rested and fed people can cope much better with problems and the work load.
1	24. Would like to have water tight tents
1	25. In the CMOC tent we should have better lighting
1	26. the base and refugee camps need to either be closer together or a better means of transportation between the two
1	27. Camp security actual and exercise needs to be addressed before thefts occur.  Tents with valuable equipment were repeatedly left unguarded and an exercise thief was able to clean out half the camp.
1	28. Yesterday when we were on the ground there were no guards at the gate, there was no single camp poc to ask for things like electricity and accomodations, etc.  Some how there should have been more advanced coordination.
1	29. pick a better base camp area
1	30. Lack of CMOC security yesterday was surprising.
1	31. Camp Security  was not taken seriously enough in the exercise.  We are testing equipment and procedures in a rough environment (camp) where security awareness is necessary.
1	32. wooden pallets in the tents are not very stable and could be dangerous. The plastic sheeting when wet becomes slippery and could also pose a danger.
1	33. UN needs to task better in order to ensure office and accommodation requirements met.
0	34. There's only a few tent sizes available.
0	35. 13JUN00 Camp Set up
0	36. Refugee camp management system is fuly operational and fully will, need to tighten up on physical security of equipment and supplies
0	37. Visitors and Press seemed to be able to wander about without much 'supervision'.  Perhaps a bit more structure to their tours might be warrented.
0	38. The force protection element within the CMOC and refugee camp were extremely uncomfortable with the free acess of the media within the basecamps.
0	39. 12JUN00 Camp Setup
0	40. Need road improvements as safety and security priority... as well as for operational and exercise rationality
0	41. 15JUN00 Camp Set Up Combined
0	42. When we do experiments in the refugee area we need better coordination on physical and electronic requirements.  This went well but was frustrating for many...
0	43. 14JUN00 Camp Set UP
0	44. There are a lot of comments that fit together about a comfortable lounge inside a tent with a few chairs and coffee, sodas and perhaps a snack available.
0	45. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
0	46. Having the electricity in the tents and water running all over the place seems dangerous to me
0	47. Environmental issue: 
A.   Grading Camp Site before erection of tents etc cause multiple respiratory problems
B.  lack of goggles for Military Personnel and taking goggles from SNCO's and Officers to give to Civilians was bad move.
0	48. Would like to have a tent where we can sit to eat.
0	49. There have been a number of issues regrading the size of the tents available for each group...why is the experimental tent as large as the CMOC?
0	50. Would like to have more lights both on the CMOC campsite as well as in the tents
0	51. Several of the hardest working people out here appear to be the ones that are setting up and working on the generators.  We should all be a little patient with them.  Maybe by tommorrow the system will be running better.
0	52. 10JUN00 Camp Set up
0	53. terrain was not a big a part of the equation as it should have been i.e., how it effected equipment, especially electionics.

Ballot Items in Original Order
1. 15JUN00 Camp Set Up Combined
2. 10JUN00 Camp Set up
3. Would like to have water tight tents
4. Would like to have more lights both on the CMOC campsite as well as in the tents
5. There have been a number of issues regrading the size of the tents available for each group...why is the experimental tent as large as the CMOC?
6. In the CMOC tent we should have better lighting
7. Getting power up and running to a few key areas ASAP needed to be done vice trying to do it for the whole camp
8. dust protected accomodations.
9. Yesterday when we were on the ground there were no guards at the gate, there was no single camp poc to ask for things like electricity and accomodations, etc.  Some how there should have been more advanced coordination.
10. There's only a few tent sizes available.
11. Lack of CMOC security yesterday was surprising.
12. Reality of providing logistical support may not always be provided in the expected manner due to external difficulties.
13. UN needs to task better in order to ensure office and accommodation requirements met.
14. So far UN team was not given time and space that would normaly been available to discuss strategy and planning.
15. Camp design and configuration must be confirmed and changes must by posted at a central point to avoid confusion
16. wooden pallets in the tents are not very stable and could be dangerous. The plastic sheeting when wet becomes slippery and could also pose a danger.
17. Having the electricity in the tents and water running all over the place seems dangerous to me
18. it might be useful to have a tent where people can get together for informal discussions, a tent with some chairs and maybe something to drink (water or other),
19. Several of the hardest working people out here appear to be the ones that are setting up and working on the generators.  We should all be a little patient with them.  Maybe by tommorrow the system will be running better.
20. Would like to have a tent where we can sit to eat.
21. There should be a coffee mess with soda and coffee somewhere for informal conversations.
22. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
23. There are a lot of comments that fit together about a comfortable lounge inside a tent with a few chairs and coffee, sodas and perhaps a snack available.
24. Need road improvements as safety and security priority... as well as for operational and exercise rationality
25. 12JUN00 Camp Setup
26. Huge footprint at CMOC Camp is to support relief operation at refugee camp with small Marine footprint.  Hard to role-play/exercise whilst Marines at refugee camp are stretched to provide actual essential services such as showers.
27. Establishment of a one stop shop at the refugee camp will help
28. The location for the exercise was less imporant then the process we tried to coordinate .  The exercise would have met with as much success and considerably less effort if it had been planned at PTA, or another less challenging area..
29. In a 'real' environment, UN would not hold office long in a tent environment like the one we have now. It would kill the equipment, and undermine people's health.
30. As conditions at  CMOC worsen, we should evaluate if some meetings in better conditions would improve our productivity.
31. In real environment, more infrastructure would be set up at refugee camp -- less focus on supporting base that serves less of a function in a humanitarian context.
32. 13JUN00 Camp Set up
33. Camp security actual and exercise needs to be addressed before thefts occur.  Tents with valuable equipment were repeatedly left unguarded and an exercise thief was able to clean out half the camp.
34. Refugee camp management system is fuly operational and fully will, need to tighten up on physical security of equipment and supplies
35. Camp Security  was not taken seriously enough in the exercise.  We are testing equipment and procedures in a rough environment (camp) where security awareness is necessary.
36. Visitors and Press seemed to be able to wander about without much 'supervision'.  Perhaps a bit more structure to their tours might be warrented.
37. The force protection element within the CMOC and refugee camp were extremely uncomfortable with the free acess of the media within the basecamps.
38. Starting last night with the showers, thing improved in the refugee camp greatly.  When dealing with refugees the policy should be ....do not over promise.  It destroys trust.  The rule should be...Under promise, over perform.
39. In real life many unauthorized people enter the camp.  The camp is not a prison.
40. The flexibility of the Marines in not keeping strict meal or shower hours at the refugee camp to accomodate the less rigid schedule of the camp has been appreciated.
41. When we do experiments in the refugee area we need better coordination on physical and electronic requirements.  This went well but was frustrating for many...
42. 14JUN00 Camp Set UP
43. the base and refugee camps need to either be closer together or a better means of transportation between the two
44. better tents at CMOC, water tight and better dust resistant. This was already a drag for this short time. If this was a longer operation, it would undermine moral and health. Well rested and fed people can cope much better with problems and the work load.
45. Environmental issue: 
A.   Grading Camp Site before erection of tents etc cause multiple respiratory problems
B.  lack of goggles for Military Personnel and taking goggles from SNCO's and Officers to give to Civilians was bad move.
46. Environmental issue: 
A.   Grading Camp Site before erection of tents etc cause multiple respiratory problems
B.  lack of goggles for Military Personnel and taking goggles from SNCO's and Officers to give to Civilians was bad move.
47. next time, do not level the camp. Leave as is, cut the grass short, but leave the roots in and remove the stones.
This will keep the soil fixed, and we will not have all of that dust flying around
48. pick a better base camp area
49. camps need a PA system to pass word as not all troops and or refugees had radios or could hear verbal instructions
50. Consistant stable power was a number one requirement for the civilians and I am not sure that was a number one priority for the Marines
51. Needed  more time to get the camp setup.
52. The site for this exercised presented a number of challenges for the personnel and the equipment deployed.  If this is to be one again then we need to take a harder look at all the personnel and equipment required
53. terrain was not a big a part of the equation as it should have been i.e., how it effected equipment, especially electionics.

15JUN00 Combined COMMS (Vote)

Voting Results
Multiple Selection (maximum choices = 10) (Allow bypass)
Number of ballot items: 19
Total number of voters (N):  17

Total
9	1. There is a very direct communications line between UN and the military. This helps to resolve problems.
9	2. camps need a PA system to pass word as not all troops and or refugees had radios or could hear verbal instructions
8	3. some of military staff have no idea on who are the civilians participating in the exercise.  Need for better briefing on organisations they will have to cooperate with.
8	4. Thanks to WFP for the excellent communications today between refugee camp site and the MOC during an actual actual.  The level of service provided is excellent.  Sharing comms between key participants in field operations is essential where we often have different systems.
7	5. Again we have proven that we need constant power to do anything we computers in camp.  Or we should have solid UPS systems in place
7	6. Some how we need a better communication system for the Marines on the ground.  The people that we planned with know the score but the pass down needs to be spread out more to the guys doing the work
5	7. Communication was difficult to coordinate, many individules used personal cell phones which would/may not be plausable in certain real world locations
4	8. There was a good comms system between UN and military. The radio system worked very well
3	9. The communications from the CMOC afloat to ashore did not go well and there is still no HF commo between both
3	10. Identity  if items ACTUAL ACTUAL vs Exercise interjects- need to clarify the distinction -especially on 'open' comm systems
3	11. Intel information cycle of distribution was hampered by the lack of the SIPR net being activated upon arrival.  No other secure means of communications was established back to the ship for Intel updates.
1	12. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
1	13. COMMS from the refugee camp back to the MOC did not always work
0	14. 15JUN00 Comms Combined
0	15. 10JUN00 Comms
0	16. 12JUN00 Comms
0	17. 13JUN00 Comms
0	18. 14JUN00 Comms
0	19. there was no interorganiztion communication between the civilian groups

Ballot Items in Original Order
1. 15JUN00 Comms Combined
2. 10JUN00 Comms
3. The communications from the CMOC afloat to ashore did not go well and there is still no HF commo between both
4. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
5. 12JUN00 Comms
6. Identity  if items ACTUAL ACTUAL vs Exercise interjects- need to clarify the distinction -especially on 'open' comm systems
7. Again we have proven that we need constant power to do anything we computers in camp.  Or we should have solid UPS systems in place
8. There is a very direct communications line between UN and the military. This helps to resolve problems.
9. Some how we need a better communication system for the Marines on the ground.  The people that we planned with know the score but the pass down needs to be spread out more to the guys doing the work
10. some of military staff have no idea on who are the civilians participating in the exercise.  Need for better briefing on organisations they will have to cooperate with.
11. Thanks to WFP for the excellent communications today between refugee camp site and the MOC during an actual actual.  The level of service provided is excellent.  Sharing comms between key participants in field operations is essential where we often have different systems.
12. 13JUN00 Comms
13. 14JUN00 Comms
14. there was no interorganiztion communication between the civilian groups
15. COMMS from the refugee camp back to the MOC did not always work
16. There was a good comms system between UN and military. The radio system worked very well
17. Intel information cycle of distribution was hampered by the lack of the SIPR net being activated upon arrival.  No other secure means of communications was established back to the ship for Intel updates.
18. camps need a PA system to pass word as not all troops and or refugees had radios or could hear verbal instructions
19. Communication was difficult to coordinate, many individules used personal cell phones which would/may not be plausable in certain real world locations

15JUN00 Combined Coordination (Vote)

Voting Results
Multiple Selection (maximum choices = 10) (Allow bypass)
Number of ballot items: 85
Total number of voters (N):  17

