

**THE CMOC: ONE STOP SHOPPING FOR  
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE  
COORDINATION IN PEACE  
OPERATIONS**

**A MONOGRAPH  
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## ABSTRACT

The CMOC: One Stop Shopping for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination in Peace Operations? By MAJ Paul A. Duff, Canadian Forces, 38 pages.

The world has experience many complex humanitarian emergencies since the end of the Cold War. These emergencies were primarily the result the impact of war but entailed a great degree of human suffering. The international community responded to these emergencies with military forces and with civilian humanitarian relief organizations (HROs).

Both military and civilians deployed to relieve the suffering. The combination meant that some coordination between their efforts was necessary. Mechanisms were established and doctrine was written for the employment of those mechanisms. This monograph examines the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) to determine whether it can perform the necessary functions of coordination and whether it is sufficient.

The doctrinal basis for the CMOC is examined through Canadian Land Forces doctrine, US Army doctrine and US Joint doctrine. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees publications provide a civilian perspective on the employment of the CMOC.

Three recent operations provide historical case studies in which coordination of humanitarian assistance is reviewed. Operation Provide Comfort was the US led mission to assist Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq in the wake of the Persian Gulf War. Operation Restore Hope was the US led mission to provide relief to the victims of civil war in Somalia. Finally the operations of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and UNHCR in Bosnia in 1992-93 provide a perspective from outside the US experience. Civilian led alternatives to the CMOC are identified through the case studies.

The monograph concludes that the CMOC can perform the necessary functions but that coordination of humanitarian assistance is a task better allocated to a civilian led coordinating mechanism.


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## **Introduction**

The Cold War ended with a bang but it was the echo that was most unexpected. The Gulf War signaled the end to the Cold War and with it the paradigm upon which the Western nations' armies were organized. War in Europe against the Soviets was the basis for the organization and training of the Western armies. Iraq provided a suitably equipped, tank based enemy for the US and its allies and the war was fought with the tactics and weapons honed for use in Europe. It was the shape of the world at the end of the Gulf War that presented a new problem to the Western armies.

The Kurdish uprising in Northern Iraq was brutally suppressed by the Iraqi Army, driving the Kurds to the snow covered mountains for refuge. The world reaction to the plight of the Kurds prompted an urgent effort on behalf of the US and its allies to relieve the suffering. As the cause of the Kurdish flight to the mountains was the Iraqi Army, the solution required some military force. The response to the situation could not be found in the doctrine of the day and required an innovative response from military planners in the effort to relieve the suffering.

Suffering and starvation among civilian populations goes hand in hand with war. In the decades following World War II, organizations developed in response to alleviate this suffering. These Humanitarian Relief Organizations (HROs) developed expertise in raising money and delivering humanitarian assistance to populations under siege.<sup>1</sup> What changed in Northern Iraq in 1991 was that the efforts of these organizations were now integrated to a much greater degree with the efforts of military forces deployed with the sole mission of ensuring that civilian populations receive the necessities of life despite the

conflict which raged around them.<sup>2</sup> What followed Operation Provide Comfort was a series of similar situations in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda.

Military forces and the HROs reacted to the new situations by developing mechanisms to effect coordination between the two. In Northern Iraq, Coalition Combined Task Force (CCTF) Provide Comfort established a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) to coordinate activities. In Somalia the United Nations (UN) established a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) prior to the arrival of Joint Task Force (JTF) Restore Hope. Both organizations approached the challenge of coordinating the multitude of relief agencies from different perspectives. From these experiences, military forces and the HROs have developed doctrine to support these organizations. In this monograph we will examine the validity of that doctrine.

This examination asks two questions. Is the CMOC a sufficient mechanism by which we can coordinate humanitarian assistance? If it is, can it perform all the necessary functions?

In the first chapter, this monograph examines the doctrine of several military forces to identify the functions performed by the CMOC. Canadian doctrine, contained in *Canadian Forces Publication (CFP) 301-3*,<sup>3</sup> will be used as the basis for this discussion since Canada has a great deal of experience in peacekeeping but lacks the specialized Civil Affairs (CA) personnel that operated the CMOC in Northern Iraq. US Army doctrine is fundamental to the discussion, as the CMOC is a US concept that other nations have adopted. *Field Manual (FM) 41-10 Civil-Military Operations* is the key doctrinal manual. It was revised after the Gulf War to account for the collapse of the Soviet Union and is currently under review to include much of the experience discussed

here. These two editions of *FM 41-10*, along with the 1985 version that was doctrine at the time of Operation Provide Comfort, will be used to demonstrate the evolution of US Army doctrine on Humanitarian Assistance and the CMOC. *The Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* will be used to link the Army doctrine to the Joint Community. HRO doctrine will be examined through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

The second chapter uses historical analysis to understand how the doctrine came into being. By examining Operation Provide Comfort, the assistance provided to the Kurds in Northern Iraq in 1991, the development of the CMOC will be examined. Operation Restore Hope provides insight into the HOC and its relationship to the CMOC. The experience of UN forces in the former Yugoslavia in 1992 and 1993 will create a link between the US perspective and the multinational efforts without US support.

In chapter three, doctrine and historical context are used to evaluate the ability of the CMOC to perform the functions identified in the preceding chapters. They will be assessed based upon how well they support three principles as established in Canadian doctrine:<sup>4</sup> Selection and Maintenance of the Aim, Economy of effort and Cooperation. Selection and maintenance of the aim is the master principle in Canadian doctrine and is the principle which focuses efforts. Cooperation is a principle that is fundamental to success in complex humanitarian emergencies since the results obtained by cooperation are far greater than those gained by independent action.

This monograph concludes that the CMOC is a valuable mechanism when humanitarian assistance is conducted in an insecure environment and when the HROs have not been able to organize themselves in the area of operations. In these cases the



military requirements of the mission become primary and the CMOC is sufficient. When the HROs have been in the AO before the arrival of the military or when they have been able to establish their coordination mechanism, coordination is best achieved by providing military liaison to the civilian mechanism.

## **Chapter 1 The Doctrine of Coordination**

As a result of their experiences in the early 1990s, Canadian and US military forces and UNHCR have developed doctrine to guide the coordination of effort. The US Army established the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) as a mechanism to coordinate military assistance to the HROs. Canada has also accepted this approach. The HRO approach has been manifested in mechanisms with a variety of names, such as Humanitarian Operations Centers (HOC) or On Site Coordination Center (OSCC), that serve as a coordination mechanism for their efforts. By first reviewing the military doctrine and then looking at UNHCR publications we will examine the current state of humanitarian assistance doctrine and compare the two.

Canadian doctrine for Humanitarian Assistance (HA) is incorporated in *Canadian Forces Publication 301 Volume 3 Peacekeeping Operations (CFP 301-3)* as part of general peacekeeping doctrine. Canada recognizes that HA “may be conducted independently or as part of a peace support operation.” HA “may involve to a large extent other governmental or non-governmental agencies specialized in humanitarian relief.”<sup>5</sup> Thus it is recognized that these operations involve military and civilian participation. The extent to which civil-military coordination is required depends upon the tasks performed by each participant.

The tasks performed by military forces may be related directly or indirectly to providing relief. Activities of military forces can include “security for convoys under the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) or providing the actual means of delivery by land, sea or air.” The activities performed by the military are often critical to the success of the mission. This is true particularly “at the outset of these missions, when they (the missions) urgently require rapid response from disciplined, self sufficient organizations with effective command, control and communications and the inherent mobility to operate in marginal terrain, or where infrastructure is limited, in order to quickly establish a secure environment and to provide basic support.” Canadian doctrine also recognizes that reconstruction of a long-term nature is best left to civilian organizations.<sup>6</sup> While military forces are capable of conducting HA operations independently, effective integration with HROs can only be achieved through coordination.