Total
7	1. quick establishment of a joint logistics cell is probably one of the most important coordination structures available:  it de-conflicts transport assets arriving and sets out procedures information sharing.  USMC provided useful fact file on their current capabilities.
7	2. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
6	3. More coordination needs to made between the higher personnel in the UN agencies and the military leadership concerning what their actual partication will be in the refugee camp.
5	4. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
5	5. Need for more face to face amoung ":Like counterparts" - technical to technical, logisticians to logisticians, etc...
5	6. some of military staff have no idea on who are the civilians participating in the exercise.  Need for better briefing on organisations they will have to cooperate with.
4	7. Front load ALL OICs/Heads together or an appropriate forum by the UN/NGO/HN experts so that we can understand the mission rather than at the end when frustration/misunderstanding has already set in.
4	8. There are a lot of opportunities to have free flowing discussions with the military. This informal communications adds to understanding eachother.
4	9. The JLC start up proved to be very useful.
3	10. There needs to be more concise communication about the technologies that will be used in these types of exercises
3	11. need for better coordination and info exchange.
3	12. have more information for those not in the planning stages so final execution does not seem so haphazard.
3	13. In future exercises with a civilian population, having a full time help/information person available to either answer questions/concerns and or direct  people to the appropriate contact person. The " refugees" would find such an individual very reassuring and it would provide a consistent  and single point of contact for problems.
3	14. For the sake of safety,  it is essential for a distincition to be made between exercise exercise and actual actual as not all role players did so causing confusion  and even unsafe conditions at times.
3	15. CMOC and refugee camps were set up too late. Camp was not ready by the time the UN ror refugees came in
3	16. Provide some sort of transfer of information before the exercise begins concerning persons exact responsibilities so they will know who to contact when dealing with problems.
3	17. ha/dr is not a standard military operation, requires more information to be passed to the junior enlisted and officers,  You must be ready and flexible to meet unusual requests..
3	18. After the arrival of the refugee actors, we spent too much time trying to figure out whether the military or the UN was in charge of the camp.
3	19. Identfy new areas where the military can assist UNICEF -  at the troop level - need to tell the UNICEF reps what they see on their travels, patrols that day, hour, short time frame - in regards to children alone, abuses, abused women, etc.  Share the information in a timely enough manner to actual save/assist the situation.
2	20. Need to identify key NEW or Potential Points of Contact in the Government/Political areana to help smooth the military and public acceptance of the HADR Role.  UN - can you please help us identify them.
2	21. the religious needs and practices of the refugees need to be taken into consideration and met
2	22. The MPs needed a mechanism to coordinate people exiting and entering from different gates and from the camp to allow for better control of where people were at all times
2	23. in the refugee camp this afternoon I discovered that some of the lowere ranking military had absolutely no clue about what was going on. Information does not seem to be shared
2	24. Some how we need a better communication system for the Marines on the ground.  The people that we planned with know the score but the pass down needs to be spread out more to the guys doing the work
2	25. To make  this an effective exercise, a coalition of militaries, US and non US and the UN/NGOs/HN should be involved in the management and creation of the camp.  My opinion this was unrealistic because it was a unilateral coordinated effort with Navy and Marines.  b
2	26. after visiting the camp this afternoon I got a strong impression that the "refugees" had not been briefed properly on what was in store for them
2	27. The Refugee camp appeared to be created without input from UN/NGO/HN or other US/Non US Military factions.  No true infrastructure set in the beginning until there were complaints/concerns.
2	28. There seemed to be an extreme lack of inclusion of OICs in the coordination and discussion of issues within the camp in conjunction with the UN/NGOs/notional HN
2	29. There needs to be a clearer understanding of who sets up the refugee camp.
2	30. Somehow there needs to be more time for informal meetings together.  To often we mix informal with formal and there is something lost when we do that type of meeting.
2	31. Camp design and configuration must be confirmed and changes must by posted at a central point to avoid confusion
2	32. The lines of communcation between the UN and the military needs to be opened a little more.  If the UN needs things done they should be willing and learning who they can go to.
2	33. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
1	34. Early on in the exercise there needed to be better coordination between some of the civilian planners and the Marines that were on the ground
1	35. Regardless of late arrival a general camp meeting of all participants/refugees is required. To once again reiterate general camp management issues, schedules, who to go and see re problems etc.
1	36. Having Marine officer in charge at the refugee camp site is essential to getting tasks completed.
1	37. it might be useful to have a tent where people can get together for informal discussions, a tent with some chairs and maybe something to drink (water or other),
1	38. Essential for UN teams to create and follow a meeting schedule which allows time for inter-agency coordination and collaboration.
1	39. role play should be on for more than one day and indication regarding when to play should be given to refugee
1	40. Coordination for Intelligence MSL items were done in a vacuum,  all the key players were not involved.
1	41. So far UN team was not given time and space that would normaly been available to discuss strategy and planning.
1	42. Need to establish who is the person in chage of the refugee camp on the military side
1	43. jumping to conclusions to be avoided, i.e. when people are not on site it does not mean they are enjoying the beach life
1	44. Some entity/office needs to coordinate the individual NGO/PVO groups to ensure support can be consolidated to reduce the peacemeal way requests for assistance would come in from the MOC
1	45. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
1	46. We need to exchange email & Address lists at next LL meeting.  It is the PERSONAL contacts that will help us in the future ev ents.  Lets not loose touch.
1	47. Exceptional weather/environment planning - sun, sandstorms and rain.  where is the weather guy anyway?
1	48. The relationship and coordination between all parties has evolved into a seemingly cohesive grouping resulting in speedy and sound decisions.
1	49. We were 50 to 60 Marines short to make up for all the working parties
0	50. better distinction between exercise control and exercise execution.
0	51. real refugees would not have the same transportation requirements
0	52. Consistant stable power was a number one requirement for the civilians and I am not sure that was a number one priority for the Marines
0	53. Communication was difficult to coordinate, many individules used personal cell phones which would/may not be plausable in certain real world locations
0	54. More workers need to be sent on the advanced party to prepare for the arrival of Marines
0	55. CECG for Intel input was not as responsive as it needed to be.  Personnel spent the majority ot the exercise at the Ref Camp. No intel info could be passed nor evaluated from thier perspective.
0	56. Embarkl:
Significant safety issues with stuffing Marins and Sailor into LCAC the thrwing gear over top of them.  Two sticks went in this way.  if there had been a MISHAP there would have been no way to evac the Cabin
0	57. refugee tents and cots were flying away this morning. Only two military were there to help them out. Someone should have monitored that situation, and guided the 'rescue'.
0	58. UN needs to be clearer about what it is doing when not visible/on site
0	59. To get in front of the problem we need to be better at identifying what are the most likely problems that will be encountered.
0	60. Need to sppeed up UN operational planning process without compromising the consensus discussions required and need to reach common agreement on objectives , priorities and actions
0	61. Testing systems while we are establishing relationships contribute to more chaos than would normally be encountered.
0	62. Reality of providing logistical support may not always be provided in the expected manner due to external difficulties.
0	63. UN needs to task better in order to ensure office and accommodation requirements met.
0	64. rain seemed to have come unexpectedly and some of the sleeping equipment is wet. Is somebody checking the weather forecast?
0	65. Understand that the MOC is the center for all logistical support.  If supplies are issued and vehicles dispatched without their knowledge, the CSSE does not have an acurate picture of what is truly available to be issued/used.
0	66. Where are the meal times posted?  Some folks missed the food line because no one knew they were passing out hot meals
0	67. better communication between all parties needs to be established and certain problems need to be explained better (i.e. yesterday the helicopter flights were delayed)
0	68. Much planning has gone into this exercise, from plans for the refugee camp layout, to safety parameters for civilian refugee volunteers, to availability of HLZ on site for medevacs, etc.  These planning documents have been ignored in favor of free flowing role-play.
0	69. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
0	70. 12JUN00 Coordination
0	71. 10JUN00 Coordination
0	72. Issues with the IDs for the press and the vistors need to be worked out well before we begin the exercise.
0	73. 15JUN00 Coordination Combined
0	74. 13JUN00 Coordination
0	75. I noticed in the cmoc report from the camp, there is no mention of the UN agencies.
0	76. refugees need to arrive earlier in the day to properly inprocess them and allow for role play from the start
0	77. COMMS from the refugee camp back to the MOC did not always work
0	78. Helicopter landing yesterday was poorly organised. Loads of confusion. Does not give confidence
0	79. The media arriving at the base-camp sometimes arrived with no escort, or were not included on the pre-identified media list.  Had this been a real CMOC area/refugee site, many of the media who arrived unexpectedly would not have been admitted.
0	80. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOR THE RIMPAC GAME PLAY WAS INSUFFICIENT.
0	81. there was no interorganiztion communication between the civilian groups
0	82. 14JUN00 Coordination
0	83. Some of the experimental personnel need to be a bit more aggressive.  The people with the Cell phones for the refugees sat in the camp all day waiting for someone to approach them.  They almost left with the Cell phones
0	84. Could we bring some of the junior officers (Lts) into the next LL.  They are doing a lot of the heavy lifting out here and having their perspective would be useful to help us finalize these lessons learned
0	85. When we do experiments in the refugee area we need better coordination on physical and electronic requirements.  This went well but was frustrating for many...

Ballot Items in Original Order
1. 15JUN00 Coordination Combined
2. 10JUN00 Coordination
3. There needs to be more concise communication about the technologies that will be used in these types of exercises
4. need for better coordination and info exchange.
5. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
6. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
7. UN needs to be clearer about what it is doing when not visible/on site
8. To get in front of the problem we need to be better at identifying what are the most likely problems that will be encountered.
9. Need to sppeed up UN operational planning process without compromising the consensus discussions required and need to reach common agreement on objectives , priorities and actions
10. Testing systems while we are establishing relationships contribute to more chaos than would normally be encountered.
11. jumping to conclusions to be avoided, i.e. when people are not on site it does not mean they are enjoying the beach life
12. Reality of providing logistical support may not always be provided in the expected manner due to external difficulties.
13. UN needs to task better in order to ensure office and accommodation requirements met.
14. rain seemed to have come unexpectedly and some of the sleeping equipment is wet. Is somebody checking the weather forecast?
15. So far UN team was not given time and space that would normaly been available to discuss strategy and planning.
16. Camp design and configuration must be confirmed and changes must by posted at a central point to avoid confusion
17. There are a lot of opportunities to have free flowing discussions with the military. This informal communications adds to understanding eachother.
18. Understand that the MOC is the center for all logistical support.  If supplies are issued and vehicles dispatched without their knowledge, the CSSE does not have an acurate picture of what is truly available to be issued/used.
19. Somehow there needs to be more time for informal meetings together.  To often we mix informal with formal and there is something lost when we do that type of meeting.
20. Essential for UN teams to create and follow a meeting schedule which allows time for inter-agency coordination and collaboration.
21. it might be useful to have a tent where people can get together for informal discussions, a tent with some chairs and maybe something to drink (water or other),
22. Helicopter landing yesterday was poorly organised. Loads of confusion. Does not give confidence
23. Where are the meal times posted?  Some folks missed the food line because no one knew they were passing out hot meals
24. There needs to be a clearer understanding of who sets up the refugee camp.
25. The lines of communcation between the UN and the military needs to be opened a little more.  If the UN needs things done they should be willing and learning who they can go to.
26. better communication between all parties needs to be established and certain problems need to be explained better (i.e. yesterday the helicopter flights were delayed)
27. Much planning has gone into this exercise, from plans for the refugee camp layout, to safety parameters for civilian refugee volunteers, to availability of HLZ on site for medevacs, etc.  These planning documents have been ignored in favor of free flowing role-play.
28. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
29. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
30. 12JUN00 Coordination
31. after visiting the camp this afternoon I got a strong impression that the "refugees" had not been briefed properly on what was in store for them
32. Regardless of late arrival a general camp meeting of all participants/refugees is required. To once again reiterate general camp management issues, schedules, who to go and see re problems etc.
33. Having Marine officer in charge at the refugee camp site is essential to getting tasks completed.
34. The JLC start up proved to be very useful.
35. refugee tents and cots were flying away this morning. Only two military were there to help them out. Someone should have monitored that situation, and guided the 'rescue'.
36. ha/dr is not a standard military operation, requires more information to be passed to the junior enlisted and officers,  You must be ready and flexible to meet unusual requests..
37. role play should be on for more than one day and indication regarding when to play should be given to refugee
38. quick establishment of a joint logistics cell is probably one of the most important coordination structures available:  it de-conflicts transport assets arriving and sets out procedures information sharing.  USMC provided useful fact file on their current capabilities.
39. Some how we need a better communication system for the Marines on the ground.  The people that we planned with know the score but the pass down needs to be spread out more to the guys doing the work
40. Issues with the IDs for the press and the vistors need to be worked out well before we begin the exercise.
41. in the refugee camp this afternoon I discovered that some of the lowere ranking military had absolutely no clue about what was going on. Information does not seem to be shared
42. Need to establish who is the person in chage of the refugee camp on the military side
43. Identfy new areas where the military can assist UNICEF -  at the troop level - need to tell the UNICEF reps what they see on their travels, patrols that day, hour, short time frame - in regards to children alone, abuses, abused women, etc.  Share the information in a timely enough manner to actual save/assist the situation.
44. some of military staff have no idea on who are the civilians participating in the exercise.  Need for better briefing on organisations they will have to cooperate with.
45. Need for more face to face amoung ":Like counterparts" - technical to technical, logisticians to logisticians, etc...
46. In future exercises with a civilian population, having a full time help/information person available to either answer questions/concerns and or direct  people to the appropriate contact person. The " refugees" would find such an individual very reassuring and it would provide a consistent  and single point of contact for problems.
47. 13JUN00 Coordination
48. I noticed in the cmoc report from the camp, there is no mention of the UN agencies.
49. The media arriving at the base-camp sometimes arrived with no escort, or were not included on the pre-identified media list.  Had this been a real CMOC area/refugee site, many of the media who arrived unexpectedly would not have been admitted.
50. The relationship and coordination between all parties has evolved into a seemingly cohesive grouping resulting in speedy and sound decisions.
51. Exceptional weather/environment planning - sun, sandstorms and rain.  where is the weather guy anyway?
52. We need to exchange email & Address lists at next LL meeting.  It is the PERSONAL contacts that will help us in the future ev ents.  Lets not loose touch.
53. When we do experiments in the refugee area we need better coordination on physical and electronic requirements.  This went well but was frustrating for many...
54. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
55. Could we bring some of the junior officers (Lts) into the next LL.  They are doing a lot of the heavy lifting out here and having their perspective would be useful to help us finalize these lessons learned
56. Need to identify key NEW or Potential Points of Contact in the Government/Political areana to help smooth the military and public acceptance of the HADR Role.  UN - can you please help us identify them.
57. Some of the experimental personnel need to be a bit more aggressive.  The people with the Cell phones for the refugees sat in the camp all day waiting for someone to approach them.  They almost left with the Cell phones
58. 14JUN00 Coordination
59. the religious needs and practices of the refugees need to be taken into consideration and met
60. there was no interorganiztion communication between the civilian groups
61. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOR THE RIMPAC GAME PLAY WAS INSUFFICIENT.
62. We were 50 to 60 Marines short to make up for all the working parties
63. There seemed to be an extreme lack of inclusion of OICs in the coordination and discussion of issues within the camp in conjunction with the UN/NGOs/notional HN
64. After the arrival of the refugee actors, we spent too much time trying to figure out whether the military or the UN was in charge of the camp.
65. COMMS from the refugee camp back to the MOC did not always work
66. refugees need to arrive earlier in the day to properly inprocess them and allow for role play from the start
67. have more information for those not in the planning stages so final execution does not seem so haphazard.
68. More coordination needs to made between the higher personnel in the UN agencies and the military leadership concerning what their actual partication will be in the refugee camp.
69. The MPs needed a mechanism to coordinate people exiting and entering from different gates and from the camp to allow for better control of where people were at all times
70. Coordination for Intelligence MSL items were done in a vacuum,  all the key players were not involved.
71. To make  this an effective exercise, a coalition of militaries, US and non US and the UN/NGOs/HN should be involved in the management and creation of the camp.  My opinion this was unrealistic because it was a unilateral coordinated effort with Navy and Marines.  b
72. The Refugee camp appeared to be created without input from UN/NGO/HN or other US/Non US Military factions.  No true infrastructure set in the beginning until there were complaints/concerns.
73. better distinction between exercise control and exercise execution.
74. Early on in the exercise there needed to be better coordination between some of the civilian planners and the Marines that were on the ground
75. real refugees would not have the same transportation requirements
76. Consistant stable power was a number one requirement for the civilians and I am not sure that was a number one priority for the Marines
77. Provide some sort of transfer of information before the exercise begins concerning persons exact responsibilities so they will know who to contact when dealing with problems.
78. CMOC and refugee camps were set up too late. Camp was not ready by the time the UN ror refugees came in
79. CECG for Intel input was not as responsive as it needed to be.  Personnel spent the majority ot the exercise at the Ref Camp. No intel info could be passed nor evaluated from thier perspective.
80. Front load ALL OICs/Heads together or an appropriate forum by the UN/NGO/HN experts so that we can understand the mission rather than at the end when frustration/misunderstanding has already set in.
81. Communication was difficult to coordinate, many individules used personal cell phones which would/may not be plausable in certain real world locations
82. For the sake of safety,  it is essential for a distincition to be made between exercise exercise and actual actual as not all role players did so causing confusion  and even unsafe conditions at times.
83. More workers need to be sent on the advanced party to prepare for the arrival of Marines
84. Some entity/office needs to coordinate the individual NGO/PVO groups to ensure support can be consolidated to reduce the peacemeal way requests for assistance would come in from the MOC
85. Embarkl:
Significant safety issues with stuffing Marins and Sailor into LCAC the thrwing gear over top of them.  Two sticks went in this way.  if there had been a MISHAP there would have been no way to evac the Cabin

15JUN00 Combined Objectives (Vote)

Voting Results
Multiple Selection (maximum choices = 10) (Allow bypass)
Number of ballot items: 32
Total number of voters (N):  17

Total
9	1. there needs to be a clear and concise mission statement developed and this needs to be spelled out to all of the participants especially that  the more junior participants have a better understanding as to why they are here
9	2. Too little attention is being paid to assisting the host population. This is imperative in order to ensure relations, PR value, smooth and efficient exit as well as ensuring that they receive some tangible benefits
7	3. After days of hard and sometimes unrewarding work the Marines have managed to keep efficiency and sense of humor. Good and very informative informal discussions with them in the camp, help to better understand how they operate.
7	4. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
7	5. Need to put a media training aspect into the exercise.
6	6. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
6	7. The close coordination between the agencies executing the refugee support has proven to show we can work together.
5	8. If the ultimate goal is self sufficency for the refugees, self-sufficency should be preached from the very begining of the excersize in order to determine what the true mission of each organization throughout.
5	9. Each Agency has different priorities and needs - at the operational planning phase - we need to identify the phases and priorities and the ACTUAL ACTUAL time lines.
4	10. working with actual civilians and not Marines playing civilians was great training, and is the best way to prepare for HA/DR ops
4	11. This operation may have been a bit too ambiguous.  Trying to do civil military cooperation,  humanitian assistance,  equipment  testing  and develp command relationships all in two weeks is creates too many competing  priorities
2	12. The safety of the actual refugees is paramount.  Seemingly too much attention paid to role-playing and other "exercise" parts of the mission and not enough attention to the actual needs of civilian refugee volunteers under our care.
2	13. After the arrival of the refugee actors, we spent too much time trying to figure out whether the military or the UN was in charge of the camp.
2	14. increased interactions on one on one basis have proved to be very useful and informative.
2	15. The relationship and coordination between all parties has evolved into a seemingly cohesive grouping resulting in speedy and sound decisions.
2	16. The transition matrix looks useful.
2	17. Tests and new developments are very important, yet, the establishment of functional organizations to deal with the issues at hand are as difficult to build as the new tested systems.
2	18. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
1	19. Cmoc role in the camp working with  the refugees and coordinating information was very impressive.
1	20. CommandNet is up and running in the ref camp and CA is using it to enter reports
1	21. the specific role of the military was not clearly defined..
1	22. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
1	23. the training was fairly realisitc, but at the same time real refugees would not be treated nearly the same way, i.e. complaints ect.....
0	24. 13JUN00 Objectives
0	25. There seems some confusion on what is exercise control and what is exercise execution.
0	26. 12JUN00 Objectives
0	27. 15JUN00 Objectives Combined
0	28. 14JUN00 Objectives
0	29. There needs to be more concise communication about the technologies that will be used in these types of exercises
0	30. It seemed like every civilian thought they could tell a Marine what to do, and they expected the Marine to jump when told to do something.
0	31. It seemed like every civilian thought they could tell a Marine what to do, and they expected the Marine to jump when told to do something.
0	32. 10JUN00 Objectives

Ballot Items in Original Order
1. 15JUN00 Objectives Combined
2. 10JUN00 Objectives
3. Each Agency has different priorities and needs - at the operational planning phase - we need to identify the phases and priorities and the ACTUAL ACTUAL time lines.
4. There needs to be more concise communication about the technologies that will be used in these types of exercises
5. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
6. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
7. Tests and new developments are very important, yet, the establishment of functional organizations to deal with the issues at hand are as difficult to build as the new tested systems.
8. The safety of the actual refugees is paramount.  Seemingly too much attention paid to role-playing and other "exercise" parts of the mission and not enough attention to the actual needs of civilian refugee volunteers under our care.
9. This operation may have been a bit too ambiguous.  Trying to do civil military cooperation,  humanitian assistance,  equipment  testing  and develp command relationships all in two weeks is creates too many competing  priorities
10. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
11. 12JUN00 Objectives
12. There seems some confusion on what is exercise control and what is exercise execution.
13. Need to put a media training aspect into the exercise.
14. 13JUN00 Objectives
15. The transition matrix looks useful.
16. The relationship and coordination between all parties has evolved into a seemingly cohesive grouping resulting in speedy and sound decisions.
17. increased interactions on one on one basis have proved to be very useful and informative.
18. The close coordination between the agencies executing the refugee support has proven to show we can work together.
19. Cmoc role in the camp working with  the refugees and coordinating information was very impressive.
20. CommandNet is up and running in the ref camp and CA is using it to enter reports
21. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
22. Too little attention is being paid to assisting the host population. This is imperative in order to ensure relations, PR value, smooth and efficient exit as well as ensuring that they receive some tangible benefits
23. After days of hard and sometimes unrewarding work the Marines have managed to keep efficiency and sense of humor. Good and very informative informal discussions with them in the camp, help to better understand how they operate.
24. 14JUN00 Objectives
25. the specific role of the military was not clearly defined..
26. After the arrival of the refugee actors, we spent too much time trying to figure out whether the military or the UN was in charge of the camp.
27. there needs to be a clear and concise mission statement developed and this needs to be spelled out to all of the participants especially that  the more junior participants have a better understanding as to why they are here
28. working with actual civilians and not Marines playing civilians was great training, and is the best way to prepare for HA/DR ops
29. It seemed like every civilian thought they could tell a Marine what to do, and they expected the Marine to jump when told to do something.
30. It seemed like every civilian thought they could tell a Marine what to do, and they expected the Marine to jump when told to do something.
31. the training was fairly realisitc, but at the same time real refugees would not be treated nearly the same way, i.e. complaints ect.....
32. If the ultimate goal is self sufficency for the refugees, self-sufficency should be preached from the very begining of the excersize in order to determine what the true mission of each organization throughout.

15JUN00 Combined Scheduling (Vote)

Voting Results
Multiple Selection (maximum choices = 10) (Allow bypass)
Number of ballot items: 22
Total number of voters (N):  17

Total
10	1. Building more time into the exercise that would have allowed for more interaction with the participants of the CMOC would have allowed us to establish more creditability with each other.
9	2. The briefing for the VIPs provided a good overview of the exercise and where we were at.  Maybe a time out mid exercise would be useful to take stock of the exercise.
8	3. The tools used to capture lessons learned have been useful.  Keeping the meeting under an hour is critical
6	4. Confusion about Coordination meeting between various meetings at the CMOC, Capitol, & Local Govt.  Need Poted agreed to schedule
6	5. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
5	6. Essential for UN teams to create and follow a meeting schedule which allows time for inter-agency coordination and collaboration.
5	7. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
4	8. Meeting times and locations need to be posted...there has been to much confusion
4	9. after visiting the camp this afternoon I got a strong impression that the "refugees" had not been briefed properly on what was in store for them
4	10. Having some spare time to discuss issues in a more relaxed manner today proved valuable
3	11. scheduled meetings need to take place as planned and if the scheduled time changes, all concerned need to be informed (central board)
3	12. UN should be present earlier in the camp (like 7 am) so the refugees have someone to turn to with questions.
2	13. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
1	14. Review and confirm plans for the registration and initial care of the refugees at least 24 hours in advance
1	15. Pre-assigned aIr missions should be validated within 4-8 hours before the mission is flown.
1	16. There needed to be set times for transportation of the civilians established and edhered to.
0	17. 15JUN00 Scheduling Combined
0	18. 10JUN00 Scheduling
0	19. 12JUN00 Scheduling
0	20. 13JUN00 Scheduling
0	21. Let's not forget that ENDEX does not come until mid-day on the 15th.  Now that the Admirals, other DVs and press have gone, we still have a mission to support.
0	22. 14JUN00 Scheduling

Ballot Items in Original Order
1. 15JUN00 Scheduling Combined
2. 10JUN00 Scheduling
3. Confusion about Coordination meeting between various meetings at the CMOC, Capitol, & Local Govt.  Need Poted agreed to schedule
4. scheduled meetings need to take place as planned and if the scheduled time changes, all concerned need to be informed (central board)
5. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
6. Review and confirm plans for the registration and initial care of the refugees at least 24 hours in advance
7. Meeting times and locations need to be posted...there has been to much confusion
8. Essential for UN teams to create and follow a meeting schedule which allows time for inter-agency coordination and collaboration.
9. Building more time into the exercise that would have allowed for more interaction with the participants of the CMOC would have allowed us to establish more creditability with each other.
10. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
11. 12JUN00 Scheduling
12. UN should be present earlier in the camp (like 7 am) so the refugees have someone to turn to with questions.
13. after visiting the camp this afternoon I got a strong impression that the "refugees" had not been briefed properly on what was in store for them
14. 13JUN00 Scheduling
15. Having some spare time to discuss issues in a more relaxed manner today proved valuable
16. Let's not forget that ENDEX does not come until mid-day on the 15th.  Now that the Admirals, other DVs and press have gone, we still have a mission to support.
17. The tools used to capture lessons learned have been useful.  Keeping the meeting under an hour is critical
18. The briefing for the VIPs provided a good overview of the exercise and where we were at.  Maybe a time out mid exercise would be useful to take stock of the exercise.
19. Pre-assigned aIr missions should be validated within 4-8 hours before the mission is flown.
20. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
21. 14JUN00 Scheduling
22. There needed to be set times for transportation of the civilians established and edhered to.