In Canadian doctrine, coordination between civilian relief organizations and the military is well recognized as a result of experience. “[R]ecent missions clearly demonstrated the requirement to establish a sound working relationship and, if at all possible, a necessity to synchronize the multitude of activities conducted by the various players.”<sup>7</sup> This necessity is derived from the conclusion that despite numerous difficulties involved in the military-civilian relationship, “all participants have the same generic aim to assist the local population.”<sup>8</sup> Coordination efforts conducted within a structure can yield more effective results.

The mechanism of choice for coordination is the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). Despite its crucial role, Canadian doctrine gives little definition to the CMOC.

It is to be located within the military HQ and it provides a focus for civilian agencies requesting military assistance. It can also “provide a meeting place where the military chain of command can have access to civilian personalities and organizations.” For the civilians it can help them overcome the “problems associated with a lack of familiarity with the military structure.”<sup>9</sup> Since the CMOC is a creation of US Army Civil Affairs, it can be more clearly examined by reviewing the US doctrine.

*FM 41-10 Civil Military Operations* is the US Army’s Civil Affairs doctrinal manual. During the period we are examining, there have been three editions. The 1985 edition established Civil-Military Operations (CMO) doctrine to support the state of the battlefield as anticipated during the Cold War. At that time, humanitarian assistance did not appear in US Army Civil Affairs (CA) doctrine. Civil Affairs doctrine was limited to the core functions of conducting Civil Military Operations and assisting Civil Administration. The first of these seeks to reduce the effect of military operations on the civilian populace and the second provides order and basic services to civilians in liberated friendly territory and occupied enemy territory.<sup>10</sup> It was not until the 1993 edition of the manual that HA entered the CA doctrine. The manual dedicates three pages to discussion of HA, primarily focusing on the Title 10 authority and congressional limitations placed upon the kind of support that the US Army is permitted to provide.<sup>11</sup> Despite the use of the CMOC in Iraq in 1991 no mention of it appears in doctrine.

The CMOC receives a much more detailed examination in the Initial Draft of the revised FM 41-10, released in 1997. While this is not yet accepted doctrine, it illuminates the path doctrine writers are taking toward the establishment of CMOCs. The CMOC is a coordination center and acts as an extension of the Civil-Military Operations

(CMO) Officer, normally the S-5 or G-5 at the tactical level. It provides capability but not resources. It is not a unit or a formal organization. As a result it must be tailored to the mission.<sup>12</sup> Although the US Civil Affairs branch created it, the CMOC has been adopted by the Joint Warfighting Center, which included the concept in both the Joint Peacekeeping and Interagency Cooperation doctrine.<sup>13</sup>

In both Joint and Army doctrine, the CMOC's primary function is to transmit data, usually requests for assistance, from local governments and HROs to the CMO Officer. Its functions can be summarized under the broad categories of communication, coordination and planning.

Communication includes meetings where participants share information about their activities and the environment in which they work. A fixed operations center can also provide radio and telephone services and office space that can act as an information clearing-house. These meetings, and the establishment of a fixed operations center, provide HROs "a focal point for activities that are civilian populace related."<sup>14</sup>

Coordination comprises the activities and mechanisms related to the provision of support. This includes requests for assistance, control of resources and negotiations between agencies to arrive at a mutually beneficial agreement. These efforts are primarily related to responses to requests for military resources and coordination of US Government efforts by working closely with the Disaster Area Response Team (DART) from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. The bulk of the tasks identified in the US Army and Joint doctrine relate to the coordination function.<sup>15</sup>

Planning is a more detailed form of coordination in which the participants prepare for missions conducted in concert with others. Joint doctrine allows the CMOC

to “convene ad hoc mission planning groups to address complex military missions that support NGO and PVO requirements.”<sup>16</sup> Here the US Army doctrine differs from Joint doctrine. The Army reserves the planning of CMO to the S-5/G-5 of the force and execution of CMO to the allocated CA Brigade or Battalion.<sup>17</sup>

The experience of Humanitarian Assistance coordination has not been exclusively military. Some HROs have also distilled this experience into handbooks and training programs. Chief among these is the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Until 1992, it was the UN’s lead agency in delivering Humanitarian Assistance, a function now performed by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA). As the lead agency UNHCR gained a great deal of experience with UN military forces. UNHCR has incorporated their experience into a number of publications designed to educate all participants in Humanitarian Assistance.

Some of these publications are designed as training materials for their own staff.<sup>18</sup> There is also a handbook for military forces training to operate with UNHCR or other HROs.<sup>19</sup> While clearly establishing that the policy and perspective that they elaborate is intended to represent no organization other than UNHCR, their efforts have produced a fairly general perspective on the challenges of coordination.

In the Handbook for the Military, UNHCR discusses some of the difficulties that face both military and HRO participants when operating together. These difficulties stem from organizational cultures that tend to be hierarchical in military forces and devolved in the HRO. This cultural gap is often complicated by the view often taken by HROs that coordination and independence are mutually exclusive.

UNHCR has recognized that “[t]he key to alleviating the effects of these difficulties is to maintain open and constant communication.”<sup>20</sup> In their contribution to the discussion, they have enunciated ten steps to effective coordination. The steps are central coordination at all levels, early agreement on responsibilities, a common AOR definition that relates to local administrative boundaries, compatible communications, collocation of headquarters, use of liaison officers, inter-agency meetings, routine contacts, establishment of CMOCs, and pre-mission reconnaissance.<sup>21</sup> While military forces would likely regard agreement on responsibilities, AOR definition and reconnaissance as a commander’s prerogative, the remaining tasks would easily fall into the communications and coordination functions. Reviewing the experience of HA coordination in operations can bring the functions of the CMOC into much clearer focus.

## **Chapter 2 Historical Perspective**

Since the doctrine that guides the use of the CMOC is still emerging, reviewing the history of Humanitarian Assistance coordination in the 1990s is essential in this analysis. The review will begin with the operation referred to in the introduction, Operation Provide Comfort, the response to the plight of the Kurdish refugees who fled the Iraqi Army to the Zagros Mountains in 1991. The development of the CMOC will be followed in reviewing Operation Restore Hope, the US led mission to provide assistance to Somalis suffering through a destructive civil war. The experience of UN forces in Bosnia ran concurrent with the Somalia operation and provides a perspective that does not involve US forces. In each case study the origin of the operation will first be explained, then the review will be focused on the coordination of Humanitarian

Assistance within the operation. Before reviewing the three case studies, it is necessary to add a framework to the discussion. Humanitarian assistance has a number of different tasks. These tasks can be generally described as the provision, delivery and distribution of assistance and the coordination required to perform the first three tasks efficiently.

First the personnel and supplies must be provided.

HROs have their own personnel who deploy to the AO to conduct their operations. Medical, food and other relief supplies can be provided by the HROs themselves from funds provided by private donors or they may come from government aid programs or UN agencies such as the World Food program. These supplies must be delivered from the point of origin to an air or sea port in the AO. From the port the supplies must be further transported to the places where they will be distributed to the population in need. Finally the relief supplies must be distributed to the population. This distribution can be performed directly by the HRO or by providing the supplies to local authorities, which then distribute them to the populations at risk. The distinction between these options is particularly clear in the provision of medical support, where an HRO like Doctors Without Borders will treat the sick and injured while the UNHCR may provide medical supplies to local hospitals. Finally, when more than one organization is active in the AO, coordination of these efforts, the subject of this monograph, is also a task.