15JUN00 Combined Philosophy (Vote)

Voting Results
Multiple Selection (maximum choices = 10) (Allow bypass)
Number of ballot items: 69
Total number of voters (N):  17

Total
10	1. The obstacles we faced (equipment breakdown, misunderstanding of mission, poor communication of expectations by those in charge of the exercise) added an element of realism to the exercise.  A perfectly scripted, no obstacles exercise would have been unrealistic and boring.
7	2. The military needs to be much more prepared for children.
7	3. Holding a mock press briefing was useful since it allowed us to focus on the questions and issues the media will continue to raise during emergencies involving both the military and UN relief agencies.
6	4. It is a basic challenge for the UN to decide how much they would like to depend on the military to provide services/support which will profoundly define the level of the UN services. E.g. if we would have brought our own tents, WE define when the tents go up. If we bring our own generators, WE define when the service is up. It is scary to think that some of our core functions might not be provided because a third party (the military) provides some parts which will directly affect our service level
5	5. For future consideration:  Look at different scenarios (displaced persons, due to strife,  natural or manmade disasters), focus on the coordination at various levels by separating Capitol from CMOC from relief site and ensure those site are separated to avoid confusion.  Use fixed facilities to avoid losing focus on UN/military interaction vice infrastructure.
5	6. quick establishment of a joint logistics cell is probably one of the most important coordination structures available:  it de-conflicts transport assets arriving and sets out procedures information sharing.  USMC provided useful fact file on their current capabilities.
5	7. This should be exercised regularly (annually?) to include ALL appropriate components/activities/organizations.
5	8. Too little attention is being paid to assisting the host population. This is imperative in order to ensure relations, PR value, smooth and efficient exit as well as ensuring that they receive some tangible benefits
4	9. for such type of assignment, more female staff should be present within military personnel deployed. Important to deal with issues affecting female refugees requiring female staff only.
4	10. The military needs to bring more females to HA refugee situations as over 50% of refugees are women.
4	11. There is a very direct communications line between UN and the military. This helps to resolve problems.
4	12. the TO&E of the military does not completely accomidate a civilian requirement...we should build a support package that more readily meets this unique mission
4	13. there needs to be a clear and concise mission statement developed and this needs to be spelled out to all of the participants especially that  the more junior participants have a better understanding as to why they are here
3	14. We received our rules of engagement but what were the rules of engagement for the UN/NGO/HN??
3	15. There are a lot of opportunities to have free flowing discussions with the military. This informal communications adds to understanding eachother.
3	16. ha/dr is not a standard military operation, requires more information to be passed to the junior enlisted and officers,  You must be ready and flexible to meet unusual requests..
3	17. Discussion of Field CMOC vs. Capital CMOC very helpful.  In future need Political/Ambassador involvement.
3	18. Keeping a sense of humour is critical
3	19. Lack of real urgency and absence of other usual key partners should be taken into consideration in analysis and evaluation of exercise.
2	20. This operation may have been a bit too ambiguous.  Trying to do civil military cooperation,  humanitian assistance,  equipment  testing  and develp command relationships all in two weeks is creates too many competing  priorities
2	21. Military has to be prepared to do much more than they expect.
2	22. Having some spare time to discuss issues in a more relaxed manner today proved valuable
2	23. I was surprised at the lack of UN presence in the refugee camp.  The UNHCR flag was hoisted, but seldom was their anyone from the UN on site.
2	24. some planning tools used by the military can be adapted and useful to the UN.
2	25. Starting last night with the showers, thing improved in the refugee camp greatly.  When dealing with refugees the policy should be ....do not over promise.  It destroys trust.  The rule should be...Under promise, over perform.
2	26. If the ultimate goal is self sufficency for the refugees, self-sufficency should be preached from the very begining of the excersize in order to determine what the true mission of each organization throughout.
2	27. Front load ALL OICs/Heads together or an appropriate forum by the UN/NGO/HN experts so that we can understand the mission rather than at the end when frustration/misunderstanding has already set in.
2	28. As OICs who will be teaching and directing our personnel would have wanted more interaction with UN/NGO/HN leadership with their input/lessons learned as the exercise evolved.  How can we teach our personnel without an accurate  understanding of the thought process?
2	29. The military seems to always "put on a show" whenever they deal with civilian organizations, why is it necessary to put up a facade. If there is a need to change the military when the spotlight is on, maybe those changes should be implemented permanently, or the spotlight should reveal the "real" way things are done.
2	30. In real environment, more infrastructure would be set up at refugee camp -- less focus on supporting base that serves less of a function in a humanitarian context.
2	31. The UN team feels that it is  not fully aware of all the research areas being piloted . They feel defensive and put on the spot when asked to accept or agree to participate in experiments which have not been discussed with them
2	32. Before  introducing new tools and technologies - it is better to gain consensus first.
2	33. The disproportionate human resources available to the military can easily overwhelm the civilian teams.
2	34. The Military and the Civilian communities have different procedures and methods and each feels at an uncomfortable disadvantage when required to conform to the other
1	35. Recommend that more value is gained in an HA exercise with so many higher level participants that vice using an FTX format a TEWT (tactical exercise without troops) would be more useful in garnering SOP's and understanding between organizations.  Items that need to have actual people being the refugees (for exeriments) we could do that in a seperate yet parallel.
1	36. Number of observors seems superior in some meetings to number of reel players.
1	37. I was hoping to see how to resolve more problems without throwng money at them.
1	38. DV/Media day mov es the focus from relief effort to supporting the visit
1	39. Intelligence was not a major player in this exercise, but was relied on heavely for daily briefs on the current situations around the camp and in other (notional) countries.  Intel reps from the exercising command sholud be included in the planning phases of future HA/DR exercise to ensure that thier own mission of providing the best intel support for the command is accomplished.
1	40. This exercise is not being taken as seriously as it should.  I am not saying the military or the UN is not taking it seriously.  Even though we do not have 80,000 refugees it should be treated as such; therefore, we should all train as if this were real life.
1	41. "Traditional" telemedicine ie care to a single indvidual is inappropriate in a mass HA situation except for possible care to aid providers.
1	42. The length of time in playing to problem has been good.  However, a period of time built into the exercise to allow for the many additional items we have found to be helpful would be helpful for the next HA; -discussions on each others organizations, -discussions on capabilities, -education to the refugees on the overall help they would receive and what would be happening to each to them, and informal discussions on how we could improve each other.
1	43. To make  this an effective exercise, a coalition of militaries, US and non US and the UN/NGOs/HN should be involved in the management and creation of the camp.  My opinion this was unrealistic because it was a unilateral coordinated effort with Navy and Marines.  b
1	44. Felt that a lot of people were involved in the lessons learned. hope all feedback will be taken care of
1	45. Parts of this evolution were not very plausable, much of the requirements of this camp would never have supported an emcampment of a large number of refugees >500
0	46. Angry volunteers could significnt damage the prospect of this type of exercise in the future, even if we meet all other objectives.  Lets redouble our effort to create "happy campers."  Note: a group of 40 that is 100% positive may be better than a group of 60 that is only 75% positive.
0	47. Civilian advisors should be, and generally are, curtous to the military on the ground.  This has not alway been the case and has made UN reps a little uncomfortable...
0	48. Marines need to train as the fight which means weapons
0	49. 10JUN00 Philosophy
0	50. With arrival ashore the only thing that is for sure is nothing is a given.
0	51. The ability to determine what is going to happen in an unsure situation is incressed by experance.
0	52. If civilians are ever used for an exercise again.  They need to have a clearer undersnding of what there role is.  Real refugees do not get treated the way these ones did.
0	53. realisticly, would refugees be promised certain things contractually.  support and assistance comes and gives people assistance when they have nothing, and they receive support as it is available barring unforseen problems.
0	54. Flexibility and patients have been exceptional by all parties.  THe key to good communications is courtesty and desire to do the right thing.
0	55. the training was fairly realisitc, but at the same time real refugees would not be treated nearly the same way, i.e. complaints ect.....
0	56. Inprocessing concerns =- accounatbility vs force protection vs. refugee relief.  Good discussions, reviews of perceptions and actual practice.  One refugee stated that her community hurrican evacuation team had learned so much that day with the transit to the refugee site.  In the future they will provide shade & Comfort, then water and worry about the paperwork later.
0	57. Just like in real life it is difficult to build a little town on a tropical island from scratch.  Patience with the various parts of the Combat Service Support Detachment is appreciated.  When you look around outside there are a bunch of very hard working young men and women doing the best they can.
0	58. jumping to conclusions to be avoided, i.e. when people are not on site it does not mean they are enjoying the beach life
0	59. the religious needs and practices of the refugees need to be taken into consideration and met
0	60. 14JUN00 Philosophy
0	61. The media and press would have enjoyed listening and watching one of our daily CMOC meetings in action.
0	62. In real life many unauthorized people enter the camp.  The camp is not a prison.
0	63. The force protection element within the CMOC and refugee camp were extremely uncomfortable with the free acess of the media within the basecamps.
0	64. It makes for a lot better stories afterward if it rains on you during an event like this.
0	65. Press & DV's seemed to add additional focus, revitalization to our mission.
0	66. 13JUN00 Philosophy
0	67. 12JUN00 Philosophy
0	68. There seems some confusion on what is exercise control and what is exercise execution.
0	69. 15JUN00 Philosophy Combined

Ballot Items in Original Order
1. 15JUN00 Philosophy Combined
2. 10JUN00 Philosophy
3. With arrival ashore the only thing that is for sure is nothing is a given.
4. Before  introducing new tools and technologies - it is better to gain consensus first.
5. The ability to determine what is going to happen in an unsure situation is incressed by experance.
6. Flexibility and patients have been exceptional by all parties.  THe key to good communications is courtesty and desire to do the right thing.
7. Number of observors seems superior in some meetings to number of reel players.
8. Just like in real life it is difficult to build a little town on a tropical island from scratch.  Patience with the various parts of the Combat Service Support Detachment is appreciated.  When you look around outside there are a bunch of very hard working young men and women doing the best they can.
9. jumping to conclusions to be avoided, i.e. when people are not on site it does not mean they are enjoying the beach life
10. The Military and the Civilian communities have different procedures and methods and each feels at an uncomfortable disadvantage when required to conform to the other
11. There are a lot of opportunities to have free flowing discussions with the military. This informal communications adds to understanding eachother.
12. The disproportionate human resources available to the military can easily overwhelm the civilian teams.
13. This exercise is not being taken as seriously as it should.  I am not saying the military or the UN is not taking it seriously.  Even though we do not have 80,000 refugees it should be treated as such; therefore, we should all train as if this were real life.
14. It makes for a lot better stories afterward if it rains on you during an event like this.
15. The UN team feels that it is  not fully aware of all the research areas being piloted . They feel defensive and put on the spot when asked to accept or agree to participate in experiments which have not been discussed with them
16. Lack of real urgency and absence of other usual key partners should be taken into consideration in analysis and evaluation of exercise.
17. It is a basic challenge for the UN to decide how much they would like to depend on the military to provide services/support which will profoundly define the level of the UN services. E.g. if we would have brought our own tents, WE define when the tents go up. If we bring our own generators, WE define when the service is up. It is scary to think that some of our core functions might not be provided because a third party (the military) provides some parts which will directly affect our service level
18. This operation may have been a bit too ambiguous.  Trying to do civil military cooperation,  humanitian assistance,  equipment  testing  and develp command relationships all in two weeks is creates too many competing  priorities
19. 12JUN00 Philosophy
20. There seems some confusion on what is exercise control and what is exercise execution.
21. Military has to be prepared to do much more than they expect.
22. The military needs to bring more females to HA refugee situations as over 50% of refugees are women.
23. Discussion of Field CMOC vs. Capital CMOC very helpful.  In future need Political/Ambassador involvement.
24. The military needs to be much more prepared for children.
25. ha/dr is not a standard military operation, requires more information to be passed to the junior enlisted and officers,  You must be ready and flexible to meet unusual requests..
26. There is a very direct communications line between UN and the military. This helps to resolve problems.
27. quick establishment of a joint logistics cell is probably one of the most important coordination structures available:  it de-conflicts transport assets arriving and sets out procedures information sharing.  USMC provided useful fact file on their current capabilities.
28. Inprocessing concerns =- accounatbility vs force protection vs. refugee relief.  Good discussions, reviews of perceptions and actual practice.  One refugee stated that her community hurrican evacuation team had learned so much that day with the transit to the refugee site.  In the future they will provide shade & Comfort, then water and worry about the paperwork later.
29. Holding a mock press briefing was useful since it allowed us to focus on the questions and issues the media will continue to raise during emergencies involving both the military and UN relief agencies.
30. for such type of assignment, more female staff should be present within military personnel deployed. Important to deal with issues affecting female refugees requiring female staff only.
31. For future consideration:  Look at different scenarios (displaced persons, due to strife,  natural or manmade disasters), focus on the coordination at various levels by separating Capitol from CMOC from relief site and ensure those site are separated to avoid confusion.  Use fixed facilities to avoid losing focus on UN/military interaction vice infrastructure.
32. Civilian advisors should be, and generally are, curtous to the military on the ground.  This has not alway been the case and has made UN reps a little uncomfortable...
33. Recommend that more value is gained in an HA exercise with so many higher level participants that vice using an FTX format a TEWT (tactical exercise without troops) would be more useful in garnering SOP's and understanding between organizations.  Items that need to have actual people being the refugees (for exeriments) we could do that in a seperate yet parallel.
34. Angry volunteers could significnt damage the prospect of this type of exercise in the future, even if we meet all other objectives.  Lets redouble our effort to create "happy campers."  Note: a group of 40 that is 100% positive may be better than a group of 60 that is only 75% positive.
35. In real environment, more infrastructure would be set up at refugee camp -- less focus on supporting base that serves less of a function in a humanitarian context.
36. Keeping a sense of humour is critical
37. 13JUN00 Philosophy
38. Having some spare time to discuss issues in a more relaxed manner today proved valuable
39. Press & DV's seemed to add additional focus, revitalization to our mission.
40. DV/Media day mov es the focus from relief effort to supporting the visit
41. some planning tools used by the military can be adapted and useful to the UN.
42. The force protection element within the CMOC and refugee camp were extremely uncomfortable with the free acess of the media within the basecamps.
43. Starting last night with the showers, thing improved in the refugee camp greatly.  When dealing with refugees the policy should be ....do not over promise.  It destroys trust.  The rule should be...Under promise, over perform.
44. "Traditional" telemedicine ie care to a single indvidual is inappropriate in a mass HA situation except for possible care to aid providers.
45. In real life many unauthorized people enter the camp.  The camp is not a prison.
46. The length of time in playing to problem has been good.  However, a period of time built into the exercise to allow for the many additional items we have found to be helpful would be helpful for the next HA; -discussions on each others organizations, -discussions on capabilities, -education to the refugees on the overall help they would receive and what would be happening to each to them, and informal discussions on how we could improve each other.
47. The media and press would have enjoyed listening and watching one of our daily CMOC meetings in action.
48. Too little attention is being paid to assisting the host population. This is imperative in order to ensure relations, PR value, smooth and efficient exit as well as ensuring that they receive some tangible benefits
49. 14JUN00 Philosophy
50. the religious needs and practices of the refugees need to be taken into consideration and met
51. the TO&E of the military does not completely accomidate a civilian requirement...we should build a support package that more readily meets this unique mission
52. there needs to be a clear and concise mission statement developed and this needs to be spelled out to all of the participants especially that  the more junior participants have a better understanding as to why they are here
53. To make  this an effective exercise, a coalition of militaries, US and non US and the UN/NGOs/HN should be involved in the management and creation of the camp.  My opinion this was unrealistic because it was a unilateral coordinated effort with Navy and Marines.  b
54. Felt that a lot of people were involved in the lessons learned. hope all feedback will be taken care of
55. I was surprised at the lack of UN presence in the refugee camp.  The UNHCR flag was hoisted, but seldom was their anyone from the UN on site.
56. This should be exercised regularly (annually?) to include ALL appropriate components/activities/organizations.
57. Parts of this evolution were not very plausable, much of the requirements of this camp would never have supported an emcampment of a large number of refugees >500
58. the training was fairly realisitc, but at the same time real refugees would not be treated nearly the same way, i.e. complaints ect.....
59. Front load ALL OICs/Heads together or an appropriate forum by the UN/NGO/HN experts so that we can understand the mission rather than at the end when frustration/misunderstanding has already set in.
60. realisticly, would refugees be promised certain things contractually.  support and assistance comes and gives people assistance when they have nothing, and they receive support as it is available barring unforseen problems.
61. If civilians are ever used for an exercise again.  They need to have a clearer undersnding of what there role is.  Real refugees do not get treated the way these ones did.
62. As OICs who will be teaching and directing our personnel would have wanted more interaction with UN/NGO/HN leadership with their input/lessons learned as the exercise evolved.  How can we teach our personnel without an accurate  understanding of the thought process?
63. Intelligence was not a major player in this exercise, but was relied on heavely for daily briefs on the current situations around the camp and in other (notional) countries.  Intel reps from the exercising command sholud be included in the planning phases of future HA/DR exercise to ensure that thier own mission of providing the best intel support for the command is accomplished.
64. We received our rules of engagement but what were the rules of engagement for the UN/NGO/HN??
65. The obstacles we faced (equipment breakdown, misunderstanding of mission, poor communication of expectations by those in charge of the exercise) added an element of realism to the exercise.  A perfectly scripted, no obstacles exercise would have been unrealistic and boring.
66. The military seems to always "put on a show" whenever they deal with civilian organizations, why is it necessary to put up a facade. If there is a need to change the military when the spotlight is on, maybe those changes should be implemented permanently, or the spotlight should reveal the "real" way things are done.
67. I was hoping to see how to resolve more problems without throwng money at them.
68. Marines need to train as the fight which means weapons
69. If the ultimate goal is self sufficency for the refugees, self-sufficency should be preached from the very begining of the excersize in order to determine what the true mission of each organization throughout.

15JUN00 Combined Exercise Planning (Vote)

Voting Results
Multiple Selection (maximum choices = 10) (Allow bypass)
Number of ballot items: 111
Total number of voters (N):  16

Total
8	1. Green Government representation and interaction need to be strengthened to bring more reality to scenario.
6	2. Next time we should have a fulltime "real" government offical playing the roll fulltime during the exercise
5	3. Would be good if all marines could be briefed in an info session what the UN does, what we do as an agency, what we do in real life. A lot of them are very interested and when confronted on a 1-on-1 basis, they are full of curiosity and interest.
5	4. At the beginning of the exercise, all UN agencies should have briefed the military staff (all of them) about what they are doing. Some of the guys still have no idea what the different UN organisations do and what they stand for.
4	5. It is a basic challenge for the UN to decide how much they would like to depend on the military to provide services/support which will profoundly define the level of the UN services. E.g. if we would have brought our own tents, WE define when the tents go up. If we bring our own generators, WE define when the service is up. It is scary to think that some of our core functions might not be provided because a third party (the military) provides some parts which will directly affect our service level
4	6. Would the addition of a DART from the U.S. State Dept be helpful? What about other NGO's?
4	7. This has been (and still is) a very good learning exercise for everybody. If a similar exercise is planned for the future, it might be good to extend it, i.e. invite NGOs
4	8. Working with UN agency personnel has been very enlightening.  This exercise has enhanced our understanding of HA operations and will facilitate smooth coordination with NGOs/PVOs in future exercises/operations.
4	9. scope of overall mission was underestimated.  Millitary personnel were simultanously involved in CMOC construction, refugee camp construction and VIP visits and had difficulty prioritizing effort.
4	10. Building more time into the exercise that would have allowed for more interaction with the participants of the CMOC would have allowed us to establish more creditability with each other.
3	11. Publications that describe each participants' organization, capabilities and requirements, burned on a CD in any popular format, would be a great "take home" item.
3	12. This should be exercised regularly (annually?) to include ALL appropriate components/activities/organizations.
3	13. The location for the exercise was less imporant then the process we tried to coordinate .  The exercise would have met with as much success and considerably less effort if it had been planned at PTA, or another less challenging area..
3	14. Again we have proven that we need constant power to do anything we computers in camp.  Or we should have solid UPS systems in place
3	15. Too little attention is being paid to assisting the host population. This is imperative in order to ensure relations, PR value, smooth and efficient exit as well as ensuring that they receive some tangible benefits
3	16. For the sake of safety,  it is essential for a distincition to be made between exercise exercise and actual actual as not all role players did so causing confusion  and even unsafe conditions at times.
3	17. Lack of real urgency and absence of other usual key partners should be taken into consideration in analysis and evaluation of exercise.
3	18. The exercise control group needs a more robust cell - perhaps with an NGO?
3	19. Medical Mission Creep,
Multiple medical taskings arose that were not in the original training plan , i.e.,  HST ops.

The original medical  manning plan for refugee camp was IDC during the day and a general duty HM at night for emergencies only.  this changed by CADIF Surgeon and IDC had to remain 24/7.   "Fly the Brief"