With these tasks in mind, there are some characteristics that can be drawn from the review of the examination of the historical cases that follow. These characteristics can be described as the security of the AO, the presence of HROs in the AO, the degree of organization exhibited by the HROs and the extent to which the humanitarian assistance tasks are conducted by military forces. A secure environment is one in which

the belligerent forces respond positively to the presence of outside military force and cease hostilities in the AO. An insecure AO is one in which the belligerents continue hostilities despite the presence of outside military forces. The presence of HROs in the area of operations (AO) is key. Presence is defined as the active operation of a number of international HROs. Activity includes the provision, delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance. When there is low HRO presence, the military will be called upon to perform these tasks, in addition to providing the coordination mechanism. When HRO presence is high, the tasks of humanitarian assistance are generally performed by the HROs.

The degree of HRO organization is based upon the existence of a coordinating mechanism formed among the HROs. A high degree of organization is exhibited when the HROs have organized themselves into some form of coordinating committee or a HOC is established by a lead HRO. A low degree of organization in the AO is where there has been no self-organization amongst the HROs.

Another characteristic is the extent to which military forces are conducting the humanitarian assistance. A low degree of military involvement is one in which the humanitarian assistance is primarily provided by the HROs. A high degree would see extensive involvement of military forces in the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

### **Operation Provide Comfort**

On March 7, 1991 the Kurds of Northern Iraq rebelled against the government of Saddam Hussein after a call from American radio broadcasts for Iraqis to overthrow the regime. Three weeks later, the Iraqi Army turned against the Kurds with tanks and



artillery and suppressed the rebellion. The Kurds fled to the Zagros Mountains along the Iraqi-Turkish border where they felt safe from the Iraqi Army. The extreme cold, the effects of the battle with the Iraqis and the arduous journey into the mountains took a heavy toll of the Kurdish people.<sup>22</sup>

As the plight of the Kurds became known to the outside world, a call came to provide relief. Members of the Gulf War coalition, again led by the United States, responded with limited military support and food aid. Initially the assistance came in the form of air delivered supplies with Special Forces (SF) units deployed to assist in the distribution. Once the SF units were in the area, they determined that the scale of the problem was beyond their capacity to resolve and that the return of the refugees to their homes was essential to the relief.<sup>23</sup>

Coalition Combined Task Force (CCTF) Provide Comfort was a US led task Force. Its structure was based upon a US command and control structure to which other nations provided units. In total, thirteen nations provided over 23,000 soldiers to form CCTF Provide Comfort and assist the resettlement of the Kurdish refugees to their homes in Northern Iraq.<sup>24</sup>


The CCTF that was established under the command of then Lieutenant-General John Shalikashvili on 17 April had two subordinate Task Forces. Task Force (TF) Alpha was commanded by Brigadier-General Dick Potter and was centered on the SF units from the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG) initially deployed to assist with the air delivered supplies. The Task Force was located in Silopi, Turkey. They were responsible for establishing Humanitarian Service Support Bases (HSSBs) to support distribution of relief and locate the border camps where refugees were concentrated prior to transition

back to Iraq. They were also to assist the camp leadership and HROs with some aspects of the operation of the camps and establish transit centers and way stations and transfer the refugees to the control of TF Bravo for resettlement in Iraq.<sup>25</sup>

TF Bravo was based upon the U.S. Marines 24 Marine Expeditionary Unit under the command of Major-General Jay Garner. It was responsible for resettling the refugees in Iraq. They were based in Zahku and their tasks included the selection, design, construction and operation of transit camps in Iraq. HROs would eventually assume TF Bravo's role in the operation of these camps. Since this operation was inside Iraqi territory, security was an important part of their task.<sup>26</sup>

Three other elements of the CCTF were based in Turkey. The Combined Support Command was also based in Silopi and provided logistic support to the CCTF. The US Air Force element (AFFOR)<sup>27</sup> was based at the air base in Incirlik, Turkey west of Silopi. Finally the Civil Affairs Command (CAC) was also based in Incirlik, although Civil Affairs (CA) units were deployed with each Task Force.<sup>28</sup>

The objectives of the CCTF were threefold. The immediate objective was to stop the dying and suffering. In the mid-term the objective was to resettle the population at temporary sites in a sustainable secure environment and the ultimate objective was to return the population to their homes. This they achieved by establishing eight major camps with 43 separate locations along the Turkish Iranian border. The vision of the Palestinians living long term in the refugee camps in the Gaza Strip was what Lieutenant General Shalikashvili wanted to avoid.<sup>29</sup>



Geography and climate argued against providing aid to the refugees where they had fled, although some HROs did. The Zagros Mountains are very rugged and in late April are snow covered. The road network is poor and the refugees were dispersed to such an extent that locating them was difficult. Along the border the temperatures rise to 120 degrees Fahrenheit and water becomes scarce by the end of June. This argued in favor of a rapid transition as well. The CCTF coaxed the refugees to move by placing the aid distribution in the camps and by providing ways station to assist them en route to the camps. They also provided transportation assistance for those too ill or weak to walk.<sup>30</sup> Security was an essential part of the mission. Negotiation and the presence of the US military eliminated the threat from the Iraqi Army. On 18 April General Shalikhshvili met with Iraqi generals "to inform them of the coalition's intent to move into northern Iraq, according to UN Resolution 688, and that they should not interfere. On that same day, UN Executive Delegate Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan signed an agreement with the

Iraqi government permitting the UN to provide humanitarian assistance in northern Iraq.”<sup>31</sup>

Convincing the HROs to move into Iraq, and the refugees likewise, depended on the feeling of security from all Iraqi government harassment. The 300 police that remained in Zakhu were still an obstacle to the movement. The 24th MEU solution was to propose that the police be provided with ID badges. This resulted in the disappearance of all police from the area.<sup>32</sup> With security assured, the military force could provide humanitarian assistance. The SF units were able to provide much needed transportation by aircraft (UH-60 and C-130) and trucks. The Marines began building the temporary refugee camps. This assistance encouraged the HROs by providing evidence that the military were partners in the humanitarian effort.<sup>33</sup>

Key to the initial effort was the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). The DART is the emergency response mechanism of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), an arm of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Dayton Maxwell of OFDA led the DART and they hired Fred Cuny, a humanitarian emergency consultant, as their operations officer. Cuny’s expertise was key to the success of the plan that drew the Kurds from the mountains to the camps and on to their homes. His good reputation amongst the HROs made it easy for him to convince them to participate in the plan that he had established with the CCTF. The relationship that Cuny and the DART established with the CCTF was initially a bilateral one based upon the common US government connection between the two agencies. It was also the genesis of the cooperation that developed between the military and the HROs.<sup>34</sup>

CMOCs were established at CCTF HQ and with the subordinate TFs. The CMOC in Incirlik was a formal affair that provided formal briefings for the CCTF Commander. With the subordinate Task Forces, the CMOCs operated less formally. This was partly based upon the personality of the Civil Affairs officer assigned. Lieutenant Colonel John Petrella was assigned on 17 April to Diyarbakir, the initial staging point in Southeastern Turkey. Diyarbakir was the Turkish town nearest to the area where the refugees were to be resettled. As such it was a natural gathering spot for the HROs. The Americans were given an office building in the town. Shortly after his arrival, Petrella began to host meetings there to coordinate the efforts of the HROs. The meetings were informal affairs at which attendance was voluntary. Petrella avoided sitting at the head of the table or leading the discussion. The head of the embassy team led the meeting instead.<sup>35</sup>