Need to "fly the brief" we T/O'd enough HM's to do Original Mission, take care of Main Camp Marines and Marines at Refugee Camp.  We were to provide Emergency Aid ONLY to refugee site.  This changed in mid stream with our staff being sucked into "notional problems"  Sometimes into evening hours.  If this was the original plan we would have staffed for this plan.
3	20. If the ultimate goal is self sufficency for the refugees, self-sufficency should be preached from the very begining of the excersize in order to determine what the true mission of each organization throughout.
3	21. The young, enlisted Marines have learnt a great deal by observation of the practical workings of the UN  Have they had any briefings by the Agencies on their roles similar to those given on the Coronado.  Some simplified technical background would reinforce the practical lessons they have learnt.
2	22. The site for this exercised presented a number of challenges for the personnel and the equipment deployed.  If this is to be one again then we need to take a harder look at all the personnel and equipment required
2	23. There seems some confusion on what is exercise control and what is exercise execution.
2	24. The military needs to be much more prepared for children.
2	25. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
2	26. In some cases, particularly where cross border displaced persons are concerned, the initial interview should be done in private so that the information given is not overheard by other people.
2	27. In future exercises with a civilian population, having a full time help/information person available to either answer questions/concerns and or direct  people to the appropriate contact person. The " refugees" would find such an individual very reassuring and it would provide a consistent  and single point of contact for problems.
2	28. So far UN team was not given time and space that would normaly been available to discuss strategy and planning.
2	29. in the refugee camp this afternoon I discovered that some of the lowere ranking military had absolutely no clue about what was going on. Information does not seem to be shared
2	30. Huge footprint at CMOC Camp is to support relief operation at refugee camp with small Marine footprint.  Hard to role-play/exercise whilst Marines at refugee camp are stretched to provide actual essential services such as showers.
2	31. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
2	32. for such type of assignment, more female staff should be present within military personnel deployed. Important to deal with issues affecting female refugees requiring female staff only.
2	33. The military needs to bring more females to HA refugee situations as over 50% of refugees are women.
2	34. On these types of missions, a Military Information Support Team (MIST) is very useful to communicate inside the camp, within the JTF, and, in some cases, with permission, with the host nation populace.
2	35. the military should have one set of personnel trained/tasked for support the refugee site that are separate from that needed at the main camp  this would improve support and deconflict many requirements
2	36. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
1	37. More workers need to be sent on the advanced party to prepare for the arrival of Marines
1	38. Having Marine officer in charge at the refugee camp site is essential to getting tasks completed.
1	39. Discussion of Field CMOC vs. Capital CMOC very helpful.  In future need Political/Ambassador involvement.
1	40. There are so many activities going on, I believe that few people have a clear idea of what is happening.    This includes refugees, soldiers, technical people and UN.
1	41. How to ensure host population needs are met in both exercise and in reality needs further consideration.
1	42. Need to put a media training aspect into the exercise.
1	43. We should begin collecting basic data within the camp (e.g., CMR, U5MR, under or mal nourishment, births, etc.).
1	44. Coordination of In-Flow process requires three plans:  The Primary Plan, the Contingency Plan and the Fall-back Plan.  Also need to identify key indices on when/what is necessary to move onto the next plan.
1	45. The money provided to support this evolution was inadiquate
1	46. Would have been good to separate the actual provision of assistance from those role-playing the exercise.  That would separate those requests that are notional from those that are actual.  Better instruction on this aspect of the exercise from the exercise control group would have helped -- perhaps through an opening brief when we all arrived on BI and before we started the ex.
1	47. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
1	48. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
1	49. Camp Management System for exercise of this nature must be coordinated during the planning phase and in the CMOC afloat.
1	50. This operation may have been a bit too ambiguous.  Trying to do civil military cooperation,  humanitian assistance,  equipment  testing  and develp command relationships all in two weeks is creates too many competing  priorities
1	51. The refugee camp should be set up when the notice of refugee are to arrive is given, not wait until they are schedule arrive.
1	52. The USMC is either expected to do to much or undermaned for this exercise.  These guys are doing a great job but they are killing themselves and their equipment.
1	53. There seemed to be an extreme lack of inclusion of OICs in the coordination and discussion of issues within the camp in conjunction with the UN/NGOs/notional HN
1	54. better distinction between exercise control and exercise execution.
1	55. Either actual NGOs or personnel role-playing them would have been a valuable addition to the exercise.
1	56. Starting last night with the showers, thing improved in the refugee camp greatly.  When dealing with refugees the policy should be ....do not over promise.  It destroys trust.  The rule should be...Under promise, over perform.
1	57. Senior military leadership visited today and added some interesting perspective.   The perspective from comparable personnel from UNICEF, UHHCR, etc. would, I'm sure, have been equally or more valuable.
1	58. The Refugee camp appeared to be created without input from UN/NGO/HN or other US/Non US Military factions.  No true infrastructure set in the beginning until there were complaints/concerns.
1	59. VIP visits can happen within the first week of an emergency -- on day three in East 	Timor the 	UN and INTERFET hadf a 15 high level delegation.  Todays visit was in a way realistic.
1	60. The MPs needed a mechanism to coordinate people exiting and entering from different gates and from the camp to allow for better control of where people were at all times
1	61. there needs to be a clear and concise mission statement developed and this needs to be spelled out to all of the participants especially that  the more junior participants have a better understanding as to why they are here
1	62. the TO&E of the military does not completely accomidate a civilian requirement...we should build a support package that more readily meets this unique mission
1	63. OK, no one wants another meeting, but a fifteen minute briefing by each organization (perhaps one a night, preferably with a good written handout) would be useful to familiarize everyone with the participating agencies.
0	64. At the Refugee Camp, it was hard to figure out what was real and what was pretend.  It made every scenerio hard to take seriously.
0	65. We need to know what actual and what is an exercise when dealing with scenarios.
0	66. Some entity/office needs to coordinate the individual NGO/PVO groups to ensure support can be consolidated to reduce the peacemeal way requests for assistance would come in from the MOC
0	67. terrain was not a big a part of the equation as it should have been i.e., how it effected equipment, especially electionics.
0	68. CMOC and refugee camps were set up too late. Camp was not ready by the time the UN ror refugees came in
0	69. The money provided to support this evolution was inadiquate
0	70. realisticly, would refugees be promised certain things contractually.  support and assistance comes and gives people assistance when they have nothing, and they receive support as it is available barring unforseen problems.
0	71. Provide some sort of transfer of information before the exercise begins concerning persons exact responsibilities so they will know who to contact when dealing with problems.
0	72. Embarkl:
Significant safety issues with stuffing Marins and Sailor into LCAC the thrwing gear over top of them.  Two sticks went in this way.  if there had been a MISHAP there would have been no way to evac the Cabin
0	73. Consistant stable power was a number one requirement for the civilians and I am not sure that was a number one priority for the Marines
0	74. As conditions at  CMOC worsen, we should evaluate if some meetings in better conditions would improve our productivity.
0	75. In a 'real' environment, UN would not hold office long in a tent environment like the one we have now. It would kill the equipment, and undermine people's health.
0	76. some of military staff have no idea on who are the civilians participating in the exercise.  Need for better briefing on organisations they will have to cooperate with.
0	77. UNHCR is not actually responsible for the refugee volunteers.  Real concerns need to be addressed by the CSSD.
0	78. Issues with the IDs for the press and the vistors need to be worked out well before we begin the exercise.
0	79. 15JUN00 Exercise Planning Combined
0	80. after visiting the camp this afternoon I got a strong impression that the "refugees" had not been briefed properly on what was in store for them
0	81. Military has to be prepared to do much more than they expect.
0	82. 12JUN00 Exercise Planning
0	83. Need road improvements as safety and security priority... as well as for operational and exercise rationality
0	84. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
0	85. Much planning has gone into this exercise, from plans for the refugee camp layout, to safety parameters for civilian refugee volunteers, to availability of HLZ on site for medevacs, etc.  These planning documents have been ignored in favor of free flowing role-play.
0	86. The UN team feels that it is  not fully aware of all the research areas being piloted . They feel defensive and put on the spot when asked to accept or agree to participate in experiments which have not been discussed with them
0	87. There needs to be a clearer understanding of who sets up the refugee camp.
0	88. The safety of the actual refugees is paramount.  Seemingly too much attention paid to role-playing and other "exercise" parts of the mission and not enough attention to the actual needs of civilian refugee volunteers under our care.
0	89. The military brought a much smaller security force than they would for a real operation specifically because they were directed to by the exercise planners in order to have everyone be a little more comfortable.
0	90. Camp design and configuration must be confirmed and changes must by posted at a central point to avoid confusion
0	91. To get in front of the problem we need to be better at identifying what are the most likely problems that will be encountered.
0	92. 10JUN00 Exercise Planning
0	93. real refugees would not have the same transportation requirements
0	94. I was surprised at the lack of UN presence in the refugee camp.  The UNHCR flag was hoisted, but seldom was their anyone from the UN on site.
0	95. Coordination for Intelligence MSL items were done in a vacuum,  all the key players were not involved.
0	96. on the military side, the t/e and t/o should have been larger
0	97. refugees need to arrive earlier in the day to properly inprocess them and allow for role play from the start
0	98. the transportation requirements seemed very unrealistic
0	99. there was no clear plan of action for the intial days for the refugees
0	100. We were 50 to 60 Marines short to make up for all the working parties
0	101. We were 50 to 60 Marines short to make up for all the working parties
0	102. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOR THE RIMPAC GAME PLAY WAS INSUFFICIENT.
0	103. the base and refugee camps need to either be closer together or a better means of transportation between the two
0	104. 14JUN00 Exercise Planning
0	105. 13JUN00 Exercise Planning
0	106. It hindsight, it probably would have been a good idea to have released an "actual" press release on the "notional" emergency for the journalists today - since a few seemed a little confused.
0	107. Could we bring some of the junior officers (Lts) into the next LL.  They are doing a lot of the heavy lifting out here and having their perspective would be useful to help us finalize these lessons learned
0	108. When we do experiments in the refugee area we need better coordination on physical and electronic requirements.  This went well but was frustrating for many...
0	109. The visit of the admiral was very well timed. Such VIP visits happen in real emergencies and despite all the work that needs to be done, time has to be made for such VIP visits as they are often related to funding and/or PR.
0	110. Best "Actual Actual" Media Question - one local journalist said that when local residents heard about Operation Strong Angel they believed a huge natural disaster was on its way to the Big Island.
0	111. Visitors and Press seemed to be able to wander about without much 'supervision'.  Perhaps a bit more structure to their tours might be warrented.

Ballot Items in Original Order
1. 15JUN00 Exercise Planning Combined
2. 10JUN00 Exercise Planning
3. The quanities  of meetings are too large for limited staffs.
4. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
5. a clear distinction should be made between actual and virtual
6. To get in front of the problem we need to be better at identifying what are the most likely problems that will be encountered.
7. The exercise control group needs a more robust cell - perhaps with an NGO?
8. So far UN team was not given time and space that would normaly been available to discuss strategy and planning.
9. Camp design and configuration must be confirmed and changes must by posted at a central point to avoid confusion
10. The military brought a much smaller security force than they would for a real operation specifically because they were directed to by the exercise planners in order to have everyone be a little more comfortable.
11. Green Government representation and interaction need to be strengthened to bring more reality to scenario.
12. The safety of the actual refugees is paramount.  Seemingly too much attention paid to role-playing and other "exercise" parts of the mission and not enough attention to the actual needs of civilian refugee volunteers under our care.
13. There needs to be a clearer understanding of who sets up the refugee camp.
14. Building more time into the exercise that would have allowed for more interaction with the participants of the CMOC would have allowed us to establish more creditability with each other.
15. The UN team feels that it is  not fully aware of all the research areas being piloted . They feel defensive and put on the spot when asked to accept or agree to participate in experiments which have not been discussed with them
16. Lack of real urgency and absence of other usual key partners should be taken into consideration in analysis and evaluation of exercise.
17. Much planning has gone into this exercise, from plans for the refugee camp layout, to safety parameters for civilian refugee volunteers, to availability of HLZ on site for medevacs, etc.  These planning documents have been ignored in favor of free flowing role-play.
18. Refugee site had to be altered due to experimentation antenae placed where tents were supposed to go.  Another group were placing their satellite dish on a standing an antenna mast with out asking permission.  Who is controlling these experiments and where they place their equipment?
19. It is a basic challenge for the UN to decide how much they would like to depend on the military to provide services/support which will profoundly define the level of the UN services. E.g. if we would have brought our own tents, WE define when the tents go up. If we bring our own generators, WE define when the service is up. It is scary to think that some of our core functions might not be provided because a third party (the military) provides some parts which will directly affect our service level
20. Need road improvements as safety and security priority... as well as for operational and exercise rationality
21. The refugee camp should be set up when the notice of refugee are to arrive is given, not wait until they are schedule arrive.
22. This operation may have been a bit too ambiguous.  Trying to do civil military cooperation,  humanitian assistance,  equipment  testing  and develp command relationships all in two weeks is creates too many competing  priorities
23. At time when we all have short staffs, it may have been better to have had daily time limits on the exercise which would have allowed us to pause, focus on the days events, and then work the next days as well as the future needs.
24. 12JUN00 Exercise Planning
25. There seems some confusion on what is exercise control and what is exercise execution.
26. Military has to be prepared to do much more than they expect.
27. after visiting the camp this afternoon I got a strong impression that the "refugees" had not been briefed properly on what was in store for them
28. The USMC is either expected to do to much or undermaned for this exercise.  These guys are doing a great job but they are killing themselves and their equipment.
29. In some cases, particularly where cross border displaced persons are concerned, the initial interview should be done in private so that the information given is not overheard by other people.
30. scope of overall mission was underestimated.  Millitary personnel were simultanously involved in CMOC construction, refugee camp construction and VIP visits and had difficulty prioritizing effort.
31. Again we have proven that we need constant power to do anything we computers in camp.  Or we should have solid UPS systems in place
32. Having Marine officer in charge at the refugee camp site is essential to getting tasks completed.
33. The military needs to bring more females to HA refugee situations as over 50% of refugees are women.
34. On these types of missions, a Military Information Support Team (MIST) is very useful to communicate inside the camp, within the JTF, and, in some cases, with permission, with the host nation populace.
35. Discussion of Field CMOC vs. Capital CMOC very helpful.  In future need Political/Ambassador involvement.
36. There are so many activities going on, I believe that few people have a clear idea of what is happening.    This includes refugees, soldiers, technical people and UN.
37. The military needs to be much more prepared for children.
38. Camp Management System for exercise of this nature must be coordinated during the planning phase and in the CMOC afloat.
39. Huge footprint at CMOC Camp is to support relief operation at refugee camp with small Marine footprint.  Hard to role-play/exercise whilst Marines at refugee camp are stretched to provide actual essential services such as showers.
40. How to ensure host population needs are met in both exercise and in reality needs further consideration.
41. Need to put a media training aspect into the exercise.
42. Issues with the IDs for the press and the vistors need to be worked out well before we begin the exercise.
43. in the refugee camp this afternoon I discovered that some of the lowere ranking military had absolutely no clue about what was going on. Information does not seem to be shared
44. We should begin collecting basic data within the camp (e.g., CMR, U5MR, under or mal nourishment, births, etc.).
45. Coordination of In-Flow process requires three plans:  The Primary Plan, the Contingency Plan and the Fall-back Plan.  Also need to identify key indices on when/what is necessary to move onto the next plan.
46. UNHCR is not actually responsible for the refugee volunteers.  Real concerns need to be addressed by the CSSD.
47. for such type of assignment, more female staff should be present within military personnel deployed. Important to deal with issues affecting female refugees requiring female staff only.
48. Would be good if all marines could be briefed in an info session what the UN does, what we do as an agency, what we do in real life. A lot of them are very interested and when confronted on a 1-on-1 basis, they are full of curiosity and interest.
49. Would have been good to separate the actual provision of assistance from those role-playing the exercise.  That would separate those requests that are notional from those that are actual.  Better instruction on this aspect of the exercise from the exercise control group would have helped -- perhaps through an opening brief when we all arrived on BI and before we started the ex.
50. Next time we should have a fulltime "real" government offical playing the roll fulltime during the exercise
51. some of military staff have no idea on who are the civilians participating in the exercise.  Need for better briefing on organisations they will have to cooperate with.
52. The location for the exercise was less imporant then the process we tried to coordinate .  The exercise would have met with as much success and considerably less effort if it had been planned at PTA, or another less challenging area..
53. In future exercises with a civilian population, having a full time help/information person available to either answer questions/concerns and or direct  people to the appropriate contact person. The " refugees" would find such an individual very reassuring and it would provide a consistent  and single point of contact for problems.
54. In a 'real' environment, UN would not hold office long in a tent environment like the one we have now. It would kill the equipment, and undermine people's health.
55. As conditions at  CMOC worsen, we should evaluate if some meetings in better conditions would improve our productivity.
56. 13JUN00 Exercise Planning
57. VIP visits can happen within the first week of an emergency -- on day three in East 	Timor the 	UN and INTERFET hadf a 15 high level delegation.  Todays visit was in a way realistic.
58. OK, no one wants another meeting, but a fifteen minute briefing by each organization (perhaps one a night, preferably with a good written handout) would be useful to familiarize everyone with the participating agencies.
59. Visitors and Press seemed to be able to wander about without much 'supervision'.  Perhaps a bit more structure to their tours might be warrented.
60. At the beginning of the exercise, all UN agencies should have briefed the military staff (all of them) about what they are doing. Some of the guys still have no idea what the different UN organisations do and what they stand for.
61. The young, enlisted Marines have learnt a great deal by observation of the practical workings of the UN  Have they had any briefings by the Agencies on their roles similar to those given on the Coronado.  Some simplified technical background would reinforce the practical lessons they have learnt.
62. Publications that describe each participants' organization, capabilities and requirements, burned on a CD in any popular format, would be a great "take home" item.
63. Best "Actual Actual" Media Question - one local journalist said that when local residents heard about Operation Strong Angel they believed a huge natural disaster was on its way to the Big Island.
64. Either actual NGOs or personnel role-playing them would have been a valuable addition to the exercise.
65. Starting last night with the showers, thing improved in the refugee camp greatly.  When dealing with refugees the policy should be ....do not over promise.  It destroys trust.  The rule should be...Under promise, over perform.
66. The visit of the admiral was very well timed. Such VIP visits happen in real emergencies and despite all the work that needs to be done, time has to be made for such VIP visits as they are often related to funding and/or PR.
67. Senior military leadership visited today and added some interesting perspective.   The perspective from comparable personnel from UNICEF, UHHCR, etc. would, I'm sure, have been equally or more valuable.
68. When we do experiments in the refugee area we need better coordination on physical and electronic requirements.  This went well but was frustrating for many...
69. Would the addition of a DART from the U.S. State Dept be helpful? What about other NGO's?
70. Transition spreadsheet appears to be a vey useful tool and will assist all actors in planning and executing relief operations.
71. Could we bring some of the junior officers (Lts) into the next LL.  They are doing a lot of the heavy lifting out here and having their perspective would be useful to help us finalize these lessons learned
72. Too little attention is being paid to assisting the host population. This is imperative in order to ensure relations, PR value, smooth and efficient exit as well as ensuring that they receive some tangible benefits
73. It hindsight, it probably would have been a good idea to have released an "actual" press release on the "notional" emergency for the journalists today - since a few seemed a little confused.
74. This has been (and still is) a very good learning exercise for everybody. If a similar exercise is planned for the future, it might be good to extend it, i.e. invite NGOs
75. 14JUN00 Exercise Planning
76. the base and refugee camps need to either be closer together or a better means of transportation between the two
77. the TO&E of the military does not completely accomidate a civilian requirement...we should build a support package that more readily meets this unique mission
78. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOR THE RIMPAC GAME PLAY WAS INSUFFICIENT.
79. We were 50 to 60 Marines short to make up for all the working parties
80. We were 50 to 60 Marines short to make up for all the working parties
81. There seemed to be an extreme lack of inclusion of OICs in the coordination and discussion of issues within the camp in conjunction with the UN/NGOs/notional HN
82. there was no clear plan of action for the intial days for the refugees
83. the transportation requirements seemed very unrealistic
84. refugees need to arrive earlier in the day to properly inprocess them and allow for role play from the start
85. there needs to be a clear and concise mission statement developed and this needs to be spelled out to all of the participants especially that  the more junior participants have a better understanding as to why they are here
86. on the military side, the t/e and t/o should have been larger
87. The MPs needed a mechanism to coordinate people exiting and entering from different gates and from the camp to allow for better control of where people were at all times
88. Coordination for Intelligence MSL items were done in a vacuum,  all the key players were not involved.
89. I was surprised at the lack of UN presence in the refugee camp.  The UNHCR flag was hoisted, but seldom was their anyone from the UN on site.
90. The Refugee camp appeared to be created without input from UN/NGO/HN or other US/Non US Military factions.  No true infrastructure set in the beginning until there were complaints/concerns.
91. better distinction between exercise control and exercise execution.
92. real refugees would not have the same transportation requirements
93. This should be exercised regularly (annually?) to include ALL appropriate components/activities/organizations.
94. Consistant stable power was a number one requirement for the civilians and I am not sure that was a number one priority for the Marines
95. Provide some sort of transfer of information before the exercise begins concerning persons exact responsibilities so they will know who to contact when dealing with problems.
96. CMOC and refugee camps were set up too late. Camp was not ready by the time the UN ror refugees came in
97. Working with UN agency personnel has been very enlightening.  This exercise has enhanced our understanding of HA operations and will facilitate smooth coordination with NGOs/PVOs in future exercises/operations.
98. At the Refugee Camp, it was hard to figure out what was real and what was pretend.  It made every scenerio hard to take seriously.
99. We need to know what actual and what is an exercise when dealing with scenarios.
100. The site for this exercised presented a number of challenges for the personnel and the equipment deployed.  If this is to be one again then we need to take a harder look at all the personnel and equipment required
101. realisticly, would refugees be promised certain things contractually.  support and assistance comes and gives people assistance when they have nothing, and they receive support as it is available barring unforseen problems.
102. The money provided to support this evolution was inadiquate
103. The money provided to support this evolution was inadiquate
104. terrain was not a big a part of the equation as it should have been i.e., how it effected equipment, especially electionics.
105. For the sake of safety,  it is essential for a distincition to be made between exercise exercise and actual actual as not all role players did so causing confusion  and even unsafe conditions at times.
106. the military should have one set of personnel trained/tasked for support the refugee site that are separate from that needed at the main camp  this would improve support and deconflict many requirements
107. More workers need to be sent on the advanced party to prepare for the arrival of Marines
108. Medical Mission Creep,
Multiple medical taskings arose that were not in the original training plan , i.e.,  HST ops.

The original medical  manning plan for refugee camp was IDC during the day and a general duty HM at night for emergencies only.  this changed by CADIF Surgeon and IDC had to remain 24/7.   "Fly the Brief"

Need to "fly the brief" we T/O'd enough HM's to do Original Mission, take care of Main Camp Marines and Marines at Refugee Camp.  We were to provide Emergency Aid ONLY to refugee site.  This changed in mid stream with our staff being sucked into "notional problems"  Sometimes into evening hours.  If this was the original plan we would have staffed for this plan.
109. Some entity/office needs to coordinate the individual NGO/PVO groups to ensure support can be consolidated to reduce the peacemeal way requests for assistance would come in from the MOC
110. Embarkl:
Significant safety issues with stuffing Marins and Sailor into LCAC the thrwing gear over top of them.  Two sticks went in this way.  if there had been a MISHAP there would have been no way to evac the Cabin
111. If the ultimate goal is self sufficency for the refugees, self-sufficency should be preached from the very begining of the excersize in order to determine what the true mission of each organization throughout.

15JUN00 Combined Attaboy (Vote)

Voting Results
Multiple Selection (maximum choices = 10) (Allow bypass)
Number of ballot items: 54
Total number of voters (N):  15

Total
7	1. working with actual civilians and not Marines playing civilians was great training, and is the best way to prepare for HA/DR ops
6	2. Despite some problems, I believe everybody (military, UN, etc.) deserves to be praised for the efforts made and for trying to solve whatever problems come along
5	3. The obstacles we faced (equipment breakdown, misunderstanding of mission, poor communication of expectations by those in charge of the exercise) added an element of realism to the exercise.  A perfectly scripted, no obstacles exercise would have been unrealistic and boring.
5	4. Civil Affairs did a great job working with the refugees and initiating the phase out of Marine support at the refugee camp.
4	5. MP Guard are silent heros, doing and excellent job and should be commend.
4	6. quick establishment of a joint logistics cell is probably one of the most important coordination structures available:  it de-conflicts transport assets arriving and sets out procedures information sharing.  USMC provided useful fact file on their current capabilities.
4	7. Marines have shown great flexibility in reacting to many changing and demanding situations!!!!!
4	8. Having the UN agencies assisting in the set-up and management was a great help.  I am very grateful for their participation.
3	9. Rotating junior officers to be in charge at the refugee camp site is good as it gives more Marines experience working with UN and civilians.   Lt. Burke, Lt. Schultz and Capt. Fillmore have all done a great job organizing the support required ad it is good that all have had that experience.
3	10. The Marines were very professional to the cilivans and worked their butts off to make everyone happy.  THANK YOU!!!
3	11. The EOD guys did a great job explaining about how to id uxo and what to do if you see some on the site
3	12. The fact that everyone has been so honest, open, and forthright in their participation is appreciated.
3	13. Marines were very patient and friendly with refugees.
3	14. After days of hard and sometimes unrewarding work the Marines have managed to keep efficiency and sense of humor. Good and very informative informal discussions with them in the camp, help to better understand how they operate.
3	15. Holding a mock press briefing was useful since it allowed us to focus on the questions and issues the media will continue to raise during emergencies involving both the military and UN relief agencies.
3	16. some of the lessons learned and recommendations of two evenings ago were executed almost immediately. Praise to whomever took care of this.
3	17. Thanks to WFP for the excellent communications today between refugee camp site and the MOC during an actual actual.  The level of service provided is excellent.  Sharing comms between key participants in field operations is essential where we often have different systems.
3	18. UNHCR is doing a great job balancing the real issues with the refugees and is taking a lot of heat maybe should be directed to exercise control.  Thank you for all you are doing.
3	19. The close coordination between the agencies executing the refugee support has proven to show we can work together.
3	20. Things work better when focus is on objectives of Strong Angel -- especially Civ-Mil coordination/cooperation -- and not on plumbing issues.  Once minimum standards are met, it allows participants to freely interact.  This part of the exercise is going beautifully.
2	21. Good excercises, we learned a lot.
2	22. Colonel Long + Captain Fujimori should be commended for their excellent work.  They have stayed on top of the ball and have got the camp into good shape. 
In addition, I noticed that the toilets, which had formerly been plastered with fairly poor humour on their walls, had been cleaned this morning.  Not a great job to have to do, but someone did it; ataboy!
2	23. While a distraction and very realistic, the visit by the admirals and press was received positively by the refugee role players
2	24. The relationship and coordination between all parties has evolved into a seemingly cohesive grouping resulting in speedy and sound decisions.
2	25. Refugee role play was excellent and personnel at the camp did well in reacting to the situations thrown at them.
2	26. There is a very direct communications line between UN and the military. This helps to resolve problems.
2	27. At least for the technical stuff, the military goes out of their way to please the UN.
2	28. Role players who arrived at the refugee camp were excellent.  The realistic scenarios they acted out challenged the military personnel during the processing.  The (real) activist who entered the refugee area challenged us even further.
1	29. The military very clearly went out of their way to make the UN folks feel comfortable. The practical support we had was tremendous.
1	30. From the military, received good, fast response on camp logistics requests
1	31. Military did not come to show off, they came to participate, and to coordinate
1	32. The flexibility of the Marines in not keeping strict meal or shower hours at the refugee camp to accomodate the less rigid schedule of the camp has been appreciated.
1	33. CommandNet is up and running in the ref camp and CA is using it to enter reports
0	34. Noticed today that the navy + marine (oops, US Marine personnel) were better briefed on why they were here and who all the agencies were.  Good passage of info.
0	35. 15JUN00 Attaboy Combined
0	36. 10JUN00 attaboy
0	37. 12JUN00 Attaboy
0	38. the intel people were very helpfull in submitting sitreps after eod drills
0	39. Don't forget the attaboys.  Everyone has worked long and hard for the past two days.
0	40. great food
0	41. There was a good comms system between UN and military. The radio system worked very well
0	42. 13JUN00 Attaboy
0	43. 14JUN00 Attaboy
0	44. The USMC is either expected to do to much or undermaned for this exercise.  These guys are doing a great job but they are killing themselves and their equipment.
0	45. The whole operation in cmoc and the camp is runnng smoother...........things are geting better with more time together
0	46. The Admiral gave a good brief, and supported the J9 expirements -- he obviously wants his personnel not to be frightened of making a mistake; this is excellent in that we are here not just for lessons learnt, but for also finding new ways of doing things. Ataboy McGinn!
0	47. Interestingly the refugees appear to regard VIP visits as evidence of interest at high levels.  On the other hand perhaps it was just an exciting break in camp boredom.  Either way, the refugees liked it.
0	48. Press and Media personnel seemed very friendly and interested.  The whole camp did a great job of presenting all aspects of this exercise in a positive, creative light.
0	49. Cmoc role in the camp working with  the refugees and coordinating information was very impressive.
0	50. The MPs continue to do an outstanding job, especially at the camp site -- where they are being stretched with keeping real world security of the perimeter whilst enthusiastically participating in a lot of the role-playing going on.
0	51. We are all learning a great deal and the lessons learned here will help shape  the our abilit to respond effectively
0	52. Refugee morale continues to be high, they are very appreciative of the work all are doing to support/train them
0	53. All refugees last night were HIGHLY complementary of the troops.  THey stated that this went beyond the expected to personal interest and assistance!
0	54. dental support was outstanding...the appointments were flexible and provided on a walk in basis..great job