Civil Affairs provided more than CMOC staff to CCTF Provide Comfort. They conducted Civil-Military Operations in accordance with CA doctrine. The total strength of CA units deployed was 447. This consisted of the 353<sup>rd</sup> CA Command, which ran the CMOC at Incirlik, the 354<sup>th</sup> CA Brigade, the 96<sup>th</sup> CA Battalion (-), three CA companies and a Civilian Agency Task Force.<sup>36</sup> Tasks performed by these units, in addition to coordination with HROs, included site selection and design for the transit camps, camp administration, establishment of police forces in the camps and distribution of food to the refugees. HROs assumed these tasks prior to the departure of the CA units.<sup>37</sup>

The HRO community in Operation Provide Comfort was represented by 50 different organizations. They had a tendency to simply appear, as if out of nowhere. They brought with them personal expertise in humanitarian emergencies as well as

supplies provided by their donors, but did not respect the military organization established to control the operation. "SF officers trying to administer would inform NGOs that they were in their 'sector'. The NGO response would be: 'What sector? Who are you? So what?'"<sup>38</sup> Once the military gained some experience working one-on-one with the HRO representatives and began to appreciate that this freewheeling spirit was part of the HRO culture, relationships improved.<sup>39</sup>

Despite their independent spirit, the HROs eventually developed their own organization. They established the NGO Coordinating Committee for Northern Iraq (NCCNI). It was established on 8 May with Mark Gorman, the representative of the International Rescue Committee, elected as its chairman. The NCCNI established as their goal "to ensure that returning refugees and displaced persons are provided coordinated and appropriate services until the time that indigenous systems can assume primary responsibility."<sup>40</sup> They were to achieve this by coordinating with the other participants (military, governmental and non-governmental), evaluating and recommending appropriate assistance measures, fostering a collaborative environment and providing an interface to allow newly arriving HROs to integrate without duplicating services.<sup>41</sup>

In Northern Iraq, the TF Bravo AO, the situation developed differently than it did in Turkey. The NCCNI was already operating by the time refugee movement began to Zakhu. The officer in this sector was Lieutenant Colonel Mike Hess. He was invited to attend NCCNI coordinating meetings as an observer. In this role Hess was able to monitor the activities of the NGOs as well as provide situation updates to the HROs. As a result the CMOC developed as a "floating concept".<sup>42</sup>

The essence of Operation Provide Comfort was that it was initially a military mission that made the transition to civilian control. The military were the first to respond to the crisis and were in place before the arrival of the HROs. Although security was a principal part of the task, it was quickly achieved and military forces were able to turn their attention to the provision of aid. Operation Provide Comfort traced a path from an operation that was best suited to the employment of a CMOC to one in which the HOC was more appropriate. At the outset, in mid April 1991, there were few HROs present in the AO and when they did arrive there was little self-organization. The presence of the Iraqi military initially created a threat to the security environment, which was quickly reduced by the presence of military forces. The military provided critical support to the delivery of humanitarian assistance due to the remoteness of the territory.

### **Somalia**

A little over a year after the end of the major effort in Operation Provide Comfort<sup>43</sup>, another complex emergency caught the world's attention in the Horn of Africa. The crisis came before the UN Security Council in January of 1992<sup>44</sup>, action was authorized in April<sup>45</sup> and the initial deployments of UN troops began in September.<sup>46</sup> The crisis itself had its origins deep in Somali history.<sup>47</sup>

Somalia was a clan-based culture divided up by the expansion of European colonialism in the late 19th century. The British and Italian Somali colonies were joined and granted independence as a single state in 1960. Some lands that Somalis traditionally called home had been were incorporated into Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti by the colonial powers. Thus conflict on its borders as the nations achieved independence was inevitable.<sup>48</sup>

After nine years of parliamentary democracy a bloodless military coup, led by Major General Mohammed Siad Barre, replaced the democratic government of the country and turned toward the Soviet Union for military support. An unsuccessful war against Ethiopia in 1977 resulted in an abortive coup by military officers in 1978. Clan based opposition to Barre's regime increased throughout the 1980s, particularly in the



north. Army suppression of the rebellious clans resulted in massacres and great refugee movements. By the end of the decade the army began splintering.<sup>49</sup>

The United Somali Congress (USC) was established based upon central and southern Somali clans. The USC expanded the civil war to the south and central areas of Somalia and by January 1991 the capital of Somalia, Mogadishu, was largely lawless.

This led to an American led rescue of foreigners who had sought refuge in the American embassy. The fighting led subsequently to the fall of Siad Barre. When one of the leaders of the USC, Mohamed Ali Mahdi, declared himself president, cracks appeared in the USC. Mohamed Farah Aideed, whose forces did much of the fighting against Siad Barre, became a challenger to Ali Mahdi.<sup>50</sup> The fighting continued well into the summer of 1992.

The fighting in Somalia coincided with a drought. The combination resulted in a famine that the International Committee of the Red Cross estimated could kill up to two million people if nothing was done. While UN relief agencies had fled the fighting in



January of 1991, a limited number of HROs remained behind. Among these were the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Doctors Without Borders/France (MSF), the International Medical Corps (IMC), World Concern, Save the Children (UK) and an Austrian group called SOS. They formed a group called the NGO Consortium, which provided an informal coordinating mechanism between them.<sup>51</sup>

In order to allow the HROs to return a UN security force of 500 Pakistani soldiers was authorized by the UN Security Council and agreed to by the Ali Mahdi and Farah Aided factions. This force was to provide security at the port of Mogadishu. The UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali requested an additional 3000 troops to protect the distribution of the aid. This force was called UNOSOM. Since the increase had not been negotiated with Farah Aided, he refused to give his consent and the force never fully deployed.

The US military support during this period was called Operation Provide Relief. This was an airlift of food to Somalia using US TRANSCOM resources. US Marine Corps Brigadier General Frank Libutti commanded the American contingent. They worked closely with the DART, acting in a supporting role. US Marine Corps Captain Chris Seiple explains, in his *The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions*, that “Every morning at 0800, the DART met to discuss the technicalities of what needed to be lifted, review NGO information received since the last meeting and consider other issues. Later that afternoon, a DART representative would attend Libutti staff meeting.”<sup>52</sup> While Seiple claims that the latter meeting was a CMOC in all but name, this process can more accurately be described as an exchange of liaison officers.

A Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) was established in the UN headquarters building under the auspices of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA). This HOC was placed under the direction of Dr. Philip Johnson, the President and CEO of CARE, an American HRO. The role of the HOC was to serve as a focal point for the HROs, increase the efficiency of the humanitarian operations through planning and coordination and gather and disseminate information among all HROs. Southern Somalia was divided into eight Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS), with a HOC established in each sector.<sup>53</sup>

Under the leadership of US forces, the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), arrived in December 1992 to secure the delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance. This force was more robust. Based upon the First Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF), it deployed under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 794. In that resolution, the primary mission of UNITAF was "to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations".<sup>54</sup> President Bush reiterated this opinion on 4 December.<sup>55</sup>

The JTF headquarters saw a clear division of tasks where the JTF would "create a secure environment in which to deliver supplies by protecting the HRO distribution system, from the ports and airfields where the supplies entered the country, to the road networks over which the supplies moved to the distribution points. The latter (the HROs) would get the supplies in country, transport them overland, and distribute them." The JTF mission was to secure ports, provide free passage and security for relief convoys and HROs, and to assist the delivery of assistance.<sup>56</sup>

Upon the arrival of UNITAF, forces were allocated to the HRS and CMOCs were established to work with the sectoral HOCs. The Mogadishu HOC also served as the

national HOC, serving as the coordination center between the UNITAF staff and the HROs.<sup>57</sup> The UNITAF headquarters was separated from the UN headquarters by a ten-minute drive by vehicle. Locating the CMOC in the UN headquarters building and collocating it with the HOC created the link between the CMOC and the HOC. Colonel Kevin Kennedy of I MEF's G-3 cell led the CMOC, assisted By Colonel Bob MacPherson, a Civil Affairs officer. The role of the CMOC was to serve as the UNITAF liaison, coordinate requests for military support, function as the UNITAF Civil Affairs Office and monitor military support in the Regional HOCs.<sup>58</sup>

The integration with the HOC was extensive. US representatives filled the senior leadership in the HOC. Dr. Johnson appointed the DART leader, initially Bill Garvelink followed by Kate Farnsworth, as his civilian deputy. Additionally he appointed Colonel Kennedy as his military deputy. The deputies ran daily meetings in the HOC.<sup>59</sup>

The NGO Consortium also played a role in the smooth functioning of the HOC. As the mission expanded, they hired a full time coordinator to run their own office. They would hold their own separate meetings in order to centralize their voices and prepare for the HOC meetings. This relieved the burden of coordinating the efforts of each individual HRO from the HOC.<sup>60</sup>

The separation from the UNITAF headquarters brought its own problems. Seiple quotes a Marine officer's view of the marine perceptions of the CMOC. He describes them as "skaters", living under UN rules with air-conditioning. Colonel MacPherson also noted that "Nobody really wanted to embrace the CMOC." The attitude conveyed is that the CMOC people were not truly in the same mission focus as the warfighters in the rest

of UNITAF. Since the purpose of the security mission was to allow the conduct of relief operations, the link to the NGOs was key.<sup>61</sup>

The JTF staff focused primarily on the security aspects of the mission and less on the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The CMOC personnel were primarily focused on delivery. This accentuated the gap between the CMOC and the headquarters. Another aspect which accentuated the gap is that the Mogadishu HOC served both as the National HOC and as the HOC for the Mogadishu HRS. The CMOC staff came from the JTF HQ and no one represented the Marine unit operating in Mogadishu. Thus in Mogadishu the military was insulated from the HRO community.<sup>62</sup>

The Somalia mission differed significantly from operations in Northern Iraq. Firstly the principal HROs were already established in the theater before the arrival of UNITAF. They already had functioning coordination mechanisms in place. Secondly the security mission was the primary task of the military force. This mission was particularly difficult since the belligerents continued to fight after the arrival of the force. Finally, although the military did play a role in the delivery of relief, the HROs maintained the lead role from the start. As a result the CMOC played more of a liaison function than an operations function. Seiple notes this with some disdain.<sup>63</sup> Operation Restore Hope is an example of an operation in which the HOC was a suitable coordination mechanism from the outset. The security environment was not benign and the majority of the effort of the JTF was placed upon the task of providing security to the AO. A number of the large HROs were in place at the outset and they were self-organized. There were two separate coordinating mechanisms, the UN led HOC and the NGO consortium. The military were

not critical to the delivery of assistance. The fact that the CMOC devolved into more of a liaison function is an indication of the effectiveness of the HOC in Somalia.

## **Bosnia**

Yugoslavia is a republic in southeastern Europe formed in the aftermath of World War II. From the end of that war until the early 1990s it consisted of six republics: Slovenia, at its northwestern border with Austria, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, in the southeast along the Greek border. Within Serbia there were also two autonomous provinces called Kosovo, in the south with a majority Albanian population, and Vojvodina, in the north with a large Hungarian population.<sup>64</sup>

The conflict in Bosnia had its immediate roots in the general break up of Yugoslavia. The process began in September 1987 when Slobodan Milosevic sided with Serbs in Kosovo against the majority Albanian population. In doing so he removed the foundation upon which the stability of the Yugoslav political system rested. "As a whole, the system could only function with two absolute political taboos: overt nationalism and the active participation of the masses in politics. It was these two taboos which Milosevic smashed in 1987."<sup>65</sup> He then set forth a process that unraveled the multi-ethnic fabric of Yugoslavia and plunged it into war.

The conflict in Kosovo was a step in his attempt to centralize the political power in Yugoslavia in the Serb Republic. Other republics wanted a further decentralization, most notably Slovenia. They held a referendum in December 1990 that authorized six months of negotiations. Without an agreement to resolve the dispute, Slovenia would be independent on June 25, 1991.<sup>66</sup>

In Croatia this nationalism was manifested overtly after the election of Franjo Tudjman and his party the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) in May 1990. Croatia voted for independence in a referendum in May 1991. Both Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in June.<sup>67</sup> The Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA) moved to prevent the secession of Slovenia and a ten-day war ensued. What was significant was that no other republic moved to support Slovenia in its fight.<sup>68</sup> The war in Croatia started slowly in July but became bitter as the fall went on. It finally ended with a cease-fire negotiated by former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, which came into effect on January 3rd, 1992. This cease-fire allowed the deployment of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to Croatia.<sup>69</sup>

Map of the Former Yugoslavia



Bitter ethnic division characterized the Yugoslav situation following the war in Croatia. The Croatian territory occupied by Serbs was adjacent to the western regions of Bosnia. Bosnia had been considered by the JNA as the rear area in the Croatian war. In the later stages of the war, Bosnians began stirring about independence. Serbs now saw the necessity of ensuring the security of the link between the Croatian Serbs and Serbia proper.<sup>70</sup>

A referendum approved independence for Bosnia in February 1992, a referendum that was boycotted by the Serb population. Tensions increased and erupted into war at the beginning of April. By May the UN Secretary-General received a report detailing the grim conditions caused by the massive displacement of civilians as a result of the fighting. "In Sarajevo alone, three to four hundred thousand people needed emergency relief."<sup>71</sup> Humanitarian assistance delivery began in Sarajevo at the beginning of July 1992. The mission of UNPROFOR in Bosnia was to support "efforts by the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular to provide protection, at UNHCR's request, where and when UNHCR considered such protection necessary."<sup>72</sup> The UNHCR representative in Sarajevo was a Chilean named Fabrizio Hochschild. At a meeting with the Bosnian Serb leadership on June 23rd, he explained the division of tasks between UNPROFOR and UNHCR. UNHCR would control the schedule of aircraft into the airport from Geneva and the local office would control the distribution within the city. UNPROFOR would secure the airport and the land corridors to the distribution sites.<sup>73</sup>

UNHCR was designated as the lead agency for the delivery of Humanitarian Assistance in the former Yugoslavia. Although this is the role for which the Department

of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) was created, UNDHA had just been established when the war in Bosnia erupted and it was not yet ready to conduct field operations. The complexity of the task in Bosnia subsequently caused the staff of UNHCR to wonder whether they had made a wise decision in accepting the role.<sup>74</sup> As the lead agency, UNHCR took on more responsibility than just delivering humanitarian assistance. It also fulfilled its traditional responsibility of caring for refugees and displaced persons. New roles included the restoration of the Bosnian infrastructure and the protection of persons before they become displaced, in an attempt to prevent the displacement. UNHCR also became the focal point for all UN agencies with an interest in the area.<sup>75</sup>

The UNHCR relationship with the military was not clearly defined. The strength of UNPROFOR made a relationship between the two essential to the completion of UNHCR's mission. UNHCR had little choice but to deal with UNPROFOR. Yet the relationship was not one of subordination of one to the other. Indeed the independence of the two was often the cause of difficulty. For example, in February 1993 the High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, suspended humanitarian operations in Eastern Bosnia because of the threats to the convoys in the area. The local military commander decided to proceed with the convoys that had already been planned. He only complied with the High Commissioner's direction when overruled by his own Force Commander in Zagreb.<sup>76</sup>

Although there was some friction in the relationship, it was a positive one. The contribution of the military to the relationship came in the form of the expertise the military possessed. In Sarajevo, they provided daily briefings at UN staff meetings that UNHCR found valuable. The information provided gave UNHCR an understanding of



the military operations and changes in the security situation within the AO. On a weekly basis these meetings were expanded to include non-UN agencies participating in the operation.<sup>77</sup> This meeting approximated what might be expected in a CMOC, but that was the extent of the similarity.

The main source of the expertise was more related to core military competencies. A principal task was the security that they provided to the humanitarian convoys. UNHCR was impressed by the cooperation that was gained by the mere presence of the military forces. The military airlift, which provided the initial relief to Sarajevo, was a key element to the military support. Engineer units were also deployed to assist in the restoration of civilian infrastructure.<sup>78</sup>

The military forces used liaison to coordinate their support to UNHCR. The Spanish Battalion occupied a sector in the southwest centered on the city of Mostar. The main task was to escort convoys to distribution centers in their sector and through their sector to central Bosnia. To support this, G5 deployed a liaison officer to the main UNHCR warehouse in Metkovic, Croatia. The liaison officer would send a request by fax to the G3 and G5 when UNHCR had a convoy that required escort. The G3 would plan the military support and the G5 would then coordinate with the belligerents for the passage of lines necessary. This liaison supplemented the weekly meetings and daily coordination conducted with UNHCR as was done in Sarajevo.<sup>79</sup>

There was no formal CMOC established by UNPROFOR in Bosnia and neither was there a HOC established by UNHCR. The coordination function was executed through the daily staff meetings and weekly meetings including the non-UN participants in the operation.

The mission in Bosnia can be characterized as being conducted in an environment that lacked the consent of the parties, resulting in a difficult security situation. With UNHCR in control of the relief operations, there was little confusion for UNPROFOR as to who was in control of the humanitarian aspects, despite the fact that it began from a standing start. It can be described as having high degree of HRO presence and self-organization, since UNHCR was acting as the lead agency. There was little involvement by the military in the delivery of assistance.

### Summary of Case Studies

The three case studies presented provide an insight into the operation of coordination mechanisms in humanitarian assistance operations. There was variety in the geographic, cultural and operational environments as well as the presence and organization of the HROs. These missions can be characterized according to the following table:

	Presence	Security	Organization	Military Conduct
Provide Comfort	Low (initially)	High	Low (initially)	High (Initially)
Restore Hope	High	Low	High	Low
Bosnia	Moderate	Low	Low	High

**Table 1 Comparison of Cases by Characteristics**


These characteristics can be exhibited in various combinations. Presence of HROs does not imply a secure environment. HROs have demonstrated their willingness to operate in dangerous conditions. Somalia had a relatively high degree of HRO presence. The HROs had been operating in the AO well before the arrival of any military

forces, although many had been absent for over a year. The security situation was clearly insecure. In Bosnia, the conflict developed quickly and became so severe that the AO was very insecure. The presence of UNHCR because of the previous conflicts in the area meant that HRO presence could be developed quickly and could just as quickly become organized.

On the other hand it would seem intuitive that there is a relationship between the degree of HRO organization and the extent to which military forces are involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In Somalia UNDHA had a HOC operating independently of UNITAF. Additionally the HROs also had the Consortium, coordinating their own efforts. The military were thus free to use their assets to conduct more traditional military tasks, such as providing security for the transport and distribution of the relief.

The strength of the CMOC is exhibited when the military are most firmly in control of the operation. This condition exists when the HROs are not organized and when the military is conducting the humanitarian assistance tasks. The presence of the HROs is related to the degree of organization they exhibit. An AO with a high presence of HROs without self-organization would still benefit from the presence of a CMOC. The security task is primarily a military mission and would be conducted regardless of the coordinating mechanism used for the humanitarian assistance.

Presented graphically, the relationships between the characteristics and the strengths of the two mechanisms can be depicted in this manner:



**Fig.1 HOC and CMOC Strengths**

### **Chapter 3 Analysis**

The functions of the CMOC have been described above as Coordinating, Communicating and Planning. These functions can be shared with a civilian coordinating mechanism. In order to identify how this should be done we will use the characteristics drawn from the historical analysis and judge the functions within that framework against three of the Principles of War, as interpreted in Canadian doctrine. The three principles are Selection and Maintenance of the Aim, Economy of Effort and Cooperation.

Selection and maintenance of the aim is the most important principle. “Every operation must have a single, attainable and clearly defined aim which remains the focus of the operation and towards which efforts are directed.”<sup>80</sup> While the HROs may not share this aim, the importance of selecting a military aim and maintaining that aim remains essential to the conduct of military operations. According to the principle of economy of effort, the “judicious expenditure of resources and balanced employment of forces” are key.<sup>81</sup> This implies that resources should not be duplicated upon the same or

similar tasks. “Cooperation is a function of cohesion. It entails a unified aim, team spirit interoperability” and coordination to achieve synergy in the conduct of operations.<sup>82</sup> The mechanism chosen to conduct the coordination must emphasize cooperation between the participants in the operation.

### **Selection and Maintenance of the Aim**

General Shalikashvili made clear in his presentation to Congress at the completion of Operation Provide Comfort that refugee camps which become permanent settlements, as they have for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, was the main thing that he sought to avoid in Northern Iraq.<sup>83</sup> In any humanitarian assistance operation, a speedy solution to the problem should be the overriding aim. Thus the military forces can say that the selection of the aim in a humanitarian assistance operation is relatively straightforward. The military aim should be to quickly relieve the source of the humanitarian emergency.

The solution to the problem may be extremely complex. In Somalia and Bosnia the ethnic divisions underlying the conflict were so severe that it was necessary to treat the symptoms. In the framework of the historical analysis above, this can be achieved by establishing a secure AO with high degree of HRO presence, an organized HRO structure and low military involvement in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This would be the environment that would allow the withdrawal of military forces and the assumption of all humanitarian assistance by civilian agencies. The coordination of humanitarian assistance by a CMOC does not support the achievement of this aim. Coordination by a HOC, or a HRO led coordination mechanism under another name, is the ultimate goal when the military gets involved in humanitarian assistance. Hence it is in the interest of

the military to encourage the establishment of a civilian coordination mechanism as early as possible in the mission.

The establishment of a CMOC was appropriate in Northern Iraq. At the outset both the presence of HROs and the degree of HRO organization in the AO was low. Additionally, the military was heavily involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Military air resources were used to bring the aid into the AO and military trucks to deliver it to the distribution sites. Military resources were used to construct the camps in Zakhu and to operate them initially. In all, military resources were the primary elements of the relief effort and thus military coordination is key. In this role the CMOC has a strong role in providing coordination. Yet even in Provide Comfort, the CA personnel saw the need to establish a civilian coordinating mechanism in order to ensure an orderly transition to HRO control.