Ballot Items in Original Order
1. 15JUN00 Attaboy Combined
2. 10JUN00 attaboy
3. From the military, received good, fast response on camp logistics requests
4. 12JUN00 Attaboy
5. Don't forget the attaboys.  Everyone has worked long and hard for the past two days.
6. Refugee role play was excellent and personnel at the camp did well in reacting to the situations thrown at them.
7. The USMC is either expected to do to much or undermaned for this exercise.  These guys are doing a great job but they are killing themselves and their equipment.
8. Marines were very patient and friendly with refugees.
9. At least for the technical stuff, the military goes out of their way to please the UN.
10. MP Guard are silent heros, doing and excellent job and should be commend.
11. Despite some problems, I believe everybody (military, UN, etc.) deserves to be praised for the efforts made and for trying to solve whatever problems come along
12. There is a very direct communications line between UN and the military. This helps to resolve problems.
13. quick establishment of a joint logistics cell is probably one of the most important coordination structures available:  it de-conflicts transport assets arriving and sets out procedures information sharing.  USMC provided useful fact file on their current capabilities.
14. Things work better when focus is on objectives of Strong Angel -- especially Civ-Mil coordination/cooperation -- and not on plumbing issues.  Once minimum standards are met, it allows participants to freely interact.  This part of the exercise is going beautifully.
15. Holding a mock press briefing was useful since it allowed us to focus on the questions and issues the media will continue to raise during emergencies involving both the military and UN relief agencies.
16. Role players who arrived at the refugee camp were excellent.  The realistic scenarios they acted out challenged the military personnel during the processing.  The (real) activist who entered the refugee area challenged us even further.
17. some of the lessons learned and recommendations of two evenings ago were executed almost immediately. Praise to whomever took care of this.
18. Thanks to WFP for the excellent communications today between refugee camp site and the MOC during an actual actual.  The level of service provided is excellent.  Sharing comms between key participants in field operations is essential where we often have different systems.
19. UNHCR is doing a great job balancing the real issues with the refugees and is taking a lot of heat maybe should be directed to exercise control.  Thank you for all you are doing.
20. Marines have shown great flexibility in reacting to many changing and demanding situations!!!!!
21. Having the UN agencies assisting in the set-up and management was a great help.  I am very grateful for their participation.
22. We are all learning a great deal and the lessons learned here will help shape  the our abilit to respond effectively
23. All refugees last night were HIGHLY complementary of the troops.  THey stated that this went beyond the expected to personal interest and assistance!
24. 13JUN00 Attaboy
25. Rotating junior officers to be in charge at the refugee camp site is good as it gives more Marines experience working with UN and civilians.   Lt. Burke, Lt. Schultz and Capt. Fillmore have all done a great job organizing the support required ad it is good that all have had that experience.
26. Noticed today that the navy + marine (oops, US Marine personnel) were better briefed on why they were here and who all the agencies were.  Good passage of info.
27. The relationship and coordination between all parties has evolved into a seemingly cohesive grouping resulting in speedy and sound decisions.
28. Refugee morale continues to be high, they are very appreciative of the work all are doing to support/train them
29. The close coordination between the agencies executing the refugee support has proven to show we can work together.
30. The MPs continue to do an outstanding job, especially at the camp site -- where they are being stretched with keeping real world security of the perimeter whilst enthusiastically participating in a lot of the role-playing going on.
31. Cmoc role in the camp working with  the refugees and coordinating information was very impressive.
32. While a distraction and very realistic, the visit by the admirals and press was received positively by the refugee role players
33. Press and Media personnel seemed very friendly and interested.  The whole camp did a great job of presenting all aspects of this exercise in a positive, creative light.
34. Colonel Long + Captain Fujimori should be commended for their excellent work.  They have stayed on top of the ball and have got the camp into good shape. 
In addition, I noticed that the toilets, which had formerly been plastered with fairly poor humour on their walls, had been cleaned this morning.  Not a great job to have to do, but someone did it; ataboy!
35. The flexibility of the Marines in not keeping strict meal or shower hours at the refugee camp to accomodate the less rigid schedule of the camp has been appreciated.
36. CommandNet is up and running in the ref camp and CA is using it to enter reports
37. Interestingly the refugees appear to regard VIP visits as evidence of interest at high levels.  On the other hand perhaps it was just an exciting break in camp boredom.  Either way, the refugees liked it.
38. The Admiral gave a good brief, and supported the J9 expirements -- he obviously wants his personnel not to be frightened of making a mistake; this is excellent in that we are here not just for lessons learnt, but for also finding new ways of doing things. Ataboy McGinn!
39. The whole operation in cmoc and the camp is runnng smoother...........things are geting better with more time together
40. After days of hard and sometimes unrewarding work the Marines have managed to keep efficiency and sense of humor. Good and very informative informal discussions with them in the camp, help to better understand how they operate.
41. The fact that everyone has been so honest, open, and forthright in their participation is appreciated.
42. 14JUN00 Attaboy
43. The military very clearly went out of their way to make the UN folks feel comfortable. The practical support we had was tremendous.
44. The EOD guys did a great job explaining about how to id uxo and what to do if you see some on the site
45. There was a good comms system between UN and military. The radio system worked very well
46. great food
47. Civil Affairs did a great job working with the refugees and initiating the phase out of Marine support at the refugee camp.
48. the intel people were very helpfull in submitting sitreps after eod drills
49. Military did not come to show off, they came to participate, and to coordinate
50. working with actual civilians and not Marines playing civilians was great training, and is the best way to prepare for HA/DR ops
51. The Marines were very professional to the cilivans and worked their butts off to make everyone happy.  THANK YOU!!!
52. The obstacles we faced (equipment breakdown, misunderstanding of mission, poor communication of expectations by those in charge of the exercise) added an element of realism to the exercise.  A perfectly scripted, no obstacles exercise would have been unrealistic and boring.
53. Good excercises, we learned a lot.
54. dental support was outstanding...the appointments were flexible and provided on a walk in basis..great job

15JUN00 Combined Drinks (Vote)

Ballot Items in Original Order
1. 15JUN00 Drinks Combined
2. 12JUN00 Drinks
3. where is the coffee?
4. Refugees need good strong coffee
5. DOn't forget the tea
6. Why is Navy coffee so much better than Marine brown water?
7. joe needs to improve hs computer skills
8. what happened to the coffee
9. 13JUN00 Drinks
10. DV/Media day mov es the focus from relief effort to supporting the visit
11. Again there is no good strong coffee available
12. Certain Marines don't know ho to use computers
13. Helo landing in the dust field was not necessary - we had not run out of dust yet.
14. Jim Rogers looks knackered!  Why!
15. The host nation Mc Donalds is doing fine thank you
16. I hope that we end soon -- I am thirsty
17. Has anyone else noticed that the tank trail (the good road) is not so good anymore???
18. 14JUN00 Drinks

15JUN00 Combined Very Important Lessons Learned 14JUN00 (Vote)

Ballot Items in Original Order
1. 14JUN00 Very Important Lessons Learned
2. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOR THE RIMPAC GAME PLAY WAS INSUFFICIENT.
3. have more information for those not in the planning stages so final execution does not seem so haphazard.
4. More coordination needs to made between the higher personnel in the UN agencies and the military leadership concerning what their actual partication will be in the refugee camp.
5. Coordination for Intelligence MSL items were done in a vacuum,  all the key players were not involved.
6. Our (the military) understanding of the mission was to support the ability of the NGO/PVO organizations in performing a transition eg they would support refugees we would support them...this transition never seemed to materialize and resulted in over tasking
7. I was surprised at the lack of UN presence in the refugee camp.  The UNHCR flag was hoisted, but seldom was their anyone from the UN on site.
8. This should be exercised regularly (annually?) to include ALL appropriate components/activities/organizations.
9. Provide some sort of transfer of information before the exercise begins concerning persons exact responsibilities so they will know who to contact when dealing with problems.
10. The money provided to support this evolution was inadiquate
11. if the military is serious about learning how they  can best be utilized in excercises of this type, consider sending them to real world refugee crisisis around the world and acting in a voluntary role.

Contacts (Group Outliner)

1. Contacts
LTC Raymond E. Rippel
Civil Affairs, U.S. Army Reserve
(808) 247-1316
ray209@hotmail.com

111A Hekili Street #309
Kailua HI 96734

Mark Prutsalis
mprutsalis@hotmail.com
70 Remsen Street, Apt. 8-I
Brooklyn, NY 11201  USA
tel (718) 858-3259
cell (917) 362-4708
fax (305) 422-6485

Mark Adkins
Director of Research
Center for the Management of Information
University of Arizona
114 McClelland Hall
Tucson, AZ  85704
adkins@arizona.edu
520,621.2603 (v)
520.621.2641 (f)

Peter Scott-Bowden
Head, ALITE (Augmented Logistics Intervention Team in Emergencies)
UN World Food Programme
I
Tel	+39-066513-2394
E-mail	Peter.Scott-Bowden@wfp.org

Abby Spring
Public Affairs
UN World Food Programme
Two UN Plaza Room DC2500
NY NY  10017
Work 212/963-5196
email: springa@un.org

Jewett, Elllen M - CDR
COMTHIRDFLT / J9C: CMOC & HADR
1983 Mendocino Blvd
SAN DIEGO, CA  92107-2304
H: 619-226-2745
W: 619-524-9532
Fax: 619-226-2743
Cell:619-846-6999
email: ej@spacelink.com
             ej@home.com
             jewett@coronado.navy.mil

Surgeon Commander Peter Buxton Royal Navy
Department of Radiology, Royal Hospital Haslar, GOSPORT PO12 2AA, 
United Kingdom.  +44 2392 762536  peter@buxtonp.freeserve.co.uk

Department of Radiology, Royal Hospital Haslar, GOSPORT PO12 2AA, United Kingdom.  +44 2392 762536  peter@buxtonp.freeserve.co.uk

COL Annette Sobel
USAF/Sandia National Labs
P.O. Box 1507, Tijeras, NM  87059
(505)844-1411 (voice)
(505)621-4284 (Cell)
alsobel@sandia.gov
(505)284-4917 (fax)

Tanny Noorlander
Supply Officer
c/o UNICEF ESARO
P.O. Box 44145
NAIROBI
Kenya
Tel: +254.2.622358 (Office) 443114 (Residence)
Fax: +254.2.622694 (Office)
e-mail: tnoorlander@unicef.org     or    tannynoorlander@hotmail.com

LTC Stu Shapiro
Commander, 3rd Fleet  Joint Plans/Army Liaison Officer
8836 Greenberg Lane
San Diego, California 92129
Work: 619-524-9517
stuart-shapiro@us.army.mil
Home/Fax: 858-780-0352

Jo Hegenauer, Jr
Senior Emergency Officer
UNHCR  HQ
Case Postale 2500
Geneva 1201
Switzerland
Work: 41 22 739 7785
Fax:    41 22 739 7301
e-mail:  Hegenaue@UNHCR.CH
Mobitel:  41 79 253 5321

Philippe Duamelle
Executive Officer
UNICEF
UNICEF House
3 UN Plaza
New York, NY 10017
Work: 212 326 7310
cel: 917 856 1571
fax: 212 326 7758
email: pduamelle@unicef.org

Lt.Col. Frederick Bystrom, 3D Civil Affairs Group
Box 555124, Camp Pendleton, CA 92055
(Business) Bystrom &  Chidi
445 South Figueroa, Suite 2210
Los Angeles, CA 90071-1626
work (213) 891-1676
home (805) 522-0133
e-mail FCBYSTROM@aol.com
(unit) (760) 725-6020

Peter McDermott
Po Box 33610
United Nations 
Lusaka Zambia.

PMcDermott@unicef.org
Peter_Mcdermott@unicef.zm

Tel. Office 260 1 295733
         Home 260 1 295733
         Cell 260 1 770381

G. Mike Allan,   BSc,MD,CCFP
Doctor, Canadian Navy 
4034 Cumberland Rd
Victoria, BC, V8X 2E6, Canada
home (250) 744-4341
work (250) 363-4123
e-mail:   M&B_Allan@telus.net

Eric Rasmussen, MD, FACP
Lieutenant Commander, Medical Corps, US Navy
Fleet Surgeon, Third Fleet

rasmused@coronado.navy.mil
EricRasmussen@worldnet.att.net

619-524-9541 office shpboard
619-925-7701 cell
858-513-2647 home

13831 Wayland Grove Court
Poway, CA, USA  92064

Major Stephen J. Gabri
CSSG-3, III MEF 
Marine Corps Base Hawaii, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii 96863 
USA
gabrisj@mcbh.usmc.mil
(808) 257-1852

Peter Casier
Regional TC/IT officer Balkans and Head WFP Fast IT and Telecoms Emergency & Support Team for Asia (FITTEST/Asia)
peter.casier@wfp.org

Lionel Marre
WFP Telecommunications Engineer - HQ
Lionel.Marre@wfp.org

Anna Argentieri
WFP IT Helpdesk - HQ
anna.argentieri@wfp.org

Cyprien Hiniolwa
Telecoms/IT engineer 
WFP FITTEST/Asia 
cyprien.hiniolwa@wfp.org

Vjosa Hasanaj
Radio Operator WFP Kosovo
vjosa.hasanaj@wfp.org

Col Mark Nixon
CSSG-3, 3d FSSG, III MEF
Marine Corps Base Hawaii, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii 96863
USA
nxonrm@mcbh.usmc.mil
(808) 257-1851

Col R. M. Nixon   (Mark)
516 Nimitz Rd
Kailua Hawaii  96746
Work:  (808) 257-1853
Home: (808) 254-5178
e-mail: nxnrm@aol.com