### **Economy of Effort**

Essential to the principle of economy of effort is the avoidance of duplication of effort and of the expenditure of effort on unnecessary activities. In this way the use of a CMOC to coordinate humanitarian assistance also fails to support the principle except in the most extreme case of an immature theatre where HROs are not organized and the military forces are conducting the main tasks of delivering humanitarian assistance.

Initially in Iraq there was no coordination. The CMOC filled the void and performed the necessary functions. As the HROs became established and the NCCNI began to function, the importance of the CMOC diminished. By allowing the importance to diminish, the CMOC supported the overall aim of an early transfer of authority to civilian control.

In Somalia the CMOC duplicated some of the effort of the HOC and became separated from Tactical Operations Center (TOC) by its location at the UN headquarters. In fact it was unnecessary. It was absorbed into the HOC rather than functioning as an independent entity. The doctrinal role of the CMOC is to serve the CMO Officer at the military HQ. In Somalia, the CMOC became detached from the HQ it was supposed to be serving. A liaison element to the HOC would have been a more appropriate method of achieving coordination. As Seiple noted, that was the end result of the CMOC's role at the HOC location.<sup>84</sup>

In Bosnia the use of liaison officers was effective in providing the link to UNHCR. Since UNHCR was operating as the lead agency, coordination at the staff level was sufficient to provide the information interchange that would have been provided by the HOC, had one been established.

### **Cooperation**

The HROs are fiercely independent. Identification of the HRO effort with the military can be detrimental to the position of the HRO. The HROs rely on factional support, particularly if they work among only one of the factions. If that faction turns against the military force, the HRO's position could be undermined. Hence HROs will deliberately distance themselves from the military effort if they perceive that their support is being undermined.<sup>85</sup>

Despite their fierce independence, there are formal coordination mechanisms developing among HROs. The World Food Program (WFP) has signed a contract with a US HRO, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), whereby CRS conducts distribution of WFP relief. At the strategic level, the UN has established the Inter Agency Standing

Committee (IASC). The IASC is chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and includes representatives of the UN “big four”: the WFP, UNHCR, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the UN Development Program. Also included are the World Health Organization, the Food and Agricultural Organization, the ICRC, the International Organizations for Migrations (a Geneva based refugee organization) and representatives of European and US NGOs. The committee has improved communication but has been unable to plan or coordinate response effectively.<sup>86</sup>

When a HOC is established independent of the military HQ, it can create the distance required between the HROs and the military forces to allow cooperation to take place without identifying the HRO effort too greatly with the military forces. The use of liaison, as the CMOC became in Somalia or as was used in Mostar by the Spanish Battalion, can create the link that the military needs in order to ensure military operations are synchronized with the relief efforts.

In general, a civilian-led mechanism like a HOC is better suited to support the coordination of humanitarian assistance operations. It more directly support the aim of a resolution to the causes of the emergency, it economizes force by avoiding duplication between civilian and military efforts and it fosters cooperation between the military and the HROs to a greater degree.

## **Conclusion**



This monograph set out to examine the functions performed by the CMOC in the coordination of humanitarian assistance during peace operations. The questions asked were whether the CMOC constitutes a sufficient mechanism by which we can coordinate humanitarian assistance and, if it does, can it perform all the necessary functions.

The three functions that were identified from the analysis of doctrine were Communication, Coordination and Planning. Since the CMOC is a mission tailored organization, we cannot analyze the structure and evaluate its ability to perform these functions by limiting our analysis to the published doctrine. Its ability to perform these functions must be assessed by reviewing its performance in an operational environment. In three case studies, four characteristics were identified that defined the operational environment in which coordination of humanitarian assistance takes place.

The first characteristic is the presence of HROs in the AO. The case studies included Operation Provide Comfort, in which the HRO presence was low prior to the arrival of military forces, as well as Somalia and Bosnia, where the HROs had considerable presence and experience in the AO. The second characteristic is the degree of self-organization exhibited by the HROs present in the AO. In Provide Comfort there was little coordination initially while in Somalia the HROs were well organized. The third characteristic is the degree to which the military is involved in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In Provide Comfort there was extensive involvement, while Somalia and Bosnia saw most of the delivery conducted by civilian agencies. The final characteristic is the security of the AO after the arrival of military forces. The AO can be relatively benign as it was in Provide Comfort or it can be very insecure as it was in Somalia and Bosnia.

The question as to whether the CMOC can perform the three key functions can be answered simply. At the outset, Operation Provide Comfort was an example of the extreme case in which the military is in firm control of the operation. In this example the CMOC performed its tasks well. It was able to plan the establishment of the camps, provide communication amongst the HROs and coordinate activities with HROs and military forces. Hence the CMOC can perform the functions.

This then leads to the question of sufficiency. As measured against the three principles of war chosen, the CMOC is not sufficient. In Canadian peacekeeping doctrine, long term reconstruction is best served by the civilian organizations. The aim is thus to transfer a humanitarian assistance operation to civilian control. Similarly, General Shalikashvili's aim in Operation Provide Comfort was a rapid return of the refugees rather than a permanent resettlement. In order to allow the civilian operations to take control a civilian coordination mechanism, such as a HOC, must be established.

Given that a HOC is necessary to achieve the aim, the use of a CMOC in addition to a HOC is a duplication of effort and thus a violation of the second principle, Economy of Effort. In Somalia the CMOC became a liaison to the HOC in all but name. In Bosnia the Spanish Battalion employed liaison to achieve coordination with the UNHCR. If a CMOC duplicates the effort of the HOC or performs nothing more than a liaison function, it is better replaced by liaison.

Cooperation amongst the HROs must be one of the goals of coordination. A mechanism that fosters cooperation amongst the HROs should not be withdrawn with the withdrawal of military forces. Hence the establishment of a HOC better serves the principle of cooperation. Furthermore as some HROs are reluctant to be identified with

military forces, a HOC allows the coordination to take place while the separation from the military is maintained.

This does not imply that there is no role for the CMOC. Doctrinally the CMOC serves the CMO not the HROs. The extreme case was described as one in which the military is in firm control of the humanitarian assistance operation. In this case the HROs do not have a significant presence or have not developed any coordinating mechanism and there is extensive use of military resources in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In this case humanitarian assistance delivery begins to resemble Civil-Military Operations. This is one of the doctrinal tasks of Civil Affairs in the US Army and the CMOC has a role to play in coordinating those efforts. This was the case at the outset of Operation Provide Comfort. Although the doctrine for a CMOC did not exist in 1991, the CMOC that was established perform the functions well. As those two key characteristics changed and the HROs developed presence and organization the coordination role was transferred to the NCCNI, a civilian led mechanism.

The role of coordinating humanitarian assistance delivery in peace operations is best served by a civilian led mechanism. Only in the extreme case of firm military control and the absence of HRO organization is the CMOC a sufficient mechanism to coordinate the efforts.

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## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> There is a nomenclature difficulty affecting this subject. Humanitarian relief is provided by a variety of organizations. Some are agencies of governments such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID) or the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). There are UN organizations such as the World Food Program (WFP) and the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Privately funded organizations can be international, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), or nationally based. These nationally based organizations are normally called Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in most of the world or Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs) in the US. Not all NGOs exist to provide humanitarian assistance. Some, like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, provide human rights monitoring. For the purposes of this monograph, organizations of all types that provide humanitarian assistance will be referred to as Humanitarian Relief Organizations (HROs).

<sup>2</sup> Chris Seiple, *The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions*, (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, 1996), 33.

<sup>3</sup> *Operations Land and Tactical Air- Volume 3 Peacekeeping Operations (CFP 301-3)*, (Ottawa: Canadian Armed Forces, 1995) on Lessons Learned Information Warehouse Version 8 [CD-ROM], Kingston, Ontario: Army Lessons Learned Centre, September 1998.

<sup>4</sup> *Canada's Army: We Stand On Guard for Thee (CFP 300)*, (Ottawa: Canadian Armed Forces 1998), 96-99. In Canadian Doctrine, the principles of war apply equally to the conduct of operations other than war. Canadian doctrine sees the principles of war as the basis for the conduct of all operations. Each type of operation has specific fundamentals, which distinguishes it from other types of operations.

<sup>5</sup> *CFP 300-3*, Chap 1, Section 3, para 8.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* All of these quotes come from the same paragraph. This paragraph establishes the approach taken by the Canadian Armed Forces toward the provision of humanitarian assistance.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Chap 3, Sect 6, para 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Chap 3 Sect 6, para 4.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, Chap 3 Sect 6, para 7.

<sup>10</sup> *FM 41-10 Civil-Military Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1985), 1-2.

<sup>11</sup> *FM 41-10 Civil-Military Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1993), 10-17 to 10-20.

<sup>12</sup> *FM 41-10(ID) Civil-Military Operations (Initial Draft)*, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1997), 4-5.

<sup>13</sup> *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Joint Warfighting Center, 1997) II-8. Also JP 3.08 *Interagency Cooperation During Joint Operations Volume I on Peace Operations* [CD-ROM], Washington, D.C.: Joint Warfighting Center, 1997.

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<sup>14</sup> *FM41-10(ID)*, 4-6.

<sup>15</sup> *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, II-8 to II-11, Also *FM41-10(ID)*, 4-6.

<sup>16</sup> *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations*, II-10.

<sup>17</sup> *FM41-10(ID)*, 4-7.

<sup>18</sup> Steven Wolfson and Neill Wright, *Working with the Military*, (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 1994).

<sup>19</sup> Steven Wolfson and Neill Wright, *A UNHCR Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations*, (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 1995), v on Peace Operations [CD-ROM], Washington, D.C.: Joint Warfighting Center, 1997.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

<sup>21</sup> Wolfson, 41.

<sup>22</sup> Lieutenant-General John M. Shalikashvili, *DOD Relief for Kurds in Iraq*, from hearings before Defense Policy Panel on the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 102d Congress, 1st Session, Hearings, Sept 4-6 1991 quoted in *DJMO Selected Readings Book, Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting II, Modules 3-6*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1997), 39.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>25</sup> Seiple, 32.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>27</sup> AFFOR is a US term that designates this as a service component under a Joint Task Force. All US Air Force elements in support of the operation were subordinated to the commander of the AFFOR.

<sup>28</sup> Shalikashvili, 44.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 40-43.

<sup>30</sup> Seiple, 36.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>34</sup> Seiple, 36-37.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

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<sup>36</sup> *354<sup>th</sup> Civil Affairs Brigade's Participation in Operation Provide Comfort in Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War: A Symposium held October 25-27 1991*, (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: US Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School), 350.

<sup>37</sup> *Operational Summary Report of Actions by the 96<sup>th</sup> Civil Affairs Battalion (Abn) during Operations Desert Shield/Storm/Provide Comfort in Civil Affairs in the Persian Gulf War: A Symposium held October 25-27 1991*, (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: US Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School), 445.

<sup>38</sup> Seiple, 39.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 40.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 49 and 44.

<sup>43</sup> Operation Provide Comfort did not end in June 1991 when the camps were turned over to UNHCR. It remains an active mission of the US Army, but its current activities have no bearing on this discussion.

<sup>44</sup> *United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 733*, 23 January 1992, Available Gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/undocs/scd/scouncil/s92/8.

<sup>45</sup> *United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 751*, 24 April 1992, Available Gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/undocs/scd/scouncil/s92/26.

<sup>46</sup> William J. Durch, "Introduction to Anarchy: Intervention in Somalia", in *UN Peacekeeping, American policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1996) 319 The origins of the war in Somalia are complex, particularly because of the complex nature of the Somali clan society and the effects of colonialism and Cold War politics upon that society. This summary is provided in order to set the discussion in context.

<sup>47</sup> It is difficult to discuss Somalia without drawing some conclusion about success or failure and making comment about mission creep. This is, however, the intent here. Those issues are of a strategic nature and do not bear directly on the operation of the CMOC.

<sup>48</sup> Durch, 313-314.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 314.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 314-315.

<sup>51</sup> Seiple, 111 and 115.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 110.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 113.

<sup>54</sup> *United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 794*, 3 December 1992, Available Gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/undocs/scd/scouncil/s92/69.

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<sup>55</sup> Durch, 320.

<sup>56</sup> Jonathon T Dworken, *Coordinating Relief Operations*, Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1995, 16.

<sup>57</sup> Seiple, 113.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 114.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 115.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 120.

<sup>62</sup> Shalikashvili, 18-19.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 118.

<sup>64</sup> Lenard J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia*, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado. 1993, 13 and 21-26. Cohen provides an explanation of the rise and fall of the idea of Yugoslavia from 1830 to 1991.

<sup>65</sup> Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, Penguin Books, New York, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition, 1996, 32. The background to the war in the former Yugoslavia is even more complex than the one in Somalia. The details of the background have come from four principal sources. I have footnoted the source from which a particular argument or conclusion has been drawn in each paragraph.

<sup>66</sup> Mark Almond, *Europe's Backyard War: The War in the Balkans*, Mandarin Paperbacks, Reading, Great Britain, 1994, 25-28.

<sup>67</sup> Glenny, 87-88.

<sup>68</sup> Almond, 213.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 230-231.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 265.

<sup>71</sup> Anthony Parsons, *From Cold War to Hot Peace: UN Interventions 1947-1995*, Penguin Books, London. 1995, 228-229.

<sup>72</sup> Susan R. Lamb, "The UN Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia", in *A Crisis of Expectations: UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s*, Westview Press, Boulder Colorado. 1995, 70.

<sup>73</sup> Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, *Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo*, (Vancouver, Douglas & MacIntyre, 1993), 229.

<sup>74</sup> Larry Minear et al, *Humanitarian Action in the Former Yugoslavia: The UN's Role 1991-1993*, The Thomas G. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Providence RI. 1994 p. 26 on *Peace Operations* [CD-ROM], Washington, D.C.: Joint Warfighting Center, 1997.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., 43.

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 88.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 83.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., 84.

<sup>79</sup> Lieutenant-Colonel Carlos de Salas, G5 Spanish Battalion, UNPROFOR, March to October 1993, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 2 December 1998.

<sup>80</sup> *CFP 300*, 96.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 98.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Shalikashvili, 43.

<sup>84</sup> Seiple, 118.

<sup>85</sup> Hugo Slim, "The Stretcher and the Drum: Civil Military Relations in Peace Support Operations", in *Beyond the Emergency: Development Within UN Peace Missions*, (London: Frank Cass, 1997) 131.

<sup>86</sup> Andrew S. Natsios, "NGOs and the UN System in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies", in *NGOs The UN & Global Governance*, Thomas G. Weiss & Leon Gordenker eds., Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado. 1996, 75.



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